

BP-18 Rate Proceeding

Final Proposal

Power Market Price Study and Documentation

BP-18-FS-BPA-04

July 2017



**POWER MARKET PRICE STUDY
and DOCUMENTATION**

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COMMONLY USED ACRONYMS AND SHORT FORMS

AAC	Anticipated Accumulation of Cash
ACNR	Accumulated Calibrated Net Revenue
ACS	Ancillary and Control Area Services
AF	Advance Funding
AFUDC	Allowance for Funds Used During Construction
aMW	average megawatt(s)
ANR	Accumulated Net Revenues
ASC	Average System Cost
BAA	Balancing Authority Area
BiOp	Biological Opinion
BPA	Bonneville Power Administration
Bps	basis points
Btu	British thermal unit
CIP	Capital Improvement Plan
CIR	Capital Investment Review
CDQ	Contract Demand Quantity
CGS	Columbia Generating Station
CHWM	Contract High Water Mark
CNR	Calibrated Net Revenue
COB	California-Oregon border
COE	U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
COI	California-Oregon Intertie
Commission	Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
Corps	U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
COSA	Cost of Service Analysis
COU	consumer-owned utility
Council	Northwest Power and Conservation Council
CP	Coincidental Peak
CRAC	Cost Recovery Adjustment Clause
CSP	Customer System Peak
CT	combustion turbine
CY	calendar year (January through December)
DD	Dividend Distribution
DDC	Dividend Distribution Clause
<i>dec</i>	decrease, decrement, or decremental
DERBS	Dispatchable Energy Resource Balancing Service
DFS	Diurnal Flattening Service
DNR	Designated Network Resource
DOE	Department of Energy
DOI	Department of Interior
DSI	direct-service industrial customer or direct-service industry
DSO	Dispatcher Standing Order
EE	Energy Efficiency
EIM	Energy imbalance market

EIS	Environmental Impact Statement
EN	Energy Northwest, Inc.
ESA	Endangered Species Act
ESS	Energy Shaping Service
e-Tag	electronic interchange transaction information
FBS	Federal base system
FCRPS	Federal Columbia River Power System
FCRTS	Federal Columbia River Transmission System
FELCC	firm energy load carrying capability
FOIA	Freedom Of Information Act
FORS	Forced Outage Reserve Service
FPS	Firm Power and Surplus Products and Services
FPT	Formula Power Transmission
FY	fiscal year (October through September)
G&A	general and administrative (costs)
GARD	Generation and Reserves Dispatch (computer model)
GMS	Grandfathered Generation Management Service
GSP	Generation System Peak
GSR	Generation Supplied Reactive
GRSPs	General Rate Schedule Provisions
GTA	General Transfer Agreement
GWh	gigawatthour
HLH	Heavy Load Hour(s)
HOSS	Hourly Operating and Scheduling Simulator (computer model)
HYDSIM	Hydrosystem Simulator (computer model)
IE	Eastern Intertie
IM	Montana Intertie
<i>inc</i>	increase, increment, or incremental
IOU	investor-owned utility
IP	Industrial Firm Power
IPR	Integrated Program Review
IR	Integration of Resources
IRD	Irrigation Rate Discount
IRM	Irrigation Rate Mitigation
IRPL	Incremental Rate Pressure Limiter
IS	Southern Intertie
kcf/s	thousand cubic feet per second
kW	kilowatt
kWh	kilowatthour
LDD	Low Density Discount
LGIA	Large Generator Interconnection Agreement
LLH	Light Load Hour(s)
LPP	Large Project Program
LPTAC	Large Project Targeted Adjustment Charge
LTF	Long-term Form
Maf	million acre-feet

Mid-C	Mid-Columbia
MMBtu	million British thermal units
MNR	Modified Net Revenue
MRNR	Minimum Required Net Revenue
MW	megawatt
MWh	megawatthour
NCP	Non-Coincidental Peak
NEPA	National Environmental Policy Act
NERC	North American Electric Reliability Corporation
NFB	National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) Federal Columbia River Power System (FCRPS) Biological Opinion (BiOp)
NLSL	New Large Single Load
NMFS	National Marine Fisheries Service
NOAA Fisheries	National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration Fisheries
NOB	Nevada-Oregon border
NORM	Non-Operating Risk Model (computer model)
Northwest Power Act	Pacific Northwest Electric Power Planning and Conservation Act
NP-15	North of Path 15
NPCC	Pacific Northwest Electric Power and Conservation Planning Council
NPV	net present value
NR	New Resource Firm Power
NRFS	NR Resource Flattening Service
NT	Network Integration
NTSA	Non-Treaty Storage Agreement
NUG	non-utility generation
NWPP	Northwest Power Pool
OATT	Open Access Transmission Tariff
O&M	operation and maintenance
OATI	Open Access Technology International, Inc.
OS	Oversupply
OY	operating year (August through July)
PDCI	Pacific DC Intertie
Peak	Peak Reliability (assessment/charge)
PF	Priority Firm Power
PFp	Priority Firm Public
PFx	Priority Firm Exchange
PNCA	Pacific Northwest Coordination Agreement
PNRR	Planned Net Revenues for Risk
PNW	Pacific Northwest
POD	Point of Delivery
POI	Point of Integration or Point of Interconnection
POR	Point of Receipt
Project Act	Bonneville Project Act
PS	Power Services
PSC	power sales contract

PSW	Pacific Southwest
PTP	Point to Point
PUD	public or people's utility district
PW	WECC and Peak Service
RAM	Rate Analysis Model (computer model)
RCD	Regional Cooperation Debt
RD	Regional Dialogue
REC	Renewable Energy Certificate
Reclamation	U.S. Bureau of Reclamation
RDC	Reserves Distribution Clause
REP	Residential Exchange Program
REPSIA	REP Settlement Implementation Agreement
RevSim	Revenue Simulation Model
RFA	Revenue Forecast Application (database)
RHWM	Rate Period High Water Mark
ROD	Record of Decision
RPSA	Residential Purchase and Sale Agreement
RR	Resource Replacement
RRS	Resource Remarketing Service
RSC	Resource Shaping Charge
RSS	Resource Support Services
RT1SC	RHWM Tier 1 System Capability
SCD	Scheduling, System Control, and Dispatch rate
SCS	Secondary Crediting Service
SDD	Short Distance Discount
SILS	Southeast Idaho Load Service
Slice	Slice of the System (product)
T1SFCO	Tier 1 System Firm Critical Output
TCMS	Transmission Curtailment Management Service
TGT	Townsend-Garrison Transmission
TOCA	Tier 1 Cost Allocator
TPP	Treasury Payment Probability
TRAM	Transmission Risk Analysis Model
Transmission System Act	Federal Columbia River Transmission System Act
Treaty	Columbia River Treaty
TRL	Total Retail Load
TRM	Tiered Rate Methodology
TS	Transmission Services
TSS	Transmission Scheduling Service
UAI	Unauthorized Increase
UFT	Use of Facilities Transmission
UIC	Unauthorized Increase Charge
ULS	Unanticipated Load Service
USACE	U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
USBR	U.S. Bureau of Reclamation
USFWS	U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service

VERBS	Variable Energy Resources Balancing Service
VOR	Value of Reserves
VR1-2014	First Vintage Rate of the BP-14 rate period (PF Tier 2 rate)
VR1-2016	First Vintage Rate of the BP-16 rate period (PF Tier 2 rate)
WECC	Western Electricity Coordinating Council
WSPP	Western Systems Power Pool

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1
2
3 **1. INTRODUCTION**

4 **1.1 Purpose of the Power Market Price Study**

5 The Power Market Price Study explains the development of the power market price forecast,
6 which incorporates natural gas pricing uncertainty and varying hydrology and load expectations.

7 The power market price is used to forecast the value of secondary sales, the cost of anticipated
8 balancing purchase and system augmentation purchases, Load Shaping and Demand rates, and
9 the distribution of net revenues used to evaluate risk, among other values used in BPA's
10 ratemaking. This Study includes BPA's natural gas price forecast and electricity market price
11 forecast. In previous rate proposals the Power Market Price Study and the Power Risk Study
12 were included in the same document (*e.g.*, BP-16-FS-BPA-04). For BP-18 the Market Price
13 Study is separate, and the Power and Transmission risk studies are included in the same
14 document, BP-18-FS-BPA-05.

15 **1.2 How Market Price Results Are Used**

16 Projections of market prices for electricity are used for many aspects of setting power rates,
17 including the quantitative analysis of risk presented in the Power and Transmission Risk Study,
18 BP-18-FS-BPA-05. The Risk Study applies this distribution of future price expectations to
19 BPA's net position to quantify risk surrounding rate levels to reflect the uncertainty in cost
20 recovery inherent in the volatility of market price fundamentals.

21
22 Forecasts of electricity market prices are used in the Power Rates Study, BP-18-FS-BPA-01, in
23 the calculations of:

- 24 • Prices for secondary energy sales and balancing power purchases
- 25 • Prices for augmentation purchases

- 1 • Load Shaping rates
- 2 • Load Shaping True-Up rate
- 3 • Resource Shaping rates
- 4 • Resource Support Services (RSS) rates
- 5 • Priority Firm Power (PF), Industrial Firm Power (IP), and New Resource Firm Power
- 6 (NR) demand rates
- 7 • PF Tier 2 Balancing Credit
- 8 • PF Unused Rate Period High Water Mark (RHWM) Credit
- 9 • PF Tier 1 Equivalent rates
- 10 • PF Melded rates
- 11 • Balancing Augmentation Credit
- 12 • IP energy rates
- 13 • NR energy rates
- 14 • Energy Shaping Service (ESS) for New Large Single Load (NLSL) True-Up rate

2. FORECASTING MARKET PRICES

2.1 AURORAxmp[®]

BPA uses the AURORAxmp[®] (version 12.1.1043) model to forecast electricity market prices. For all assumptions other than those stated in Section 2.3 of this Study, the model uses data provided by the developer, EPIS Inc., in the database labeled North American DB 2016v5. AURORAxmp[®] uses a linear program to minimize the cost of meeting load in the Western Electricity Coordinating Council (WECC), subject to a number of operating constraints. Given the solution (an output level for all generating resources and a flow level for all interties), the price at any hub is the cost, including wheeling and losses, of delivering a unit of power from the least-cost available resource. This cost approximates the price of electricity by assuming that all resources are centrally dispatched (the equivalent of cost-minimization in production theory) and that the marginal cost of producing electricity approximates the price.

2.1.1 Operating Risk Models

Uncertainty in each of the following variables is modeled as independent:

- WECC Loads
- Natural Gas Price
- Regional Hydroelectric Generation
- Pacific Northwest (PNW) Hourly Wind Generation
- Columbia Generating Station (CGS) Generation
- PNW Hourly Intertie Availability

Each statistical model calibrates to historical data and employs Monte Carlo simulation to generate a distribution of future outcomes. Each realization from the joint distribution of these models constitutes one game and serves as input to AURORAxmp[®]. Where applicable, that

1 game also serves as input to BPA's Revenue Simulation model (RevSim). The prices from
2 AURORAxmp[®], combined with the generation and expenses from RevSim, constitute one net
3 revenue game. Each risk model may not generate 3,200 games, and where necessary a bootstrap
4 is used to produce a full distribution of 3,200 games. Each of the 3,200 draws from the joint
5 distribution is identified uniquely such that each combination of load, hydrology, and other
6 conditions is consistently applied between AURORAxmp[®] prices and RevSim inventory levels.

7 8 **2.2 R Statistical Software**

9 The risk models used in AURORAxmp[®] were developed in R (www.r-project.org), an
10 open-source statistical software environment that compiles on several platforms. It is released
11 under the GNU General Public License (GPL), an operating system that is free software.

12 R supports the development of risk models through an object-oriented, functional scripting
13 environment; that is, it provides an interface for managing proprietary risk models and has a
14 native random number generator useful for sampling distributions from any kernel. For the
15 various risk models, the historical data is processed in R, the risk models are calibrated, and the
16 risk distributions for input into AURORAxmp[®] are generated in a unified environment.

17 18 **2.3 AURORAxmp[®] Model Inputs**

19 AURORAxmp[®] produces a single electricity price forecast as a function of its inputs. Thus,
20 producing a given number of price forecasts requires that AURORAxmp[®] be run that same
21 number of times using different inputs. Risk models provide inputs to AURORAxmp[®], and the
22 resulting distribution of market price forecasts represents a quantitative measure of market price
23 risk. As described in the Power and Transmission Risk Study, BP-18-FS-BPA-05, 3,200
24 independent games from the joint distribution of the risk models serve as the basis for the 3,200
25 market price forecasts. The monthly Heavy Load Hour (HLH) and Light Load Hour (LLH)

1 electricity prices constitute the market price forecast. Because AURORAxmp[®] is an hourly
2 model, the monthly prices in AURORAxmp[®] are the simple average of the simulated hourly
3 prices for that diurnal period. The following subsections describe the various inputs and risk
4 models used in AURORAxmp[®].

6 **2.3.1 Natural Gas Prices Used in AURORAxmp[®]**

7 The price of natural gas is the predominant factor in determining the dispatch cost of a natural
8 gas-fired power generation plant. When natural gas-fired resources are the marginal unit (the
9 least-cost available generator to supply an incremental unit of energy), the price of natural gas
10 influences the price of electricity. Due to natural gas plants' frequent position as the marginal
11 resource in the Pacific Northwest, rising natural gas prices will typically translate into an
12 increase in the market price for electricity (and vice versa). This effect varies seasonally; for
13 example, electricity prices are much less sensitive to the price of natural gas in spring months,
14 when hydroelectric generation is typically on the margin, whereas in the winter gas-fired
15 generation is typically on the margin and electricity prices are strongly correlated with the
16 prevailing price of natural gas.

18 **2.3.1.1 Methodology for Deriving AURORAxmp[®] Zone Natural Gas Prices**

19 Each natural gas plant modeled in AURORAxmp[®] operates using fuel priced at a natural gas hub
20 according to the zone in which it is located. Each zone is a geographic subset of the WECC.

22 The foundation of natural gas prices in AURORAxmp[®] is the price at Henry Hub, a trading hub
23 near Erath, Louisiana. Cash prices at Henry Hub are the primary reference point for the North
24 American natural gas market.

1 Though Henry Hub is the point of reference for natural gas markets, AURORA^{xmp}[®] uses prices
2 for 11 gas trading hubs in the WECC. The prices at hubs other than Henry are derived using
3 their basis differentials (differences in prices between Henry Hub and the hub in question). Basis
4 differentials reflect differences in the regional costs of supplying gas to meet demand after
5 accounting for regional heterogeneity, including pipeline constraints, pipeline costs, regional
6 production costs, and storage levels. The 11 Western hubs represent regional demand areas as
7 well as three major supply basins that are the source for most of the natural gas delivered in the
8 western United States.

9
10 Figure 1 shows the location of the 11 Western hubs. The forecast of basis differentials is derived
11 from recent historical price differentials between Henry Hub and each of the other 11 trading
12 hubs, along with projections of regional supply and demand. Sumas, Washington, is the primary
13 hub for the delivery of gas from the Western Canada Sedimentary Basin (WCSB) into western
14 Washington and western Oregon. The Opal, Wyoming, hub represents the collection of Rocky
15 Mountain supply basins that supply gas to the Pacific Northwest and California. The San Juan
16 Basin has its own hub, which primarily delivers gas to southern California. AECO, the primary
17 trading hub in Alberta, Canada, is the main benchmark for Canadian gas prices. Kingsgate is
18 another gateway for WCSB gas and is the hub that is associated with the demand center in
19 Spokane, Washington. Two eastern Oregon hub locations, Stanfield and Malin, are included
20 because major pipelines intersect at those locations. Pacific Gas and Electric (PG&E) Citygate
21 represents demand centers in northern California. Topock, Arizona, and Ehrenberg, Arizona,
22 represent intermediary locations between the San Juan Basin and demand centers in Southern
23 California. With respect to the basis differential forecast, the same price is used for both of these
24 Arizona hubs, as they serve largely the same purpose and share the same underlying

1 fundamentals. Finally, Southern California Citygate represents demand centers in southern
2 California.

3
4 Once a forecast is prepared for the trading hubs' basis values, AURORAxmp[®] assigns a forecast
5 to each zone. Sumas, AECO, Kingsgate, Stanfield, Malin, and PG&E Citygate hubs are
6 associated with zones in the Pacific Northwest, Northern California, and Canada. The Opal hub
7 is associated with zones in Montana, Idaho, Wyoming, and Utah. San Juan, Topock, Ehrenberg,
8 and Southern California Citygate hubs are associated with zones in Nevada, Southern California,
9 Arizona, and New Mexico.

11 **2.3.1.2 Recent Natural Gas Market Fundamentals**

12 Gas prices have varied substantially over time and most recently have been at the low end of
13 recent historical values. *See Figure 2.* U.S. natural gas production for 2016 declined relative to
14 2015, on an annual basis. The expectation is that 2017 annual average production will be
15 roughly equal to the 2016 annual production level, but the trajectory of production across the
16 year is expected to be different in 2017: production declined throughout 2016, but is expected to
17 increase throughout 2017. Throughout 2015 and 2016, the marginal cost of natural gas
18 production continued to drop because advances in technology improved the efficiency of
19 production in all phases, including exploration, drilling, and well stimulation. Producers are
20 focusing on the most easily attainable resources by drilling longer, better targeted, lateral wells to
21 increase rig efficiencies and decrease costs.

22
23 In 2016 the market reached sufficiently low prices and rig count levels such that, despite
24 efficiency gains, production significantly declined; 2016 averaged about 1.67 billion cubic feet
25 per day [Bcf/d] less than 2015. *See Figure 3.* Now production needs to increase again in order

1 to match demand. The turnaround in 2017 is expected to be fueled by two main sources of gas:
2 associated gas—a byproduct of oil production in certain oil plays (a play being a defined
3 geographic location where natural gas can be recovered from the underlying geology) that has
4 virtually no cost—and Appalachian shale gas, which is recoverable at very low cost. Therefore,
5 fundamental cost drivers on the supply side remain low.

6
7 The winter of 2013–2014 created record demand due to cold weather and lagging supply that led
8 to a record pace of storage withdrawals and the highest prices in the shale gas era. The supply
9 response was swift and strong. Production powered through a colder than normal winter in
10 2014–2015, and storage entered the 2015–2016 withdrawal season at the all-time record high
11 level of 4,009 Bcf of natural gas. Storage proceeded to exit the withdrawal season at another all-
12 time record high of 2,473 Bcf, setting the stage for low prices and attempts at producer restraint
13 in 2016. *See* Figure 4.

14
15 In 2016 the market rebalanced, and is now even considered short by many market experts.
16 Average daily production is expected to be less than average daily demand in 2017. This should
17 result in both the increasing price of natural gas and increasing rig counts. It is expected that
18 through the remainder of FY 2017, and through FY 2018, production will rise to match demand,
19 and they will then stay roughly in balance leaving natural gas prices relatively stable. As the rate
20 period progresses into FY 2019, supply should slowly surpass demand, leading to slightly lower
21 prices in FY 2019 than in FY 2018.

22 23 **2.3.1.3 Henry Hub Forecast**

24 The average of the monthly forecast of Henry Hub prices is \$3.12 per million British thermal
25 units (MMBtu) during FY 2018 and \$3.00/MMBtu during FY 2019. *See* Table 1.

1 Depending on the makeup of supply—from associated gas to dry gas and wet gas—gas prices
2 should eventually settle out at the long-run marginal cost of natural gas production. It is
3 estimated that, assuming normal weather, supply will continue to lag demand in FY 2017 and
4 balance should be reached by, or in, FY 2018. However, it is expected that supply will again
5 exceed demand in FY 2019. Given marginal production cost estimates in the industry today and
6 assuming that the market can remain close to equilibrium long-run marginal cost, prices in the
7 FY 2018–2019 rate period are expected to average in the high \$2.00/MMBtu to low
8 \$3.00/MMBtu range.

9
10 There are many supply-side pressures keeping gas price expectations from rising above this
11 level. In the current natural gas market, low-cost and highly productive plays are expanding
12 production to meet additional calls on natural gas supply, and the expansion of this low-cost
13 resource base is displacing higher-cost marginal resources. By bringing more very low-cost
14 resources into the supply mix, the price expectation at almost all levels of production is adjusted
15 downward in the forecast.

16
17 The Marcellus and Utica gas plays, located in the Appalachian region of the United States, have
18 become a dominant story in the natural gas landscape. They have low breakeven costs, they
19 have shown that they can ramp up production levels quickly, and they are located close to
20 premium Northeast U.S. (NE) markets. Given their historical performance, it is reasonable to
21 expect that these plays will be able to increase production quickly and inexpensively in the future
22 to meet incremental calls from demand. The major barrier for these NE plays is take-away
23 pipeline capacity. While there is ample capacity scheduled to come online through 2019, there is
24 always the potential for unforeseen delays and cancellations to hamper the ability of NE gas to
25 expand production and seize market share.

1 On the other side of the continent, WCSB gas has also shown itself to be resilient to the low-
2 price environment. With a large amount of natural gas produced almost as a byproduct from
3 extracting natural gas liquids (condensate) for Canadian oil-sand processing and transport, this
4 persistent and cheap supply has pushed down into the Pacific Northwest and east into the
5 Rockies as well as down from Canada into the Midwestern United States.

6
7 Associated gas out of the Permian, located in west Texas and southeast New Mexico, has arisen
8 as an unexpectedly large source of incremental natural gas production. The Permian is primarily
9 an oil play and returns on investment are quite large, given current oil prices. Producers have
10 responded by adding rigs to the region to the point that market experts are expecting associated
11 gas volumes to soon exceed the already large capacity of existing takeaway pipeline
12 infrastructure.

13
14 Growth in gas produced in the Marcellus and Utica plays, the WCSB, and in association with oil
15 extraction in the U.S. is expected to prove sufficient to maintain the low prices the markets have
16 come to expect from the U.S. shale gas era. Production and supply are expected to remain strong
17 and capable of meeting incremental demand without significant price increases through the
18 BP-18 rate period.

19
20 Although these supply-side pressures are significant, when forecasting Henry Hub prices it is
21 important to consider demand as well. In response to low prices, the FY 2017–2019 timeframe
22 shows the potential for significant long-term demand growth in liquefied natural gas (LNG)
23 exports, Mexican exports, and the industrial sector. Sources of demand such as gas burn for
24 power generation and LNG spot market transactions should function as the primary demand-side
25 levers for making short-term adjustments to balance the market. If demand growth outpaces

1 supply growth, storage levels will decrease and Henry Hub prices will likely increase to the point
2 that natural gas-fired generation will become less cost-effective and be priced out of the market
3 in favor of less expensive coal generation, thereby reducing demand. Conversely, if supply
4 growth outpaces demand, natural gas prices will fall to lower the costs of natural gas-fired
5 generation, pricing it into the market and raising demand. LNG export capacity not secured in
6 long-term contracts should serve a similar function as export capacity is priced in and out of the
7 global natural gas market.

8
9 Looking forward, exports are expected to make up an increasingly significant portion of overall
10 natural gas demand. For LNG exports from the U.S., 2016 was a big year. The Sabine Pass
11 LNG terminal sent out its first cargo in February and provided up to 1.3 Bcf/d of incremental
12 demand (once Train 2 ramped up). Through 2019, LNG exports could grow to total 3 Bcf/d, or
13 more.

14
15 The Mexican natural gas extraction industry is currently reforming to a more deregulated
16 environment, with the specified aim of opening up the industry to the private sector. Into the
17 foreseeable future the U.S. is likely to provide significant amounts of gas to the Mexican
18 marketplace. About 1 Bcf/d or more of incremental exports are expected through FY 2019.

19
20 Another category of major demand growth is industrial sector demand. To date, industrial
21 demand has been slow to recover from the recession. However, recent low natural gas prices
22 have inspired growth in industries using natural gas or its byproducts as feedstock. A lag
23 between a price change and induced demand is generally expected in the industrial component of
24 natural gas demand, because investment decisions require implementation time. Due to this lag,
25 the industrial sector was not able to provide any meaningful price support in the FY 2015 and

1 FY 2016 period. It is expected that investment decisions will begin to induce industrial demand
2 growth during the BP-18 rate period, with projections ranging between 1 and 2 Bcf/d of growth
3 through FY 2019.

4
5 Natural gas demand for power burn reached record levels in 2016, helping to absorb excess gas
6 supply. Where possible, to maximize efficiencies and take advantage of low natural gas fuel
7 costs, coal generating units were shut down and gas generating units fired up in their place. As
8 natural gas prices rise through FY 2017 and FY 2018, and the costs of operating natural gas
9 plants also rise, some coal units will work their way back into the generating stack, reducing
10 natural gas demand for power burn. However, coal and nuclear retirements through the duration
11 of the rate period will continue to provide the opportunity to maintain or increase natural gas
12 baseload demand. Because gas demand for power burn has been at such elevated levels, and
13 rising gas prices and increasing renewable energy penetration (which lower gas demand) can
14 oppose the effect of retirements of competing fuel generating resources (coal and nuclear power
15 plants), industry opinion is split on whether gas demand for power burn will increase or decrease
16 through the rate period. Demand at its existing levels can be assumed to support Henry Hub
17 prices.

18
19 Demand growth from these categories, combined with other organic growth, should prove
20 sufficient to balance the market through the first year of the rate period (FY 2018). However,
21 balance depends on both sides of the supply and demand equation. Risks to the forecast balance
22 are risks to expected prices. Unexpected activities or shocks to either side could send prices
23 higher or lower than the forecast. General sources of risk are weather, legislative action that
24 restricts (or promotes) the gas industry, and lack of producer restraint.

1 Risks to forecasted demand vary by the demand category. Risks to industrial demand center on
2 continued recovery from the recession. Risks to LNG exports depend on a combination of global
3 gas markets and local pricing. Risks to the expectation of continued strong natural gas demand
4 for power burn center on any carbon legislation, the future of the U.S. coal industry, and policy
5 support for renewable resources.

6
7 The upward risks to the Henry Hub price forecast are tempered by the abundant supply of gas
8 available at low prices, and the downward risks are tempered by the real (albeit declining) cost of
9 extraction. Price movements in the natural gas market will elicit supply-side responses to help
10 balance the market. Further price risk moderation and market balancing is provided on the
11 demand-side by the flexibility and price sensitivity of gas burn for power demand and LNG
12 exports. All of these factors should combine to keep prices rangebound, while allowing for some
13 natural deviations, around \$3.00/MMBtu through FY 2019.

14 15 **2.3.1.4 The Basis Differential Forecast**

16 Table 1 shows the basis differential forecast for the 11 trading hubs in the Western U.S. used by
17 AURORAxmp[®]. The location of natural gas production growth can dramatically change basis
18 relationships as traditional pipeline flows are altered and even reversed. Production levels in the
19 Rocky Mountains, Western Canada, Western Texas/Southeastern New Mexico, and,
20 increasingly, the Appalachian region directly impact the relationships among Western hubs.
21 Additionally, pipeline transportation availability and cost can impact basis relationships.

22
23 In general, relationships between the regional hubs are expected to remain largely unchanged
24 over the rate period, but basis values across the region to Henry Hub are anticipated to change

1 based on the expectation of escalating competition between WCSB, Appalachian, Permian and
2 Rockies gas combined with steady Pacific Northwest demand and declining Southwest demand.

3
4 With confidence increasing that significant NE pipeline expansion will occur within the rate
5 period, Appalachian gas is expected to gain market share in eastern Canada and the Midwest
6 U.S. Midwest gas will be pushed south and west into the Rockies, and each source of gas will be
7 forced to discount their prices in an attempt to stay competitive. Larger than expected amounts
8 of Permian gas will also be pushing up into the Midwest and west into California, with the same
9 end result of lowering regional gas prices. It is expected that AECO will have to discount its
10 own gas in an attempt to remain competitive in east Canada, the Midwest, and along the West
11 Coast.

12
13 The AECO discount will push through to Kingsgate, Sumas, and Stanfield. These four bases are
14 expected to maintain their historical price relationships to each other, such that gas is incented to
15 flow from Canada south to major demand centers.

16
17 The Opal and San Juan bases, representing two producing areas where output is in relative
18 decline, are expected to maintain their lowered basis level over the rate period. Recently
19 enhanced pipelines such as the Rockies Express Pipeline (REX) have given shippers the ability
20 to reverse flow to send Marcellus natural gas east to west, contrary to the pipeline's original
21 west-to-east design and contracts. Appalachian flows westward continue to grow, reducing the
22 amount of Rocky Mountain gas that can economically be delivered eastward. Additional
23 pressure is being placed on the Opal basis by WCSB gas, displacing traditional flows west into
24 Stanfield.

1 The PG&E Citygate basis will likely remain at a premium compared to other gas hubs in the
2 region, as strong Northern California natural gas demand continues, and as a result its expected
3 basis decline is the lowest of the hubs in this forecast. The continued relative strength of the
4 PG&E Citygate basis will keep the Malin basis strong enough to continue to support sufficient
5 gas flow into Northern California.

6 The Southern California hubs of Topock, Ehrenberg, and Southern California Citygate are all
7 expected to see lower basis values during the rate period. Renewables growth will continue to
8 erode natural gas market share, negating demand growth, and it now appears unlikely that Aliso
9 Canyon will ever resume normal operations, thereby eliminating a large amount of Southern
10 California injection-season demand.

11 12 **2.3.1.5 Natural Gas Price Risk**

13 Addressing uncertainty regarding the price of natural gas is fundamental in evaluating electricity
14 market price risk. As noted, when natural gas-fired generators deliver the marginal unit of
15 electricity, as they frequently do in the Pacific Northwest, the price of natural gas largely
16 determines the market price of electricity. Furthermore, as natural gas is an energy commodity,
17 the price of natural gas is expected to fluctuate, and that volatility is an important source of
18 market uncertainty.

19
20 BPA's natural gas risk model simulates daily natural gas prices, generates a distribution of
21 875 natural gas price forecasts, and presumes that the gas price forecast represents the median of
22 the resultant distribution. Model parameters are estimated using historical Henry Hub natural
23 gas prices. Once estimated, the parameters serve as the basis for simulated possible future Henry
24 Hub price streams. This distribution of 875 simulated forecasts is randomly sampled to provide
25 the Henry Hub natural gas price forecast input for each game in AURORAxmp[®].

1 The distribution of simulated natural gas prices is aggregated by month prior to being input into
2 AURORAxmp[®] because RAM2018 and the TPP calculations use only monthly electricity prices
3 from AURORAxmp[®] and the addition of daily natural gas prices does not appreciably affect
4 either the volatility or expected value of monthly electricity prices. The median, 5th, and 95th
5 percentiles of the forecast distribution are reported in Figure 6.

7 **2.3.2 Load Forecasts Used in AURORAxmp[®]**

8 This Study uses the West Interconnect topology, which comprises 46 zones. It is one of the
9 default zone topologies supplied with the AURORAxmp[®] model and requires a load forecast for
10 each zone.

12 **2.3.2.1 Load Forecast**

13 AURORAxmp[®] uses a WECC-wide, long-term load forecast as the base load forecast. Default
14 AURORAxmp[®] forecasts are used for areas outside the U.S. BPA produced a monthly load
15 forecast for each balancing authority in the WECC within the U.S. for the rate period. Default
16 AURORAxmp[®] forecasts are used for Canada and Mexico. As AURORAxmp[®] uses a cut-plane
17 topology (*see* Figure 7) that does not directly correspond to the WECC balancing authorities, it is
18 necessary to map the balancing authority load forecast onto the AURORAxmp[®] zones. The
19 forecast by balancing authority is in Table 2.

21 **2.3.2.2 Load Risk Model**

22 The load risk model uses a combination of three statistical methods to generate annual, monthly,
23 and hourly load risk distributions that, when combined, constitute an hourly load forecast for use
24 in AURORAxmp[®]. When referring to the load model, this Study is referring to the combination
25 of these models.

1 **2.3.2.3 Yearly Load Model**

2 The annual load model addresses variability in loads created by long-term economic patterns;
3 that is, it incorporates variability at the yearly level and captures business cycles and other
4 departures from forecast that do not have impacts measurable at the sub-yearly level. The model
5 is calibrated using historical annual loads for each control area in the WECC aggregated into the
6 AURORAxmp[®] zones defined in the West Interconnect topology. Furthermore, it assumes that
7 load growth at the annual level is correlated across regions: the Pacific Northwest, California
8 including Baja, Canada, and the Desert Southwest (which comprises all AURORAxmp[®] areas
9 not listed in the other three). It also assumes that load growth is correlated perfectly within them,
10 guaranteeing that zones within each of these regions will follow similar annual variability
11 patterns.

12
13 The model takes as given the history of annual loads at the balancing authority level, as provided
14 in FERC Form 714 filings from 1993 to 2014 and aggregated into the regions described above.
15 The model estimates the load in each region using a time series econometric model. Once the
16 model is estimated, the parameters of the model are used to generate simulated load growth
17 patterns for each AURORAxmp[®] zone.

18
19 **2.3.2.4 Monthly Load Risk**

20 Monthly load variability accounts for seasonal uncertainty in load patterns. This seasonal load
21 variation can potentially pose substantial risk to BPA revenue. Unseasonably hot summers in
22 California, the Pacific Northwest, and the inland Southwest have the potential to exert substantial
23 pressure on prices at Mid-C and thus are an important component of price risk.

1 In addition to an annual load forecast produced in average megawatts, AURORAxmp[®] requires
2 factors for each month of a forecast year that, when multiplied by the annual load forecast, yield
3 the monthly loads, also in average megawatts. As such, the monthly load risk is represented by a
4 distribution of vectors of 12 factors with a mean of 1. The monthly load risk model generates a
5 distribution of series of these factors for the duration of the forecast period. The monthly load
6 model takes as given the historical monthly load for each AURORAxmp[®] zone, normalized by
7 their annual averages and centered on zero. These historical load factors, which average to zero
8 for any given year, constitute the observations used to calibrate a statistical model that generates
9 a distribution of monthly load factors.

11 **2.3.2.5 Hourly Load Risk**

12 Hourly load risk embodies short-term price risk, as would be expected during cold snaps, warm
13 spells, and other short-term phenomena. While this form of risk may not exert substantial
14 pressure on monthly average prices, it generates variability within months and represents a form
15 of risk that would not be captured in long-term business cycles or seasonal trends as reflected in
16 the monthly and annual load risk models.

17
18 The hourly load model takes as inputs hourly loads for each AURORAxmp[®] zone from 2002 to
19 2014. The model groups these hourly load observations by week and month, and each group of
20 week-long hourly load observations constitutes a sample for its respective month. The model
21 then normalizes the historical hourly loads by their monthly averages, so the sample space is
22 composed of hourly factors with an average of 1, and then uses a simple bootstrap with
23 replacement to draw sets of week-long, hourly observations from each month. Each draw thus
24 comprises 9,072 hours (54 weeks), with an average of 1. The model repeats this process

1 50 times, which generates 50 year-long hourly load factor time series. These 50 draws are
2 assigned randomly to the 3,200 AURORAxmp[®] runs.

3 4 **2.3.3 Hydroelectric Generation**

5 Hydroelectric generation represents a substantial portion of the average generation in the PNW
6 region and thus is a primary driver of Mid-C electricity prices in AURORAxmp[®]. Therefore,
7 fluctuations in its output can have a substantial effect on the marginal generator.

8 9 **2.3.3.1 PNW Hydro Generation Risk**

10 The PNW hydroelectric generation risk factor reflects uncertainty regarding the timing and
11 volume of streamflows. Given streamflows, BPA's Hydrosystem Simulator (HYDSIM)
12 computes PNW hydroelectric generation amounts in average monthly values. *See Power Loads*
13 *and Resources Study, BP-18-FS-BPA-03, § 3.1.2.1, for a description of HYDSIM. HYDSIM*
14 *produces 80 records of PNW monthly hydroelectric generation, each one year long, based on*
15 *actual water conditions in the region from 1929 through 2008 as applied to the current hydro*
16 *development and operational constraints. For each of the 3,200 games, the model samples one of*
17 *the 80 water years for the first year of the rate period (FY 2018) from a discrete uniform*
18 *probability distribution using R, the software described in Section 2.2 above. The model then*
19 *selects the next historical water year for the following year of the rate period, FY 2019 (i.e., if*
20 *the model uses 1929 for FY 2018, then it selects 1930 for FY 2019). Should the model sample*
21 *2008 for FY 2018, it uses 1929 for FY 2019. The model repeats this process for each of the*
22 *3,200 games and guarantees a uniform distribution over the 80 water years. The resulting*
23 *3,200 water year combinations become AURORAxmp[®] inputs.*

1 **2.3.3.2 British Columbia (BC) Hydro Generation Risk**

2 BC hydroelectric generation risk reflects uncertainty in the timing and volume of streamflows
3 and the impacts on monthly hydroelectric generation in British Columbia. The risk model uses
4 historical generation data from 1977 through 2008. The source of this information is Statistics
5 Canada, a publication produced by the Canadian government. Because hydrological patterns in
6 BC, including runoff and hydroelectric generation, are statistically independent of those in the
7 PNW, BPA samples historical water years from BC independently from the PNW water year.
8 As with the PNW, water years are drawn in sequence.

9
10 **2.3.3.3 California Hydro Generation Risk**

11 California hydroelectric generation risk reflects uncertainty with respect to the timing and
12 volume of streamflows and the impacts on monthly hydroelectric generation in California.
13 Historical generation data from 1970 through 2008 was sourced from the California Energy
14 Commission, the Federal Power Commission, and the U.S. Energy Information Administration
15 (EIA). As with the BC hydro risk model, and for the same reasons, California water years are
16 drawn independently of PNW water years.

17
18 **2.3.3.4 Hydro Generation Dispatch Cost**

19 With the introduction of negative variable costs for renewable resources, discussed in
20 Section 2.3.7 below, reflecting the amounts of hydro energy available for curtailment (spillable
21 hydro generation) in AURORAxmp[®] becomes crucial to the frequency with which such
22 renewable resources would provide the marginal megawatt of energy and set prices for the zone.
23 To model the amount of spillable hydro generation available in the PNW, a separate HYDSIM
24 study is employed to determine the incremental amount of water and energy that may be spilled
25 before reaching total dissolved gas limits. *See* Power Loads and Resources Study, BP-18-FS-

1 BPA-03, § 3.1.2.1.1. A relationship between average monthly hydro generation and these
2 calculated levels of spillable hydro generation is estimated using an econometric model; the
3 model is incorporated into AURORAxmp[®] to set the level of spillable hydro generation on a
4 monthly, game-by-game basis for hydro resources in the PNW.

5
6 The dispatch cost of spillable hydro generation retains the AURORAxmp[®] default of
7 \$1.74/MWh, while the remaining hydro generation (non-spillable hydro generation in the PNW
8 and all other hydro generation across the Western Interconnection) dispatch cost is set to
9 -\$24/MWh, one dollar below the dispatch cost of wind. These assumptions ensure that, where
10 available, approximated amounts of low-cost hydro generation are curtailed first. As the system
11 moves down the resource supply stack, renewable resources are curtailed and zonal prices
12 become negative, and finally, the remaining hydro generation and any must-run resources would
13 be curtailed.

14 15 **2.3.3.5 Hydro Shaping**

16 AURORAxmp[®] uses an algorithm to determine hydro generation availability. This algorithm
17 produces an hourly hydroelectric generation value that depends on average daily and hourly load,
18 the average monthly hydro generation (provided by HYDSIM), and the output of any resource
19 defined as “must run.” Several constraints give the user control over minimum and maximum
20 generation levels, the hydro shaping factor (*e.g.*, the extent to which it follows load), and so on.
21 AURORAxmp[®] uses the default hydro shaping logic with two exceptions: minimum generation
22 levels and the hydro-shaping factor.

2.3.3.5.1 Hydro Minimum Generation Levels

Output from AURORAxmp[®] suggests that its hydro-shaping algorithm generates a diurnal generation pattern that is inappropriate during high water; that is, the ratio of HLH generation to LLH generation is too high. It is recognized that high water compromises the ability of the hydro system to shape hydro between on-peak and off-peak hours. By default, AURORAxmp[®] limits minimum generation to 44 percent of nameplate capacity during May and June, but operations data suggest that this system minimum generation can be as high as 75 percent of nameplate capacity during high water months. To address this difference, a separate model is used to implement the minimum generation constraints. These constraints generally restrict the minimum generation to a higher percentage of nameplate capacity than default AURORAxmp[®] settings and reflect observed constraints to the degree to which the system can more realistically shape hydroelectric generation.

To implement this ratio in AURORAxmp[®], the model limits the minimum hydro generation in each month to the expected ratio of minimum generation to nameplate capacity based on an econometric model.

2.3.3.5.2 Shaping Factor for PNW Hydro Resources

In AURORAxmp[®], spillable hydro generation (described in Section 2.3.3.4 above) is locked into a flat shape throughout the day, which in turn substantially reduces the amount of hydro generation shaped into on-peak hours in the PNW. While the adjustment to minimum generation levels described above prevents the model from over-shaping hydro generation during high streamflow conditions, additional modifications to the logic are required to increase shaping during normal and lower streamflow conditions. First, an econometric model estimates the historical relationship between monthly average hydro generation and the ratio of HLH to LLH

1 hydro generation using Federal hydro system operations data from 2006 to 2016. Second, the
2 model is implemented in AURORAxmp[®] to set a target HLH-to-LLH hydro generation ratio
3 (Target Ratio) based on the relevant expected monthly hydro generation. Finally, a hydro-
4 shaping factor value necessary to achieve the Target Ratio is calculated and applied to PNW
5 hydro resources.

6 7 **2.3.4 Hourly Shape of Wind Generation**

8 AURORAxmp[®] models wind generation as a must-run resource with a minimum capacity of
9 40 percent. This assumption implies that, for any given hour, AURORAxmp[®] dispatches
10 40 percent of the available capacity independent of economic fundamentals and dispatches the
11 remaining 60 percent as needed. During the BP-18 rate period, BPA expects about 8,000 MW
12 (nameplate) of wind capacity to operate in the PNW. The large amount of wind in the PNW
13 (and throughout the rest of the WECC) affects the market price forecast at Mid-C by changing
14 the generating resource used to determine the marginal price. Modeling wind generation on an
15 hourly basis better captures the operational impacts that changes in wind generation can have on
16 the marginal resource compared to using average monthly wind generation values. The hourly
17 granularity for wind generation allows the price forecast more accurately to reflect the economic
18 decision faced by thermal generators. Each hour, generators must decide whether to operate in a
19 volatile market in which the marginal price can be below the cost of running the thermal
20 generator but start-up and shut-off constraints could prevent the generator from shutting down.

21 22 **2.3.4.1 PNW Hourly Wind Generation Risk**

23 The PNW Hourly Wind Generation Risk Model simulates the uncertainty in wind generation
24 output. The uncertainty is derived by averaging the observed output of wind plants within the
25 BPA balancing authority area every five minutes for each hour and converting the data into

1 hourly capacity factors. The source of these data is BPA's external website, www.bpa.gov.
2 These data cover the period from 2006 through 2015. The model implements a Markov Chain
3 Monte Carlo (MCMC) rejection sampling algorithm to generate synthetic series of wind
4 generation data. This technique allows the production of statistically valid artificial wind series
5 that preserve the higher-order moments of observed wind time series. Through this process, the
6 model creates 30 time series, each of which includes 8,784 hours, to create a complete wind year.
7 The model randomly samples these synthetic records and applies them as a forced outage rate
8 against the wind fleet in select AURORAxmp[®] zones. This approach captures potential
9 variations in annual, monthly, and hourly wind generation.

11 **2.3.5 Thermal Plant Generation**

12 The thermal generation units in AURORAxmp[®] often drive the marginal unit price, whether the
13 units are natural gas, coal, or nuclear. With the exception of CGS generation, operation of
14 thermal resources in AURORAxmp[®] is based on the EPIS-supplied database labeled North
15 American DB 2016v5.

17 **2.3.5.1 Columbia Generating Station Generation Risk**

18 The CGS Generation Risk Model simulates monthly variability in the output of CGS such that
19 the average of the simulated outcomes is equal to the expected monthly CGS output specified in
20 the Power Loads and Resources Study, BP-18-FS-BPA-03, § 3.1.3. The simulated results vary
21 from the maximum output of the plant to zero output. The frequency distribution of the
22 simulated CGS output is negatively skewed: the median is higher than the mean. This reflects
23 the reality that thermal plants such as CGS typically operate at output levels higher than average
24 output levels, but occasional forced outages result in lower monthly average output levels.

1 The output of the CGS Generation Risk Model feeds both RevSim (*see* the Power and
2 Transmission Risk Study, BP-18-FS-BPA-05, § 4.1.1) and AURORAxmp[®], where the results of
3 the model are converted into equivalent forced outage rates and applied to the nameplate
4 capacity of CGS for each of 3,200 games.

6 **2.3.6 Generation Additions and Retirements**

7 As a result of state Renewable Portfolio Standards (RPS) and Federal tax credit policies,
8 renewable resource additions have been substantial during recent years. Additionally,
9 installation of behind-the-meter resources, namely rooftop solar photovoltaic panels, continues to
10 grow significantly. Favorable net energy metering policies in California and declining
11 installation costs throughout the WECC region are likely to reinforce this trend for the near
12 future. Two main sets of data are used to quantify this growth.

13
14 First, data from the EIA database of planned and sited additions and retirements over the horizon
15 of the rate period is referenced against additional data from sources such as BPA's Transmission
16 Interconnection Queue, WECC's Transmission Expansion Planning Policy Committee, the
17 California Energy Commission, the California Public Utilities Commission, and third-party
18 consultant reports to create a set of planned additions and retirements in AURORAxmp[®]. BPA
19 then adds sufficient generic resources to this stack to meet state renewable portfolio standards.
20 This methodology has been updated for BP-18 to account for zonal variation of wind and solar
21 resource capacity factors, ensuring generic renewable resource additions are better aligned with
22 expectations. No custom modifications were made to EPIS default renewable generation shapes,
23 but North American DB2016v5 included updated default solar shapes.

1 Second, estimated levels of behind-the-meter, rooftop solar photovoltaic additions in California
2 were included from the California Energy Commission forecast, published February 2017. The
3 corresponding zonal load forecasts are adjusted to keep projected net load (load minus behind-
4 the-meter generation) aligned with BPA's load forecasts. Resources from both sets of data were
5 included in the resource table of AURORAxmp[®].

6
7 Finally, AURORAxmp[®] has logic capable of adding and retiring resources based upon
8 economics. In a Long Term Study, AURORAxmp[®] generates a catalogue of resource additions
9 and retirements consistent with long-term equilibrium: it (1) identifies any resources whose
10 operating revenue is insufficient to cover their fixed and variable costs of operation and retires a
11 subset of the least economic resources, subject to default annual retirement limits; and (2) selects
12 plants from a candidate list of additions whose operating revenue would cover their fixed and
13 variable costs and adds them to the resource base. AURORAxmp[®] thus ensures that resources
14 are added when economic circumstances justify. AURORAxmp[®] adds no new thermal resources
15 to the PNW during the BP-18 rate period. The latest database, North American DB 2016v5, was
16 incorporated for the BP-18 analysis. This database includes more restrictive default annual
17 retirement limits that results in fewer economic thermal resource retirements through the BP-18
18 rate period.

20 **2.3.7 WECC Renewable Resource Dispatch Cost**

21 The substantial growth of renewables across the Western Interconnection increases the
22 likelihood that such resources will provide the marginal megawatt of energy and, when in
23 market-based regions, set prices. Power purchase agreements, renewable energy credits,
24 production tax credits, and other compensation mechanisms allow renewable resources to offer
25 energy at negative prices and still earn revenue from production. Additionally, load-serving

1 entities may operate renewable resources to satisfy RPS requirements and would be expected to
2 offer such resources' generation at the replacement cost of renewable energy (*i.e.*, if the operator
3 had to curtail some amount of renewable output, the operator would be legally responsible to
4 procure additional renewable energy sufficient to meet its RPS requirement). To approximate
5 such behavior in AURORAxmp[®], all wind resource dispatch costs are set to -\$23/MWh, a
6 reflection of an appropriate offer price if the resource receives the Federal production tax credit.
7 Lacking a widely available and transparent supplemental income figure for solar resources
8 analogous to the Federal production tax credit for wind resources, BPA relies on the
9 AURORAxmp[®] default spread between wind and solar resource dispatch costs. The
10 AURORAxmp[®] default dispatch cost of solar resources is 36 cents higher than wind; this default
11 spread is applied to all solar resources, resulting in a dispatch cost of -\$22.64 /MWh.

13 **2.3.8 Transmission Capacity Availability**

14 In AURORAxmp[®], transmission capacity limits the amount of electricity that can be transferred
15 between zones. Figure 2 shows the AURORAxmp[®] representation of the major transmission
16 interconnections for the West Interconnect topology. The transmission path ratings for the
17 Alternating-Current or California-Oregon Intertie (AC Intertie or COI), the Direct-Current
18 Intertie (DC Intertie), and the BC Intertie are based on historical intertie reports posted on the
19 BPA OASIS website from 2003 through 2015. The ratings for the rest of the interconnections
20 are based on North American DB 2016v5.

22 **2.3.8.1 PNW Hourly Intertie Availability Risk**

23 PNW hourly intertie risk represents uncertainty in the availability of transmission capacity on
24 each of three interties that connect the PNW with other regions in the WECC: AC Intertie,
25 DC Intertie, and BC Intertie. The PNW hourly intertie risk model implements a Markov Chain

1 duration model based on observed data from 2003 through 2015. The data comprise observed
2 transmission path ratings and the duration of those ratings for both directions on each line.

3
4 The model begins with an observed path rating and duration from the historical record. It
5 samples the proximate path rating using a Markov Chain that has been estimated with observed
6 data. Then it samples a duration to associate with that rating based on the set of observed,
7 historical durations associated with that specific rating. This process repeats until an 8,784-hour
8 record has been constructed. The model generates 200 artificial records. Path ratings are
9 rounded to avoid a Markov Chain that is too sparse to effectively generate synthetic profiles.

10
11 For each of 3,200 games, each intertie has a single record that is independently selected from the
12 associated set of 200 records. The outage rate is applied to the Link Capacity Shape, a factor that
13 determines the amount of power that can be moved between zones in AURORAxmp[®] for the
14 associated intertie. By using this method, quantification of this risk results in the average of the
15 simulated outcomes being equal to the expected path ratings in the historical record.

16 17 **2.3.9 California Carbon Pricing**

18 The California Air Resources Board established a carbon market by placing limits on CO₂
19 emissions and requiring entities in a number of sectors, including electricity, to purchase
20 sufficient allowances (shares of the total CO₂ limit) in quarterly auctions to cover their
21 emissions. These auctions are subject to a floor price beginning at \$10 per metric ton of CO₂
22 emissions in 2012 and escalating at 5 percent annually plus the rate of inflation. In the California
23 electricity market, resources are allowed to incorporate the costs of purchasing CO₂ allowances
24 in their offer, so prices should reflect a carbon adder roughly equal to the marginal resource's
25 emission rate multiplied by the CO₂ allowance price. Out-of-state electricity producers wishing

1 to export energy to California are subject to a default emission rate of 0.428 metric tons per
2 megawatt-hour unless the producer qualifies for a lower rate more specific to its resources
3 (specified sources).

4
5 The California carbon market mechanisms are reflected in AURORAxmp[®] by applying the
6 auction floor prices to California resources using AURORAxmp[®] default CO₂ emission rates for
7 each resource to establish an incremental carbon emission cost addition, which is incorporated
8 into dispatch and commitment logic. Consequently, if a California resource provides the
9 marginal megawatt of energy and sets a zonal price, the price will include the additional cost of
10 CO₂ emissions tied to producing that megawatt of energy (the specific resource CO₂ emission
11 rate multiplied by the cost of CO₂ emissions). Using BPA's inflation forecast, the auction floor
12 prices are calculated to be \$13.60, \$14.53, and \$15.50 per metric ton of CO₂ emissions (nominal)
13 for calendar years 2017, 2018, and 2019, respectively.

14
15 Additionally, wheeling costs on all transmission lines going into California are subject to an
16 adder of the default emission rate of 0.428 metric tons per megawatt-hour at the auction floor
17 prices. While the carbon adders for California resources substantially increase prices in
18 California zones, the wheeling adders increase the cost of sending energy to California, thereby
19 preventing major shifts in energy flows. Ultimately, prices at Mid-C do not change significantly,
20 but the spreads between prices at Mid-C and California trading hubs better reflect the real-world
21 price impacts of California's carbon market, enabling more accurate estimates of BPA revenue
22 generated from sales of secondary energy to California.

1 **2.4 Market Price Forecasts Produced By AURORAxmp®**

2 Two electricity price forecasts are created using AURORAxmp®. The market price forecast uses
3 hydro generation data for all 80 water years, and the critical water forecast uses hydro generation
4 for only the critical water year, 1937. Figure 8 shows the FY 2018 through FY 2019 monthly
5 average HLH and LLH prices from the market price forecast. Figure 9 shows the FY 2018 and
6 FY 2019 monthly average HLH and LLH prices from the critical water forecast. Furthermore,
7 Tables 3 and 4 present average Mid-C prices by water year for use in the Spill Surcharge. Power
8 Rate Study BP-18-FS-BPA-01, § 4.1.1.5.

9
10 As stated previously, these projections of market prices for electricity are used for many aspects
11 of setting power rates, including the quantitative analysis of risk presented in the Power and
12 Transmission Risk Study, BP-18-FS-BPA-05, and numerous components of the Power Rates
13 Study, BP-18-FS-BPA-01.

DOCUMENTATION

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Table 1: Cash Prices at Henry Hub and Basis Differentials (nominal \$/MMBtu)

	FY 2018	FY 2019
Henry	3.12	3.00
AECO	-0.89	-0.82
Kingsgate	-0.42	-0.45
Malin	-0.24	-0.24
Opal	-0.31	-0.31
PG&E	0.23	0.23
SoCal City	0.02	0.03
Ehrenberg	-0.15	-0.14
Topock	-0.15	-0.14
San Juan	-0.34	-0.32
Stanfield	-0.32	-0.32
Sumas	-0.41	-0.41

Table 2: Control Area Load Forecast

	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O
1	Table 2: Control Area Load Forecast (MWh)														
2	Date	APS	AVA	BPA	CHPD	CISO	DOPD	EPE	GCPD	IID	IPC	LDWP	NEVP	NWE	PAC
3	Oct-17	2644652	1019788	4273875	331646	18500590	110952	731056	346993	305891	1286938	2304350	1953666	911493	4981571
4	Nov-17	2257672	1145977	5031565	371200	17352450	144564	672997	350447	254424	1372580	2140788	1833184	963502	5228522
5	Dec-17	2535223	1304837	5616643	413198	18394360	182143	719423	400429	265210	1607524	2309797	2002293	1063587	5731447
6	Jan-18	2547329	1268178	5509330	413132	18015930	182726	722815	400248	262332	1575494	2249858	2010102	1082855	5760271
7	Feb-18	2237022	1095779	4764958	351013	16214280	139858	649263	355540	242492	1362853	2026344	1776138	960536	5069422
8	Mar-18	2367991	1088409	4674363	345809	17598100	116540	696305	345707	259012	1325826	2207727	1879421	978378	5155706
9	Apr-18	2394621	1004157	4464067	322059	16972240	107642	700488	359545	261484	1291558	2110562	1806896	872452	4808056
10	May-18	2796268	1013411	4495691	319281	18276360	112347	764327	387729	337934	1600655	2273468	2148753	879145	4904336
11	Jun-18	3108837	1000239	4478601	311832	19589180	110971	837025	401945	393089	1728651	2445546	2587159	892865	5079799
12	Jul-18	3698334	1087481	4733653	332835	22440040	133829	917952	442680	454700	2111893	2731227	3091860	1017204	5821246
13	Aug-18	3660216	1088668	4626906	332837	22771450	134343	926317	437287	451262	1978101	2783413	2973417	980638	5704123
14	Sep-18	3127773	979195	4200372	313927	20493840	109210	809271	370083	389877	1564346	2560722	2401922	872062	4882518
15	Oct-18	2683104	1026278	4313267	334171	18341180	112690	745186	355038	310137	1301847	2270287	1989032	920779	5025627
16	Nov-18	2296124	1152452	5073237	373723	17210410	146302	687127	358469	258982	1387489	2110340	1868550	972776	5272446
17	Dec-18	2573676	1311296	5660076	415718	18236560	183881	733553	408428	269700	1622433	2275563	2037660	1072849	5775239
18	Jan-19	2584957	1274537	5548660	415014	17985730	184285	736699	408224	268409	1590267	2240066	2041271	1091157	5804372
19	Feb-19	2274650	1102123	4802060	352892	16196540	141417	663148	363494	248482	1377626	2018785	1807307	968826	5113392
20	Mar-19	2405618	1094738	4711200	347685	17570790	118099	710190	353638	265071	1340599	2198312	1910590	986655	5199547
21	Apr-19	2432249	1010471	4500279	323932	16949260	109200	714373	367454	267552	1306331	2102104	1838065	880718	4851767
22	May-19	2820161	1019710	4532003	321152	18257030	113906	778211	395616	344329	1620538	2263341	2174968	887398	4947919
23	Jun-19	3132730	1006523	4514868	313700	19560770	112529	850910	409810	399719	1748534	2433657	2613373	901106	5123255
24	Jul-19	3722226	1093751	4770691	334701	22391920	135387	931837	450524	461593	2131776	2716429	3118075	1025433	5864575
25	Aug-19	3684109	1094923	4663628	334701	22721030	135902	940202	445109	458139	1997984	2768064	2999632	988856	5747326
26	Sep-19	3151666	985436	4235821	315788	20459170	110769	823155	377883	396487	1584229	2547599	2428137	880267	4925595

Table 2: Control Area Load Forecast (cont.)

	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O
27	Table 2 (cont): Control Area Load Forecast (MWh)														
28	Date	PGE	PNM	PSC	PSE	SCL	SMUD	SPR	SRP	TEP	TID	TPWR	WACM	WALC	WAUW
29	Oct-17	1750627	922638	3360494	2021410	831848	1219663	1023744	2393725	1220192	222160	411853	2047973	711318	73259
30	Nov-17	1891428	926363	3413712	2320179	926508	1191493	1036938	2061322	1161106	197829	483802	2104949	640812	82881
31	Dec-17	2105839	1037426	3834616	2554436	977229	1363033	1149340	2324772	1262362	208685	532808	2329945	723449	89947
32	Jan-18	2075783	1028017	3780109	2557507	1014415	1337460	1139311	2374520	1255713	206699	527437	2284884	713971	92815
33	Feb-18	1815906	907175	3351507	2246581	888281	1147904	1025677	2061039	1130926	185971	471391	2079258	630009	81970
34	Mar-18	1841707	945246	3475712	2217676	893080	1218282	1073227	2174552	1184423	200046	468493	2157080	664579	81606
35	Apr-18	1727435	891895	3240324	2011890	833948	1136822	1011871	2183305	1129358	196501	426394	2011806	669506	71343
36	May-18	1727804	901207	3287250	1883875	801448	1225194	1045579	2608252	1299586	238663	398448	2072818	763734	73572
37	Jun-18	1665574	975552	3470409	1824138	773946	1422907	1070677	2990811	1485573	259454	379503	2173503	861748	76447
38	Jul-18	1845543	1103810	4050719	1905827	800257	1679436	1177534	3452462	1685206	293250	388370	2434073	925811	94245
39	Aug-18	1867984	1092860	3910470	1945576	796985	1658499	1176794	3413155	1664959	290203	396711	2396204	877566	86438
40	Sep-18	1703449	951219	3301813	1855491	768488	1411357	1046584	2915920	1468605	257340	382892	2067461	790170	75973
41	Oct-18	1763938	933606	3376105	2026953	833743	1217970	1044479	2437916	1235465	223815	415694	2061552	719598	73259
42	Nov-18	1904738	937341	3429323	2325721	928403	1190010	1057673	2105405	1176234	199637	488183	2118407	649069	82881
43	Dec-18	2119150	1048680	3850227	2559979	979124	1360281	1170075	2368749	1277743	210419	537558	2343284	731683	89947
44	Jan-19	2086931	1037318	3792546	2562154	1016004	1345066	1155930	2418268	1271477	208863	532015	2298105	722181	92815
45	Feb-19	1827054	916179	3363944	2251228	889870	1155338	1042297	2104680	1146384	188195	475549	2092364	638196	81970
46	Mar-19	1852855	954345	3488150	2222323	894669	1225780	1089846	2218089	1200016	202222	472629	2170073	672743	81606
47	Apr-19	1738583	900863	3252762	2016538	835537	1144246	1028491	2226737	1144817	198683	430216	2024688	677647	71343
48	May-19	1738952	910199	3299687	1888523	803037	1232698	1062198	2644378	1315466	241756	402060	2085591	771852	73572
49	Jun-19	1676722	984729	3482846	1828785	775535	1430590	1087296	3026855	1501913	262475	382974	2186168	869844	76447
50	Jul-19	1856691	1113303	4063157	1910475	801846	1687351	1194153	3488422	1702039	296160	391908	2446632	933884	94245
51	Aug-19	1879132	1102327	3922908	1950223	798574	1666395	1193413	3449033	1681744	293114	400312	2408660	885617	86438
52	Sep-19	1714597	960338	3314250	1860138	770077	1419029	1063203	2951717	1484908	260347	386390	2079814	798198	75973

Table 3: BP-18 Final Proposal FY18 Market Price (\$/MWh, nominal)

	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M
1	Water	Table 3: BP-18 Final Proposal FY18 Market Price (\$/MWh, nominal)											
2	Year	Oct	Nov	Dec	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep
3	1929	24.64	27.12	30.66	31.66	30.80	26.10	20.91	18.29	19.45	26.56	25.35	24.39
4	1930	27.73	29.04	33.92	37.03	30.01	28.25	21.44	20.90	24.92	25.59	27.04	25.72
5	1931	27.06	28.22	32.12	31.76	34.69	28.50	24.28	20.15	24.53	25.59	26.63	25.43
6	1932	26.93	28.96	31.60	33.61	31.80	21.81	14.72	9.32	10.51	22.87	24.54	23.80
7	1933	25.32	26.36	27.47	25.31	26.03	23.62	21.92	17.32	0.12	19.50	24.90	26.20
8	1934	24.49	23.19	22.11	19.89	23.82	19.12	15.01	16.43	18.60	24.83	27.55	25.08
9	1935	26.45	28.12	30.50	25.00	24.97	22.44	20.44	16.11	17.31	20.00	23.52	25.58
10	1936	25.97	27.07	32.60	34.75	30.01	24.85	19.20	8.40	13.13	24.36	26.00	24.92
11	1937	26.20	28.48	33.37	37.23	34.68	28.03	24.42	20.02	21.69	28.35	27.86	26.22
12	1938	26.34	28.63	30.42	28.13	26.99	22.37	15.28	10.56	17.55	22.60	27.57	24.87
13	1939	27.27	28.85	31.75	28.38	29.01	25.38	19.28	17.68	22.92	25.89	27.95	25.83
14	1940	26.11	27.73	31.27	29.90	30.56	21.73	20.69	17.67	22.92	25.90	28.12	25.18
15	1941	26.28	26.88	29.81	33.30	31.26	27.69	22.99	19.28	22.67	26.43	28.04	25.99
16	1942	26.49	26.20	27.98	27.04	27.23	25.01	20.77	18.21	18.28	20.76	24.71	23.18
17	1943	27.80	29.86	30.69	27.04	26.20	22.30	8.71	13.28	1.78	16.82	24.35	24.96
18	1944	25.45	26.86	31.36	31.51	29.40	26.67	23.30	21.72	26.23	28.36	28.59	26.56
19	1945	27.15	29.24	33.06	32.47	32.50	28.36	25.58	17.15	16.81	28.04	27.02	25.34
20	1946	26.50	27.04	30.14	28.13	27.07	22.56	14.76	10.36	17.23	20.14	25.40	24.33
21	1947	25.91	27.35	25.78	25.40	23.90	21.11	18.91	13.54	16.71	21.79	24.99	24.29
22	1948	23.26	26.53	28.18	25.23	26.13	23.19	18.71	5.25	1.64	21.30	22.81	25.10
23	1949	25.47	27.21	29.90	28.63	28.40	22.01	17.18	7.05	16.44	26.89	27.80	25.42
24	1950	25.77	26.32	29.89	24.73	23.73	21.11	16.87	14.68	1.07	13.40	23.39	25.93
25	1951	23.31	22.78	22.12	19.56	17.46	15.98	14.78	10.59	15.66	18.89	24.01	23.84
26	1952	23.37	26.80	26.27	25.50	25.04	21.77	12.13	2.16	13.31	21.73	25.58	26.11
29	1953	26.18	27.94	32.30	26.79	24.27	23.38	20.27	15.10	1.71	18.68	24.45	24.32
30	1954	25.43	27.28	27.08	24.52	23.48	21.22	19.32	13.93	11.78	15.03	22.08	22.62
31	1955	25.95	25.76	27.72	28.55	26.51	26.53	21.23	16.74	0.26	15.15	23.50	25.75
32	1956	24.94	24.92	25.01	22.90	22.17	19.14	13.92	5.20	0.61	20.33	24.08	26.20
33	1957	25.22	29.17	28.43	28.28	27.29	23.11	18.82	2.34	2.22	26.83	28.43	26.96
34	1958	27.49	29.18	33.04	26.63	25.22	22.21	17.78	6.54	6.81	24.08	26.36	25.73
35	1959	25.27	25.87	26.11	24.03	23.66	21.01	18.53	15.11	9.31	18.56	23.85	21.43
36	1960	21.03	23.90	26.40	27.48	27.77	24.67	14.28	18.90	14.22	23.54	26.83	26.34
37	1961	27.05	27.35	29.50	27.66	26.40	22.19	21.18	15.62	9.98	24.62	26.47	26.24
38	1962	26.01	28.26	30.10	29.13	26.96	27.41	13.97	16.10	17.91	24.07	26.31	26.36
39	1963	23.94	25.22	25.58	25.14	23.91	22.87	20.50	15.28	15.89	20.67	24.62	23.32
40	1964	26.97	28.30	29.39	29.86	29.61	27.73	21.51	17.03	-0.98	20.35	26.02	26.40
41	1965	23.88	27.41	25.57	21.67	18.60	18.53	16.98	10.60	16.33	21.32	23.29	24.79
42	1966	23.59	25.61	27.89	27.15	26.41	24.71	16.84	18.64	17.70	21.11	24.99	24.33
43	1967	27.11	29.11	28.79	25.92	25.10	22.04	23.00	16.22	1.13	20.94	25.47	26.53
44	1968	24.91	26.35	29.00	25.17	24.48	21.61	23.02	18.53	12.56	22.63	25.27	23.03

Table 3: BP-18 Final Proposal FY18 Market Price, cont. (\$/MWh, nominal)

	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M
45	Water	Table 3 (cont): BP-18 Final Proposal FY18 Market Price (\$/MWh, nominal)											
46	Year	Oct	Nov	Dec	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep
47	1969	22.32	22.77	26.30	24.23	22.57	22.02	13.98	4.18	13.68	22.18	26.70	26.55
48	1970	26.53	27.95	29.82	25.34	26.88	24.28	21.74	15.93	9.30	26.44	26.51	25.95
49	1971	25.45	27.41	29.60	22.21	18.17	17.68	13.87	5.34	0.22	15.23	22.58	25.77
50	1972	26.42	28.95	29.36	22.79	20.55	6.66	13.09	6.77	-0.16	16.36	21.29	24.25
51	1973	23.49	26.60	27.86	27.66	30.20	25.94	23.58	18.93	22.88	25.37	27.52	25.70
52	1974	25.10	26.00	25.57	12.80	16.28	12.63	10.46	7.32	-1.15	12.07	22.20	25.28
53	1975	27.91	27.82	30.32	26.84	25.56	23.07	21.78	11.63	3.24	14.71	25.03	24.74
54	1976	24.47	24.97	21.91	23.33	23.22	18.80	15.74	7.13	13.12	19.04	21.10	21.67
55	1977	25.33	28.20	32.70	32.47	29.64	26.41	24.30	21.72	26.35	28.28	28.20	28.61
56	1978	26.35	27.08	27.55	26.91	25.89	23.66	16.92	13.38	19.01	22.22	26.55	22.28
57	1979	25.83	27.02	31.24	28.75	29.27	22.42	21.73	14.14	20.21	27.99	27.70	25.63
58	1980	26.46	28.03	30.39	29.19	28.27	25.17	18.60	6.15	11.40	23.81	26.55	24.22
59	1981	27.27	28.44	27.58	26.13	25.42	26.07	23.75	17.20	7.84	20.87	23.32	24.94
60	1982	24.47	25.84	26.70	24.82	18.93	15.96	16.92	9.23	6.88	14.03	22.82	23.69
61	1983	25.23	27.45	27.98	24.40	21.74	18.20	18.59	13.16	12.65	17.76	23.88	25.07
62	1984	25.54	24.49	28.10	26.63	25.62	21.70	15.89	13.88	5.84	20.46	24.14	24.27
63	1985	24.84	25.94	28.01	27.94	28.29	25.54	17.68	15.54	20.45	26.33	28.78	25.99
64	1986	24.51	24.17	28.75	25.74	24.73	15.84	14.31	17.47	17.65	24.94	27.29	26.28
65	1987	26.74	26.51	27.89	28.66	30.37	23.86	22.05	15.91	20.68	26.34	27.32	25.14
66	1988	25.97	28.84	32.46	31.66	33.67	26.51	22.10	19.17	22.89	25.34	27.12	26.15
67	1989	25.75	26.52	30.28	30.85	32.30	25.17	18.85	17.75	20.47	26.02	27.92	26.42
68	1990	28.42	28.11	30.11	26.99	25.96	22.53	18.97	18.43	13.29	22.30	23.96	25.00
69	1991	25.15	22.76	26.33	24.70	24.49	21.32	19.25	15.83	15.43	18.61	22.52	24.85
70	1992	26.38	28.48	33.08	30.98	30.75	25.10	25.06	20.48	25.31	28.24	28.20	27.25
71	1993	27.84	28.21	32.04	32.38	35.37	25.01	20.56	14.80	19.57	25.92	26.93	25.50
72	1994	26.07	27.66	30.85	32.32	29.95	25.52	21.17	17.53	20.68	25.88	27.31	25.92
73	1995	25.64	28.08	30.97	29.12	27.04	22.86	22.05	16.32	10.44	23.77	26.45	24.88
74	1996	24.29	23.08	17.96	17.98	16.40	11.09	11.53	7.04	12.32	18.74	22.96	23.84
75	1997	25.07	26.75	26.78	17.63	17.42	12.53	9.90	5.65	1.81	18.90	24.07	24.28
76	1998	21.24	24.92	29.32	28.52	26.33	23.29	18.68	4.40	4.16	22.64	25.80	26.16
77	1999	27.01	29.38	27.40	22.57	21.05	17.57	17.22	14.28	2.12	16.94	21.63	24.76
78	2000	25.49	22.40	25.51	26.20	25.84	22.17	14.47	14.88	20.38	23.19	26.86	26.07
79	2001	26.37	28.75	32.04	33.62	30.16	26.48	24.20	20.97	27.72	25.99	26.99	26.54
80	2002	26.22	27.88	31.13	30.61	30.88	25.98	19.44	17.37	10.11	20.34	26.40	25.09
81	2003	26.29	28.77	32.02	31.81	33.26	24.32	21.34	17.62	14.58	25.75	27.75	25.94
82	2004	25.46	27.16	31.23	32.31	32.93	25.64	22.62	18.47	21.12	25.50	26.75	23.85
83	2005	24.95	27.43	27.47	27.52	26.95	25.86	21.88	15.89	18.23	23.02	25.75	24.45
84	2006	26.13	28.50	29.99	26.03	25.08	23.14	14.46	8.85	9.42	25.06	27.89	26.59
85	2007	26.18	25.87	30.10	27.66	27.50	22.80	20.19	17.82	20.60	25.34	29.91	29.31
86	2008	25.94	27.87	31.40	30.29	29.57	25.60	22.36	13.17	-2.34	24.48	26.71	27.57

Table 4: BP-18 Final Proposal FY19 Market Price (\$/MWh, nominal)

	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M
1	Water	Table 4: BP-18 Final Proposal FY19 Market Price (\$/MWh, nominal)											
2	Year	Oct	Nov	Dec	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep
3	1929	24.50	26.81	32.34	33.18	32.31	26.10	21.34	19.44	21.12	27.59	26.85	24.92
4	1930	24.90	25.85	30.87	34.26	30.56	27.52	20.94	19.99	24.79	24.23	26.66	25.38
5	1931	25.19	26.92	32.41	32.15	35.73	27.56	23.86	19.37	26.05	26.03	27.40	25.66
6	1932	24.34	26.50	31.17	35.70	36.21	24.55	15.72	11.52	14.46	23.13	25.42	24.24
7	1933	24.03	24.72	27.02	25.27	24.93	23.35	21.63	17.96	5.10	18.86	24.54	26.29
8	1934	24.82	23.61	22.20	18.86	21.53	16.99	14.10	15.32	18.84	24.42	27.18	24.96
9	1935	24.07	25.65	30.32	27.50	27.93	23.92	22.89	18.16	20.60	21.65	25.82	26.49
10	1936	24.80	26.70	33.23	36.24	33.60	27.53	21.29	12.50	17.33	25.92	27.67	26.07
11	1937	24.22	25.48	30.40	33.13	33.25	27.44	23.67	19.56	21.96	28.56	28.54	25.83
12	1938	24.95	25.80	28.20	25.62	24.57	21.97	15.32	9.84	17.71	21.19	26.28	23.70
13	1939	24.24	25.97	30.38	27.41	29.64	25.82	19.36	18.09	23.73	25.61	28.14	25.18
14	1940	25.19	26.44	31.04	28.15	29.45	20.95	20.91	17.98	23.75	26.25	29.45	25.80
15	1941	24.19	25.92	29.43	32.21	31.38	26.62	23.71	19.15	22.97	24.85	25.76	24.41
16	1942	25.52	25.86	27.90	27.08	28.27	24.48	20.86	17.54	18.41	21.05	25.51	24.09
17	1943	24.32	25.79	28.71	24.99	24.70	20.99	7.33	14.46	3.40	16.44	25.09	25.36
18	1944	23.54	24.97	29.51	31.32	32.61	27.50	23.24	22.13	26.97	26.89	27.53	25.81
19	1945	25.82	26.76	31.51	31.65	31.30	26.38	24.10	15.95	17.32	26.53	27.02	25.19
20	1946	24.06	25.43	29.09	26.48	27.41	23.12	15.06	10.80	16.91	19.55	25.79	24.72
21	1947	24.48	23.77	22.94	23.69	23.05	20.61	18.21	13.94	17.79	22.34	26.61	25.74
22	1948	19.70	23.94	27.39	23.98	26.15	22.93	19.18	6.24	5.35	19.23	21.97	24.15
23	1949	23.80	26.83	28.84	26.69	26.21	19.61	15.85	8.20	15.71	25.51	26.74	24.82
24	1950	25.26	26.46	30.72	24.16	23.06	20.08	14.81	14.13	2.68	10.77	22.57	25.66
25	1951	22.51	22.88	23.32	21.70	19.81	16.59	14.57	10.82	17.46	19.36	26.11	25.25
26	1952	20.33	24.17	25.61	24.72	24.09	22.70	13.66	3.92	15.76	21.18	25.31	25.66
29	1953	24.65	26.85	30.85	27.12	24.52	22.77	20.18	15.23	1.99	16.52	24.29	24.07
30	1954	22.91	24.19	25.37	22.63	23.36	19.79	17.98	13.43	12.59	12.50	20.72	20.61
31	1955	24.85	24.28	27.84	29.82	29.15	27.80	21.54	17.90	5.84	15.73	24.53	25.94
32	1956	22.27	22.37	22.93	20.16	20.30	18.32	13.60	6.49	4.80	18.65	24.29	25.91
33	1957	23.82	27.06	26.89	28.21	28.66	23.48	19.50	5.97	7.48	26.54	29.28	28.21
34	1958	26.42	27.14	31.24	25.49	25.94	22.90	19.17	9.10	11.07	24.97	26.29	25.89
35	1959	24.52	23.92	23.93	20.82	21.68	19.41	18.11	14.95	11.61	17.60	23.17	21.37
36	1960	19.83	22.69	25.76	26.06	25.93	22.33	12.10	16.72	14.00	20.71	25.01	24.94
37	1961	24.04	24.58	28.26	25.79	24.95	20.47	20.55	14.77	11.46	24.88	26.81	26.52
38	1962	25.58	26.38	29.16	26.27	27.18	27.75	13.69	16.43	18.55	23.49	26.11	26.27
39	1963	24.07	25.01	27.21	26.94	24.81	24.45	21.88	17.84	19.62	23.80	28.00	26.06
40	1964	24.07	25.86	28.60	27.45	28.06	25.49	19.77	16.56	1.72	17.31	24.71	24.39
41	1965	24.59	25.57	23.50	19.78	17.76	16.79	15.42	9.60	16.17	21.58	23.36	25.61
42	1966	23.30	26.50	28.89	28.11	28.19	24.59	17.50	19.21	19.17	21.92	25.95	25.20
43	1967	23.72	25.18	26.20	23.66	23.47	21.14	22.56	15.60	4.24	17.40	24.35	24.15
44	1968	25.20	26.25	27.85	25.15	25.77	22.86	24.31	19.66	13.83	22.11	25.24	23.59

Table 4: BP-18 Final Proposal FY19 Market Price, cont. (\$/MWh, nominal)

	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M
45	Water	Table 4 (cont): BP-18 Final Proposal FY19 Market Price (\$/MWh, nominal)											
46	Year	Oct	Nov	Dec	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep
47	1969	22.62	23.91	26.26	23.02	21.97	20.73	12.67	3.88	14.44	22.19	26.68	25.50
48	1970	25.42	26.66	31.14	26.51	27.40	23.99	21.98	16.04	9.81	26.74	26.12	25.41
49	1971	24.96	25.97	28.01	21.23	17.95	17.59	15.23	7.46	1.77	15.67	22.95	25.64
50	1972	23.20	26.55	28.24	20.90	18.54	6.44	11.27	7.21	3.67	13.82	21.41	24.35
51	1973	23.64	26.30	27.59	26.90	28.98	25.10	22.81	18.18	23.36	24.86	27.26	24.76
52	1974	23.41	24.49	25.96	15.13	17.10	13.12	11.11	8.89	3.72	12.33	21.71	25.31
53	1975	27.55	28.21	31.31	26.07	26.33	22.91	22.78	12.92	5.49	13.40	26.13	25.00
54	1976	20.85	21.74	20.95	21.40	22.41	18.40	14.98	7.05	13.77	17.45	21.18	20.51
55	1977	24.79	26.92	32.28	32.41	31.72	26.96	23.98	21.86	26.69	26.94	27.08	27.71
56	1978	25.96	27.05	29.01	27.66	27.41	24.63	17.46	14.89	21.20	22.64	28.26	23.44
57	1979	23.83	26.39	30.23	26.86	29.12	22.65	23.05	15.76	21.71	28.82	28.90	26.16
58	1980	24.85	25.78	29.81	27.03	27.63	25.39	18.80	8.61	13.60	23.85	27.56	25.07
59	1981	23.70	24.67	23.84	23.21	24.37	24.96	23.51	17.53	11.10	21.48	23.94	25.38
60	1982	23.66	25.21	27.58	24.81	18.22	13.91	16.97	11.16	8.94	13.71	24.05	24.15
61	1983	22.91	25.47	26.53	23.52	23.42	18.72	18.84	13.92	14.10	16.87	23.54	23.89
62	1984	24.17	22.51	26.14	24.26	24.11	21.11	14.60	14.42	9.64	19.69	24.58	24.01
63	1985	22.94	23.31	27.20	27.14	27.80	24.76	17.73	16.00	20.64	25.28	29.00	25.51
64	1986	24.52	23.62	28.93	26.33	24.89	16.06	14.30	17.77	17.87	25.36	27.18	26.10
65	1987	25.41	25.38	27.44	28.94	30.45	23.58	22.50	17.03	22.34	27.30	29.41	26.79
66	1988	24.86	26.36	31.62	31.34	33.73	25.27	21.29	18.70	22.77	24.65	27.89	26.29
67	1989	24.83	24.57	29.77	30.57	32.82	23.28	17.53	17.56	21.48	26.80	28.79	27.00
68	1990	25.96	26.37	28.02	26.90	26.74	21.99	17.90	18.00	13.88	22.41	24.14	25.39
69	1991	23.35	21.35	25.92	24.13	23.53	20.82	19.71	17.48	18.15	19.47	25.77	27.01
70	1992	24.22	25.70	31.22	29.14	28.48	24.10	25.36	20.86	26.52	28.19	28.90	27.53
71	1993	25.35	25.64	30.35	31.81	36.29	24.51	20.75	15.96	19.64	25.36	26.61	26.04
72	1994	25.17	25.65	29.35	31.54	31.02	26.46	22.35	17.88	21.99	25.90	28.43	25.49
73	1995	25.16	27.29	31.04	28.20	26.55	22.54	22.55	17.27	11.87	23.18	26.53	24.74
74	1996	23.48	21.08	16.81	16.93	16.01	10.65	11.97	8.14	14.11	18.23	24.09	25.58
75	1997	22.82	24.00	24.52	14.80	14.77	11.17	10.14	4.97	5.62	15.92	23.40	23.29
76	1998	20.22	24.13	29.38	27.62	28.03	23.91	19.93	6.98	6.20	22.42	25.68	26.36
77	1999	25.21	26.80	25.59	22.05	21.07	17.59	17.05	14.59	5.87	14.37	21.75	25.09
78	2000	23.83	21.64	25.77	25.79	25.52	22.33	15.53	15.63	20.20	21.68	25.87	26.09
79	2001	23.97	27.21	31.08	33.24	31.77	25.75	23.48	21.20	28.91	27.02	27.74	27.28
80	2002	25.15	25.63	30.20	30.40	30.21	25.09	18.02	16.80	11.29	19.07	25.50	24.36
81	2003	24.54	25.53	29.72	28.17	30.01	20.70	18.33	15.88	14.98	24.28	26.47	24.47
82	2004	23.93	25.19	29.03	27.98	31.88	25.30	21.93	18.80	21.53	24.94	27.24	23.67
83	2005	23.84	26.30	27.36	27.02	27.20	26.65	22.68	17.04	20.31	24.83	27.90	25.90
84	2006	24.95	23.84	25.52	23.16	23.67	21.56	13.16	9.39	10.96	22.58	27.29	26.44
85	2007	24.72	24.81	29.71	25.68	27.30	21.50	19.09	17.89	20.01	23.82	28.14	26.92
86	2008	26.57	27.38	32.41	29.91	29.17	25.16	22.02	13.67	3.69	23.08	26.42	26.82

Figure 1: Basis Locations




Figure 2: January 2011 Through May 2017 Monthly Henry Hub Gas Prices






Figure 3: U.S. Dry Natural Gas Production and Rig Counts




Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration and Baker Hughes

Figure 4: Natural Gas Storage



Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration


Figure 5: Natural Gas Domestic Consumption (Demand*)



Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration

***EIA 2016 data was incomplete at the time of publication, so this graph shows only the three major sectors of gas demand. The “Other” category is omitted.**

Figure 6: Natural Gas Price Risk Model Percentiles



	Oct 17	Nov 17	Dec 17	Jan 18	Feb 18	Mar 18	Apr 18	May 18	Jun 18	Jul 18	Aug 18	Sep 18	Oct 18	Nov 18	Dec 18	Jan 19	Feb 19	Mar 19	Apr 19	May 19	Jun 19	Jul 19	Aug 19	Sep 19
5th Percentile	2.18	2.26	2.24	2.35	2.19	2.09	1.92	1.88	1.92	1.97	1.93	1.91	1.96	2.02	2.14	2.12	2.20	2.10	1.91	1.87	1.90	1.92	1.93	1.87
50th Percentile	3.27	3.39	3.44	3.46	3.37	3.18	2.89	2.86	2.89	2.92	2.89	2.88	2.95	3.05	3.20	3.27	3.25	3.13	2.89	2.79	2.82	2.90	2.91	2.88
95th Percentile	4.98	5.20	5.20	5.46	5.32	5.00	4.64	4.60	4.63	4.73	4.53	4.47	4.73	4.77	5.03	5.02	5.13	4.77	4.47	4.30	4.29	4.40	4.40	4.33

Figure 7: AURORAxmp[®] Zonal Topology

AURORAxmp System Diagram: West_Interconnect

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




Figure 8: Monthly Average Mid-C Market Price for FY18/FY19 80 Water Years



	Oct 17	Nov 17	Dec 17	Jan 18	Feb 18	Mar 18	Apr 18	May 18	Jun 18	Jul 18	Aug 18	Sep 18	Oct 18	Nov 18	Dec 18	Jan 19	Feb 19	Mar 19	Apr 19	May 19	Jun 19	Jul 19	Aug 19	Sep 19
LLH	23.25	25.55	26.98	24.32	23.93	20.93	17.55	10.85	8.32	19.39	22.59	22.21	21.72	23.94	26.23	23.57	23.95	20.66	17.53	11.66	10.31	18.72	22.64	22.17
HLH	27.55	28.16	30.76	29.80	28.60	23.94	19.81	16.48	16.80	24.96	27.93	27.93	25.93	26.39	29.80	28.80	28.48	23.56	19.53	16.78	18.62	24.35	28.29	27.96

Figure 9: Monthly Average Mid-C Market Price for FY18/FY19 Critical Water



	Oct 17	Nov 17	Dec 17	Jan 18	Feb 18	Mar 18	Apr 18	May 18	Jun 18	Jul 18	Aug 18	Sep 18	Oct 18	Nov 18	Dec 18	Jan 19	Feb 19	Mar 19	Apr 19	May 19	Jun 19	Jul 19	Aug 19	Sep 19
LLH	23.38	26.32	29.90	30.95	29.67	25.38	21.89	18.32	19.75	23.53	23.05	22.10	21.83	24.66	29.35	30.52	30.15	25.21	21.95	18.52	20.02	23.53	23.18	22.01
HLH	28.61	29.17	34.79	39.38	37.20	28.91	24.96	20.01	22.10	30.48	29.41	28.67	27.07	27.40	33.94	38.62	37.47	28.82	24.99	20.17	22.87	30.20	29.98	28.87

