

BP-18 Rate Proceeding

Final Proposal

Power and Transmission Risk Study

BP-18-FS-BPA-05

July 2017



POWER AND TRANSMISSION RISK STUDY

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COMMONLY USED ACRONYMS AND SHORT FORMS

AAC	Anticipated Accumulation of Cash
ACNR	Accumulated Calibrated Net Revenue
ACS	Ancillary and Control Area Services
AF	Advance Funding
AFUDC	Allowance for Funds Used During Construction
aMW	average megawatt(s)
ANR	Accumulated Net Revenues
ASC	Average System Cost
BAA	Balancing Authority Area
BiOp	Biological Opinion
BPA	Bonneville Power Administration
Bps	basis points
Btu	British thermal unit
CIP	Capital Improvement Plan
CIR	Capital Investment Review
CDQ	Contract Demand Quantity
CGS	Columbia Generating Station
CHWM	Contract High Water Mark
CNR	Calibrated Net Revenue
COB	California-Oregon border
COE	U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
COI	California-Oregon Intertie
Commission	Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
Corps	U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
COSA	Cost of Service Analysis
COU	consumer-owned utility
Council	Northwest Power and Conservation Council
CP	Coincidental Peak
CRAC	Cost Recovery Adjustment Clause
CSP	Customer System Peak
CT	combustion turbine
CY	calendar year (January through December)
DD	Dividend Distribution
DDC	Dividend Distribution Clause
<i>dec</i>	decrease, decrement, or decremental
DERBS	Dispatchable Energy Resource Balancing Service
DFS	Diurnal Flattening Service
DNR	Designated Network Resource
DOE	Department of Energy
DOI	Department of Interior
DSI	direct-service industrial customer or direct-service industry
DSO	Dispatcher Standing Order

EE	Energy Efficiency
EIM	Energy imbalance market
EIS	Environmental Impact Statement
EN	Energy Northwest, Inc.
ESA	Endangered Species Act
ESS	Energy Shaping Service
e-Tag	electronic interchange transaction information
FBS	Federal base system
FCRPS	Federal Columbia River Power System
FCRTS	Federal Columbia River Transmission System
FELCC	firm energy load carrying capability
FOIA	Freedom Of Information Act
FORS	Forced Outage Reserve Service
FPS	Firm Power and Surplus Products and Services
FPT	Formula Power Transmission
FY	fiscal year (October through September)
G&A	general and administrative (costs)
GARD	Generation and Reserves Dispatch (computer model)
GMS	Grandfathered Generation Management Service
GSP	Generation System Peak
GSR	Generation Supplied Reactive
GRSPs	General Rate Schedule Provisions
GTA	General Transfer Agreement
GWh	gigawatthour
HLH	Heavy Load Hour(s)
HOSS	Hourly Operating and Scheduling Simulator (computer model)
HYDSIM	Hydrosystem Simulator (computer model)
IE	Eastern Intertie
IM	Montana Intertie
<i>inc</i>	increase, increment, or incremental
IOU	investor-owned utility
IP	Industrial Firm Power
IPR	Integrated Program Review
IR	Integration of Resources
IRD	Irrigation Rate Discount
IRM	Irrigation Rate Mitigation
IRPL	Incremental Rate Pressure Limiter
IS	Southern Intertie
kcfs	thousand cubic feet per second
kW	kilowatt
kWh	kilowatthour
LDD	Low Density Discount
LGIA	Large Generator Interconnection Agreement
LLH	Light Load Hour(s)
LPP	Large Project Program
LPTAC	Large Project Targeted Adjustment Charge

LTF	Long-term Form
Maf	million acre-feet
Mid-C	Mid-Columbia
MMBtu	million British thermal units
MNR	Modified Net Revenue
MRNR	Minimum Required Net Revenue
MW	megawatt
MWh	megawatthour
NCP	Non-Coincidental Peak
NEPA	National Environmental Policy Act
NERC	North American Electric Reliability Corporation
NFB	National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) Federal Columbia River Power System (FCRPS) Biological Opinion (BiOp)
NLSL	New Large Single Load
NMFS	National Marine Fisheries Service
NOAA Fisheries	National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration Fisheries
NOB	Nevada-Oregon border
NORM	Non-Operating Risk Model (computer model)
Northwest Power Act	Pacific Northwest Electric Power Planning and Conservation Act
NP-15	North of Path 15
NPCC	Pacific Northwest Electric Power and Conservation Planning Council
NPV	net present value
NR	New Resource Firm Power
NRFS	NR Resource Flattening Service
NT	Network Integration
NTSA	Non-Treaty Storage Agreement
NUG	non-utility generation
NWPP	Northwest Power Pool
OATT	Open Access Transmission Tariff
O&M	operation and maintenance
OATI	Open Access Technology International, Inc.
OS	Oversupply
OY	operating year (August through July)
PDCI	Pacific DC Intertie
Peak	Peak Reliability (assessment/charge)
PF	Priority Firm Power
PFp	Priority Firm Public
PFx	Priority Firm Exchange
PNCA	Pacific Northwest Coordination Agreement
PNRR	Planned Net Revenues for Risk
PNW	Pacific Northwest
POD	Point of Delivery
POI	Point of Integration or Point of Interconnection
POR	Point of Receipt
Project Act	Bonneville Project Act

PS	Power Services
PSC	power sales contract
PSW	Pacific Southwest
PTP	Point to Point
PUD	public or people's utility district
PW	WECC and Peak Service
RAM	Rate Analysis Model (computer model)
RCD	Regional Cooperation Debt
RD	Regional Dialogue
REC	Renewable Energy Certificate
Reclamation	U.S. Bureau of Reclamation
RDC	Reserves Distribution Clause
REP	Residential Exchange Program
REPSIA	REP Settlement Implementation Agreement
RevSim	Revenue Simulation Model
RFA	Revenue Forecast Application (database)
RHWM	Rate Period High Water Mark
ROD	Record of Decision
RPSA	Residential Purchase and Sale Agreement
RR	Resource Replacement
RRS	Resource Remarketing Service
RSC	Resource Shaping Charge
RSS	Resource Support Services
RT1SC	RHWM Tier 1 System Capability
SCD	Scheduling, System Control, and Dispatch rate
SCS	Secondary Crediting Service
SDD	Short Distance Discount
SILS	Southeast Idaho Load Service
Slice	Slice of the System (product)
T1SFCO	Tier 1 System Firm Critical Output
TCMS	Transmission Curtailment Management Service
TGT	Townsend-Garrison Transmission
TOCA	Tier 1 Cost Allocator
TPP	Treasury Payment Probability
TRAM	Transmission Risk Analysis Model
Transmission System Act	Federal Columbia River Transmission System Act
Treaty	Columbia River Treaty
TRL	Total Retail Load
TRM	Tiered Rate Methodology
TS	Transmission Services
TSS	Transmission Scheduling Service
UAI	Unauthorized Increase
UFT	Use of Facilities Transmission
UIC	Unauthorized Increase Charge
ULS	Unanticipated Load Service
USACE	U.S. Army Corps of Engineers

USBR	U.S. Bureau of Reclamation
USFWS	U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service
VERBS	Variable Energy Resources Balancing Service
VOR	Value of Reserves
VR1-2014	First Vintage Rate of the BP-14 rate period (PF Tier 2 rate)
VR1-2016	First Vintage Rate of the BP-16 rate period (PF Tier 2 rate)
WECC	Western Electricity Coordinating Council
WSPP	Western Systems Power Pool

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1 **1. INTRODUCTION**

2

3 The Bonneville Power Administration’s (BPA) business environment is replete with uncertainty
4 that a rigorous ratemaking process must consider. The objectives of the Power and Transmission
5 Risk Study are to identify, model, and analyze the impacts that key risks and risk mitigation tools
6 have on BPA’s net revenue (total revenue less total expenses) and cash flow. The Risk Study
7 ensures that power and transmission rates are set high enough that the probability BPA can meet
8 its cash obligations is at least as high as required by BPA’s Treasury Payment Probability (TPP)
9 standard. This evaluation is carried out in two distinct steps: a risk assessment step, in which the
10 distributions, or profiles, of operating and non-operating risks are defined, and a risk mitigation
11 step, in which risk mitigation tools are assessed with respect to their ability to recover costs
12 given these uncertainties. The risk assessment estimates both the central tendency of risks and
13 the potential variability of those risks. Both of these elements are used in the ratemaking
14 process.

15

16 In this Study the words “risk” and “uncertainty” are used in similar ways. Generally, each can
17 have both up-side and down-side possibilities, that is, both beneficial and harmful impacts on
18 BPA objectives. The BPA objectives that may be affected by the risks considered in this Study
19 are generally BPA’s financial objectives.

20

21 **1.1 Purpose of the Power and Transmission Risk Study**

22 The Power and Transmission Risk Study demonstrates that BPA’s proposed rates and risk
23 mitigation tools together meet BPA’s standard for financial risk tolerance, the TPP standard.

1 This Study includes quantitative and qualitative analyses of risks to net revenue and tools for
2 mitigating those risks. It also establishes the adequacy of those tools for meeting BPA’s TPP
3 standard.

4
5 In addition to mitigating the risks that reserves and other liquidity are insufficient to repay the
6 Treasury, this Study also addresses the risk that reserves are insufficient to maintain BPA’s
7 credit rating. Maintaining a high credit rating is important to BPA’s operations and access to
8 capital. To maintain BPA’s credit rating and mitigate the risk of BPA’s credit rating being
9 downgraded, the Risk Study implements the terms of BPA’s Financial Reserves Policy (FRP),
10 which is designed to provide stability and transparency to the accumulation and use of financial
11 reserves. As described more fully in Chapter 6, the FRP establishes a target level for financial
12 reserves for each business line and for BPA as an agency, and establishes lower and upper
13 thresholds for reserves.

2. FINANCIAL RISK POLICIES AND OBJECTIVES

2.1 Risk Mitigation Policy Objectives

The following policy objectives guide the development of the risk mitigation package:

- Create a rate design and risk mitigation package that meets BPA financial standards, particularly achieving a 95 percent two-year Treasury Payment Probability.
- Produce the lowest possible rates, consistent with sound business principles and statutory obligations, including BPA’s long-term responsibility to invest in and maintain the Federal Columbia River Power System (FCRPS) and Federal Columbia River Transmission System (FCRTS).
- Maintain sufficient financial reserves levels to support BPA’s credit rating.
- Include in the risk mitigation package only those elements that can be relied upon.
- Do not let financial reserve levels build up to unnecessarily high levels.
- Allocate costs and risks of products to the rates for those products to the fullest extent possible; in particular, for Power rates, prevent any risks arising from Tier 2 service from imposing costs on Tier 1 or requiring stronger Tier 1 risk mitigation.
- Rely prudently on liquidity tools, and create means to replenish them when they are used in order to maintain long-term availability.

These objectives are not completely independent and may sometimes conflict with each other.

Thus, BPA must create a balance among these objectives when developing its overall risk mitigation strategy.

1 **2.2 How Risk Results Are Used**

2 The main result from the risk assessment and mitigation process is the TPP calculation. If this
3 number is 95 percent or higher, then the rates and risk mitigation tools meet BPA’s TPP
4 standard. The calculations also take into account the thresholds and caps for the Cost Recovery
5 Adjustment Clause (CRAC) and the Reserves Distribution Clause (RDC). These values are
6 incorporated in the Power and Transmission General Rate Schedule Provisions (GRSPs) and will
7 be applied in later calculations outside the ratemaking process for determining whether a CRAC
8 or RDC will be applied to certain power and transmission rates for FY 2018 or FY 2019. Power
9 Rate Schedules and GRSPs, BP-18-A-04-AP03 (Power GRSPs); Transmission, Ancillary, and
10 Control Area Service Rate Schedules and GRSPs, BP-18-A-04-AP04 (Transmission GRSPs).

11
12 **2.3 BPA’s Treasury Payment Probability Standard**

13 In the WP-93 rate proceeding, BPA adopted and implemented its 10-Year Financial Plan, which
14 included a policy requiring that BPA set rates to achieve a high probability of meeting its
15 payment obligations to the U.S. Treasury (Treasury). *See* 1993 Final Rate Proposal
16 Administrator’s Record of Decision (ROD), WP-93-A-02, at 72. The specific standard set in the
17 10-Year Financial Plan was a 95 percent probability of making both of the annual Treasury
18 payments in the two-year rate period on time and in full. This TPP standard was established as a
19 rate period standard; that is, it focuses upon the probability that BPA can successfully make all
20 of its payments to Treasury over the multi-year rate period rather than the probability for a single
21 year. The 10-Year Financial Plan was updated July 31, 2008, and renamed the “Financial Plan.”
22 *See* <http://www.bpa.gov/Finance/FinancialInformation/FinancialPlan/Pages/default.aspx>.

1 The Pacific Northwest Electric Power Planning and Conservation Act (Northwest Power Act)
2 states that BPA's payments to Treasury are the lowest priority for revenue application, meaning
3 that payments to Treasury are the first to be missed if financial reserves are insufficient to pay all
4 bills on time. 16 U.S.C. § 839e(a)(2)(A). Therefore, TPP is a prospective measure of BPA's
5 overall ability to meet its financial obligations.

6
7 BPA's Treasury payments are an obligation of the agency. Since 2002, TPP has been
8 independently measured for the Power Services (PS) and Transmission Services (TS) business
9 lines. This Study tests the ability of PS and TS to make their portions of the Treasury payments
10 over the rate period.

11
12 The following items (explained in more detail in Chapter 4 below) are included in the calculation
13 of TPP:

- 14 • *Starting Reserves (Starting Financial Reserves Available for Risk Attributed to PS or TS).*
15 Financial reserves comprise (1) cash and investment instruments held in the BPA Fund
16 and (2) the deferred borrowing balance. Financial reserves available for risk do not
17 include funds held for others. For example, amounts in the BPA Fund that were provided
18 by customers as collateral for creditworthiness are excluded. Deferred borrowing
19 amounts exist when planned borrowing has not yet been completed. When the borrowing
20 is completed, cash in the BPA Fund is increased and the deferred borrowing balance is
21 reduced by the same amount, leaving financial reserves unchanged.
- 22 • *Planned Net Revenues for Risk (PNRR).* PNRR is the final component of the revenue
23 requirement that may be added to annual expenses. PNRR is needed when the risk

1 mitigation provided by starting financial reserves and other risk mitigation tools is
2 insufficient to meet the TPP standard. PNRR may also be added in order to meet the
3 needs of the FRP.

- 4 • *BPA's Treasury Facility.* The Treasury Facility is an arrangement BPA has with the
5 Treasury that allows BPA to borrow up to \$750 million on a short-term basis. For
6 ratemaking purposes, this facility is allocated in each rate case so as to provide the
7 greatest quantitative benefit to BPA rates. The full \$750 million in the Treasury Facility
8 is considered to be available for the liquidity needs associated with PS; reserves for risk
9 attributed to TS are sufficient for the liquidity needed to mitigate TS financial risk. The
10 Treasury Facility functions similarly to additional financial reserves.
- 11 • *Within-year Liquidity Need.* The within-year liquidity need is an amount of cash or
12 short-term borrowing capability that must be set aside for meeting within-year liquidity
13 needs (or risks). In the BP-18 rate period, the within-year liquidity need is \$320 million
14 for PS and \$100 million for TS. The methodologies for calculating these amounts and
15 the resulting amounts remain unchanged from BP-16 rates.
- 16 • *Liquidity Reserves Level.* The liquidity reserves level is the amount of financial reserves
17 that is allocated for meeting the within-year liquidity need. For this Study, the liquidity
18 reserves level is \$0 for PS and \$100 million for TS.
- 19 • *Liquidity Borrowing Level.* The liquidity borrowing level is the amount of the Treasury
20 Facility set aside to meet the within-year liquidity need. For this Study, the liquidity
21 borrowing level is \$320 million for PS. This leaves \$430 million of the \$750 million
22 Treasury Facility available for year-to-year liquidity needs for PS (*i.e.*, TPP needs).

1 Within-year liquidity needs for TS are handled through the liquidity allocation of
2 liquidity reserves; the TS liquidity borrowing level is \$0.

- 3 • *Cost Recovery Adjustment Clause.* The CRAC is an upward adjustment to applicable
4 power and transmission rates. The adjustment is applied to rates charged for service
5 beginning in October following a fiscal year in which PS or TS Accumulated Calibrated
6 Net Revenue (ACNR) falls below the Power or Transmission CRAC threshold. For the
7 Final Proposal, the PS threshold is set at the ACNR equivalent of \$0 in PS financial
8 reserves available for risk, which is the minimum allowed by the FRP. The TS threshold
9 is set at the ACNR equivalent of \$99 million in TS financial reserves available for risk;
10 this equals the Transmission lower financial reserves threshold in the FRP.
- 11 • *Reserves Distribution Clause.* The RDC allows the Administrator to put reserves for risk
12 that are above the level necessary for TPP and credit support to higher-value purposes,
13 such as retirement of debt, incremental capital investment, or a dividend distribution
14 (DD). A DD is a downward adjustment to the applicable power or transmission rates.
15 The adjustment is applied to rates charged for service beginning in October following a
16 fiscal year in which ACNR is above the RDC threshold. A reserves distribution may be
17 made if (1) reserves for risk attributed to a business line exceed the RDC threshold for
18 that business line and (2) BPA reserves for risk exceed the BPA RDC threshold. *See*
19 *Power GRSP II.P and Transmission GRSP II.I.*

21 **2.4 Quantitative vs. Qualitative Risk Assessment and Mitigation**

22 This study distinguishes between quantitative and qualitative perspectives of risk. The
23 quantitative risk assessment is a set of risk simulations that are modeled using a Monte Carlo

1 approach, a statistical technique in which deterministic analysis is performed on a distribution of
2 inputs, resulting in a distribution of outputs suitable for analysis. The output from the
3 quantitative risk assessment is a set of 3,200 possible financial results (net revenues) for each of
4 the two years in the rate period (FY 2018–2019) and for the year preceding the rate period
5 (FY 2017). The models used in the quantitative risk assessment are described in Chapter 3.
6 Quantitative risk modeling for Power is described in Section 4.1 and for Transmission in
7 Section 5.1.

8
9 BPA’s primary tool for risk mitigation is financial reserves. BPA also uses the Power CRAC
10 and Transmission CRAC to manage financial risk. The CRACs add additional risk mitigation to
11 that provided by financial reserves and liquidity. When financial reserves available for risk plus
12 the additional revenue earned through the CRAC do not provide sufficient risk mitigation to
13 meet the 95 percent TPP standard, PNRR is added to the revenue requirement. This increases
14 rates, which generates additional reserves, which increases TPP. The models used in the
15 quantitative risk mitigation are described in Chapter 3. Modeling of quantitative risk mitigation
16 is described in Sections 4.2 for Power and 5.2 for Transmission.

17
18 Some financial risks are unsuitable for quantitative modeling but are significant enough that they
19 need to be accounted for. These risks usually fit into one of two general categories that make
20 them unsuitable for modeling. The first type is risks for which there is no basis for estimating
21 the probabilities of future outcomes: relevant historical data is unavailable and subject matter
22 experts are unable to provide estimates of probabilities. The second type is risks for which

1 modeling may adversely influence the future actions of human beings, including possible impact
2 on legal proceedings.

3
4 For the most part, the qualitative risk assessment is a logical assessment of possible events that
5 could have significant financial consequences for BPA. The qualitative risk mitigation describes
6 measures BPA has put in place, or responses BPA would make to these events, and then presents
7 logical analyses of whether any significant residual financial risk remains for BPA after taking
8 into account the mitigation measures. Qualitative Power risks and associated mitigation are
9 described in Section 4.3. There have been no qualitative risks identified for Transmission rates.

10 11 **2.5 BPA's Financial Reserves Policy**

12 The FRP is intended to provide a consistent, transparent, and financially prudent method for
13 determining target financial reserves levels and upper and lower financial reserves thresholds for
14 Power Services, Transmission Services, and BPA as a whole. The FRP also describes the
15 actions BPA may take in response to financial reserves levels that either fall below a lower
16 threshold or exceed an upper threshold. The main components of the FRP and its
17 implementation for the BP-18 rate period are described in Chapter 6. *See* Administrator's Final
18 Record of Decision, BP-18-A-04, Appendix A.

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3. TOOLS AND SIMULATORS USED IN QUANTITATIVE RISK MODELING

This chapter provides an overview of BPA’s general approach to quantitative risk assessment and mitigation. More detailed descriptions of how this approach is implemented for Power and Transmission rates are provided below in Chapters 4 and 5.

The approach BPA takes to quantify risks and assess whether BPA’s proposed risk mitigation packages for PS and TS rates are sufficient is based on Monte Carlo simulation. In this technique, risks and the relationships between risks are defined using probabilistic models. A large number of games, or iterations, are run. In each game, a random value is drawn for each probabilistic model and the results are recorded. The entire set of gamed results is examined to verify that BPA’s risk mitigation objectives have been achieved.

The 3,200 games from the quantitative risk assessment are used in the quantitative risk mitigation step to determine if BPA’s financial risk standard, the 95 percent TPP standard, has been met. *See* §§ 2.3 and 3.1.5.

3.1 Modeling Process to Calculate TPP

3.1.1 Study Models

BPA traditionally models risks using Monte Carlo simulation. Accordingly, models including AURORAxmp[®], the Revenue Simulation Model (RevSim), the Non-Operating Risk Models (P-NORM and T-NORM), and ToolKit each run 3,200 iterations, or games. AURORAxmp[®] estimates electricity prices, which serve as inputs to numerous other studies, including the Power

1 portions of this Study. RevSim (see Section 3.1.2.1 below) combines deterministic load,
2 resource, revenue, and expense values with the uncertainty in spot market electricity prices, loads
3 and resources, PS transmission and ancillary services expenses, and Northwest Power Act
4 Section 4(h)(10)(C) credits to produce 3,200 values for PS annual net revenue for each year of
5 the BP-18 rate period, FY 2018 and FY 2019. The output of this process is combined with the
6 distribution of output from P-NORM and provided to the ToolKit to calculate PS TPP.
7 Similarly, TS revenue uncertainty is modeled for the TS Sales and Revenue Forecasts. *See*
8 *Transmission Rates Study and Documentation, BP-18-FS-BPA-08, § 2.* The Transmission
9 revenue uncertainty is combined with the distribution of output from T-NORM and provided to
10 ToolKit to calculate TS TPP.

12 **3.1.2 Revenue Simulation Models**

13 **3.1.2.1 Power—RevSim**

14 RevSim calculates secondary energy revenues, firm surplus energy revenues, balancing power
15 purchase expenses, and system augmentation purchase expenses. Two financial operating risks
16 are modeled externally and input to RevSim: 4(h)(10)(C) credits and PS transmission and
17 ancillary services expenses. The results from RevSim and these two financial operating risks are
18 provided for input into the Rate Analysis Model (RAM2018). RevSim also simulates PS
19 operating net revenue for use in ToolKit. Inputs to RevSim include the output of certain risk
20 models discussed in the Power Market Price Study (to the extent that they affect generation and
21 loads) and prices from AURORAxmp[®]. *See Power Market Price Study and Documentation,*
22 *BP-18-FS-BPA-04, § 2.3.* RevSim also uses deterministic monthly load and resource data;
23 revenues, expenses, and rates from RAM2018; and non-varying revenues and expenses from the

1 Power Revenue Requirement Study, BP-18-FS-BPA-02, and Chapter 2 of the Power Rates
2 Study, BP-18-FS-BPA-01.

3 4 **3.1.2.1.1 Operating Risk Models**

5 Uncertainty in each of the following variables is modeled as independent:

- 6 • WECC Loads
- 7 • Natural Gas Price
- 8 • Regional Hydroelectric Generation
- 9 • Pacific Northwest (PNW) Hourly Wind Generation
- 10 • CGS Generation
- 11 • PNW Hourly Intertie Availability

12
13 Each model uses historical data to calibrate a statistical model. The model can then, by Monte
14 Carlo simulation, generate a distribution of outcomes. Each realization from the joint
15 distribution of these models constitutes one game and serves as input to AURORAxmp[®].

16 Where applicable, the results for that game also serve as input to RevSim. The prices from
17 AURORAxmp[®], combined with the deterministic and variable values used in RevSim, constitute
18 one net revenue game. Each risk model may not generate 3,200 games, and where necessary a
19 bootstrap approach is used to produce a full distribution of 3,200 games. Each of the
20 3,200 draws from the joint distribution is identified uniquely, which guarantees coordination
21 between AURORAxmp[®] prices and RevSim inventory levels.

1 Expenses associated with the purchase of system augmentation are estimated in RevSim using
2 variable electricity prices calculated under 1937 “critical water” conditions. These results are
3 used by RAM2018 when calculating rates and calculating net revenues provided for input into
4 the ToolKit model. *See* Section 3.1.5.

5
6 Revenues associated with the firm surplus energy sales are estimated in RevSim using variable
7 electricity prices calculated under 80 water year conditions. These results are used by RAM2018
8 when calculating rates and calculating net revenues provided for input into the ToolKit model.

9
10 The monthly flat electricity prices calculated by AURORAxmp[®] under 80 water year conditions
11 for all 3,200 games for each fiscal year are inputs into the risk model that calculates the average
12 4(h)(10)(C) credits included in the Power Revenue Requirement Study, BP-18-FS-BPA-02. The
13 4(h)(10)(C) credits calculated by this risk model for 3,200 games for each fiscal year are input
14 into RevSim for use in calculating net revenue risk.

15
16 The monthly flat secondary energy values calculated by RevSim for all 3,200 games for each
17 fiscal year are inputs into the PS Transmission and Ancillary Services Expense Risk Model,
18 which calculates the average PS transmission and ancillary services expenses included in the
19 Power Revenue Requirement Study, BP-18-FS-BPA-02. The transmission and ancillary services
20 expenses calculated by the PS Transmission and Ancillary Services Expense Risk Model for
21 3,200 games for each fiscal year are input into RevSim for use in calculating net revenue risk.

3.1.2.2 Transmission—RevRAM

Transmission revenue is a key input to the income statement and to T-NORM. The Transmission Revenue Risk Assessment Model (RevRAM) models the revenue uncertainty in BPA’s transmission products and services. RevRAM uses Microsoft Excel[®]-based models and @Risk[®] to generate 3,200 iterations with Monte Carlo simulation. Transmission products and services that are modeled for revenue uncertainty include:

- Network Load Service (NT), which has risk based on load variability.
- Long-Term Point-to-Point (PTP) Service on the Network and Southern Intertie (PTP LT and IS LT), which has risk based on probability of customers taking the contractual service.
- Short-Term Service on the Network and Intertie (PTP ST and IS ST), which has risk based on variability of market conditions that include hydro and prices.
- Legacy Products (Formula Power Transmission (FPT) and Integration of Resources (IR)), which are not modeled for risk as their conversion probability is accounted for in PTP LT.
- Scheduling, System Control and Dispatch (SCD), which has variability dependent on sales of Network and Intertie transmission service.
- Other revenues, including Delivery, Fiber and PCS Wireless, and other miscellaneous revenues, which have differing inputs but are modeled using historical variability.
- Generation Inputs risk is modeled for products that have variability in revenues but a fixed expense payment to BPA Power Services (Regulation and Frequency Response (RFR), Variable Energy Resource Balancing Service (VERBS), and Dispatchable Energy Resource Balancing Service (DERBS)). Products whose revenues and expenses have

1 generally equivalent variability and are correlated—that is, any potential change in TS
2 revenue is matched by an offsetting change in TS expense—create insignificant
3 uncertainty in TS net revenue and are not modeled for risk. These include Energy
4 Imbalance/Generation Imbalance (EI/GI), and Operating Reserve (OR).

5
6 These transmission products and services are modeled individually in Microsoft Excel[®]. A
7 separate spreadsheet tab in RevRAM adds all individual revenue products to generate the total
8 transmission revenue forecast (excludes reimbursable revenues).

9 10 **3.1.3 Expense Variability Simulator**

11 NORM is an analytical risk tool that quantifies the impacts of non-operating risks in the
12 ratemaking process. NORM follows BPA’s traditional approach to modeling risks, which uses
13 Monte Carlo simulation. In this technique, a model runs through a number of games or
14 iterations. In each game, each modeled uncertainty is randomly assigned a value from its
15 probability distribution based on input specifications for that uncertainty. After all of the games
16 are run, the results can be analyzed and summarized or passed to other tools.

17
18 New risks for inclusion in NORM are identified based on review of historical results and
19 querying of subject matter experts. If a financial risk has a significant range of financial
20 uncertainty and is suitable for quantitative modeling, it is included in the model. If a risk has a
21 significant range of financial uncertainty but is not suitable for modeling, it is evaluated in the
22 qualitative risk analysis. *See* Section 4.3.

1 To obtain the data used to develop the probability distributions used by NORM, subject matter
2 experts were interviewed for each capital and expense item modeled. The subject matter experts
3 were asked to assess the risks concerning their cost estimates, including the possible range of
4 outcomes and the associated probabilities of occurrence. In some instances, the subject matter
5 experts provided a complete probability distribution.

6
7 After data is gathered, risks are modeled using Excel[®] and @RISK[®]. Risks are generally
8 modeled using continuous or discrete probability distributions selected to best match the
9 available data on the risk. Serial correlation (correlation over time) and correlation between
10 different risks are included in the modeling when relevant and assessable.

11 12 **3.1.3.1 Power—P-NORM**

13 P-NORM models PS risks that are not incorporated into RevSim, such as risks around corporate
14 costs covered by power rates and debt service-related risks. P-NORM also models some changes
15 in revenue and some changes in cash flow. While the operating risk models and RevSim are
16 used to quantify operating risks, such as variability in economic conditions, load, and generating
17 resource capability, P-NORM is used to model risks surrounding projections of non-operations-
18 related revenue or expense levels in the PS revenue requirement. P-NORM models the accrual
19 impacts of the included risks, as well as Net Revenue-to-Cash (NRTC) adjustments, which
20 translate the net revenue impacts into cash flow impacts. P-NORM supplies 3,200 games (or
21 iterations) of net revenue and cash flow impacts of the risks that it models. The outputs from
22 P-NORM, along with the outputs from RevSim, are passed to the ToolKit model to assess Power
23 TPP.

1 **3.1.3.2 Transmission—T-NORM**

2 Similar to P-NORM, T-NORM models TS risks that are not incorporated into RevRam, as well
3 as some changes in revenue and some changes in cash flow. T-NORM models the accrual
4 impacts of the included risks, as well as NRTC adjustments, which translate the net revenue
5 impacts into cash flow impacts. T-NORM supplies 3,200 games (or iterations) of net revenue
6 and cash flow impacts of the risks that it models. The outputs from T-NORM, along with the
7 outputs from RevRam, are passed to the ToolKit model to assess TS TPP.

8
9 **3.1.4 Net Revenue-to-Cash Adjustments**

10 One of the inputs to the ToolKit (through NORM) is the NRTC Adjustment. Most of BPA’s
11 probabilistic modeling is based on impacts of various factors on net revenue. BPA’s TPP
12 standard is a measure of the probability of having enough cash to make payments to the
13 Treasury. While cash flow and net revenue generally track each other closely, there can be
14 significant differences in any year. For instance, the requirement to repay Federal borrowing
15 over time is reflected in the accrual arena as depreciation of assets. Depreciation is an expense
16 that reduces net revenue, but there is no cash inflow or outflow associated with depreciation.
17 The same repayment requirement is reflected in the cash arena as cash payments to the Treasury
18 to reduce the principal balance on Federal bonds and appropriations. These cash payments are
19 not reflected on income statements. Therefore, in translating a net revenue result to a cash flow
20 result, the impact of depreciation must be removed and the impact of cash principal payments
21 must be added. P-NORM and T-NORM calculate 3,200 NRTC adjustments to make the
22 necessary changes to convert accrual results (net revenue results) into the equivalent cash flows
23 so the ToolKit can calculate reserves values in each game and thus calculate TPP.

1 The NRTC Adjustment is modeled probabilistically in NORM using a table of adjustments as its
2 starting point and includes 3,200 gamed adjustments based on deviations in revenue and expense
3 items. See §§ 4.1.3 and 5.1.3.

4 5 **3.1.4.1 @RISK® Computer Software**

6 P-NORM and T-NORM are maintained in Microsoft Excel® with the add-in risk simulation
7 computer package @RISK®, a product of Palisade Corporation of Ithaca, New York. @RISK®
8 allows analysts to develop models incorporating uncertainty in a spreadsheet environment.

9 Uncertainty is incorporated by specifying the probability distribution that reflects the specific
10 risk, providing the necessary parameters that describe the probability distribution, and letting
11 @RISK® sample values from the probability distributions based on the parameters provided.

12 The values sampled from the probability distributions reflect their relative likelihood of
13 occurrence. The parameters required for appropriately quantifying risk are not developed in
14 @RISK® but in analyses external to @RISK®.

15 16 **3.1.5 Overview of the ToolKit**

17 The ToolKit is a model that is used to evaluate the ability of PS and TS to meet BPA's TPP
18 standard given the net revenue variability embodied in the distributions of operating and non-
19 operating risks. The ToolKit is modeled in the programming language R and uses a web-based
20 interface for users to interact with the model.

21
22 The ToolKit contains several parameters (*e.g.*, Starting Reserves and CRAC and RDC settings)
23 defined within the ToolKit file itself. The ToolKit reads in data from two external files. For

1 Power, ToolKit reads in a file from RevSim and a file from P-NORM. For Transmission,
2 ToolKit reads in a file from RevRam and a file from T-NORM. Most of the modeling of risks is
3 performed by the input risk models, as described in Chapters 4 and 5.

4
5 The ToolKit is used to assess the effects of various policies, assumptions, changes in data, and
6 risk mitigation measures on the level of year-end reserves and liquidity attributable to each
7 business line, and thus on TPP. It registers a deferral of a Treasury payment when reserves and
8 all sources of liquidity for a business line are exhausted in any given year. The ToolKit is run for
9 3,200 games (or iterations). TPP is calculated by dividing the number of games where a deferral
10 did not occur in either year of the rate period by 3,200. The ToolKit calculates the TPP and
11 other risk statistics for each business line and reports results. The ToolKit also allows analysts to
12 calculate how much PNRR is needed in rates, if any, to meet the TPP standard.

13
14 If TPP is below the 95 percent standard required by BPA's Financial Plan, then one of several
15 risk mitigation tools may be adjusted in the ToolKit until the standard is met. These options
16 include (1) raising the CRAC threshold, which makes it more likely that the CRAC will trigger;
17 (2) increasing the cap on the annual revenue the CRAC can collect; and/or (3) adding PNRR to
18 the revenue requirement.

20 **3.1.5.1 R Statistical Software**

21 ToolKit was developed in R (www.r-project.org). R is an open-source statistical software
22 environment that compiles on several platforms. It is released under the GNU GPL (GNU
23 General Public License) and is free software. R supports the development of risk models

1 through an object-oriented, functional scripting environment; that is, it provides an interface for
2 managing proprietary risk models and has a native random number generator useful for sampling
3 values from a wide variety of risk distributions.

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1 **4. POWER RISK**

2

3 **4.1 Power Quantitative Risk Assessment**

4 This chapter describes the uncertainties pertaining to Power Services finances in the context of
5 setting power rates. Section 4.2 describes how BPA determines whether its risk mitigation
6 measures are sufficient to meet the TPP standard given the risks detailed in this chapter.

7

8 Variability in PS net revenue, largely a product of uncertainty in both Federal hydro generation
9 and market prices, is substantial. BPA also considers uncertainty in (1) customer load;
10 (2) Columbia Generating Station (CGS) output; (3) wind generation; (4) system augmentation
11 costs; (5) PS transmission and ancillary services expenses; and (6) Northwest Power Act
12 Section 4(h)(10)(C) credits. The effects of these risk factors on PS net revenue are quantified in
13 this Study.

14

15 PS also faces risks not directly related to the operation of the power system. These non-
16 operating risks are modeled in the Power Non-Operating Risk Model (P-NORM). These risks
17 include the potential for CGS, Corps of Engineers (Corps), and U.S. Bureau of Reclamation
18 (Reclamation) operations and maintenance (O&M) spending to differ from their forecasts. P-
19 NORM also accounts for variability in interest rate expense. P-NORM models variability in net
20 revenues, including uncertainty in the length of the CGS refueling outages in FY 2017 and
21 FY 2019.

1 **4.1.1 RevSim**

2 As described in Section 3.1.2, RevSim calculates secondary energy revenues, firm surplus
3 energy revenues, balancing power purchase expenses, and system augmentation purchase
4 expenses. Two financial operating risks are modeled externally and input into RevSim:
5 4(h)(10)(C) credits and PS transmission and ancillary services expenses. The results from
6 RevSim and these two financial operating risks are provided for input into the Rate Analysis
7 Model (RAM2018). RevSim also determines, by simulation, PS operating net revenue risk for
8 use in the ToolKit Model. *See* Section 3.1.5.

9
10 **4.1.1.1 Inputs to RevSim**

11 Inputs to RevSim include risk data simulated by various risk models and market prices calculated
12 by AURORAxmp[®]. *See* Power Market Price Study, BP-18-FS-BPA-04, § 2.1, regarding
13 AURORAxmp[®]. Other inputs include deterministic monthly data from other rate development
14 studies.

15
16 **4.1.1.1.1 Deterministic Data**

17 Deterministic data are data provided as single forecast values, as opposed to data presented as a
18 distribution of many values.

19
20 **4.1.1.1.2 Loads and Resources**

21 Monthly HLH and LLH load and resource data are provided by the Power Loads and Resources
22 Study, BP-18-FS-BPA-03. A summary of these load and resource data in the form of monthly

1 energy for FY 2018–2019 is provided in the Power Loads and Resources Study Documentation,
2 BP-18-FS-BPA-03A, Section 10.1.

3 4 **4.1.1.1.3 Miscellaneous Revenues**

5 Miscellaneous revenues represent estimated revenues that are not subject to change through
6 BPA’s ratemaking process. See Power Rates Study, BP-18-FS-BPA-01, § 9.2, for a discussion
7 of miscellaneous revenues.

8 9 **4.1.1.1.4 Composite, Non-Slice, Load Shaping, and Demand Revenues**

10 Composite, Non-Slice, Load Shaping, and Demand revenues are provided by RAM2018.
11 Consistent with the Tiered Rate Methodology (TRM), Composite and Non-Slice revenues do not
12 vary in the RevSim revenue simulation, but Load Shaping and Demand revenues do vary. The
13 Load Shaping billing determinants and Load Shaping rates from RAM2018 are input into
14 RevSim to facilitate the calculation of changes in Load Shaping revenue. Demand billing
15 determinants and rates from RAM2018 are input into RevSim to facilitate the calculation of
16 changes in Demand revenue. See Power Rates Study Documentation, BP-18-FS-BPA-01A,
17 Table 3.1.5.

18 19 **4.1.1.1.5 Risk Data**

20 Uncertainty around the deterministic data provided to RevSim must be considered in the
21 determination of TPP in ToolKit. Specifically, the uncertainty considered in RevSim is called
22 operational uncertainty, as opposed to the non-operational uncertainty considered in P-NORM.

1 Uncertainty in the deterministic data is represented by risk data; *i.e.*, a distribution of many
2 values.

3
4 Input data to RevSim for operational uncertainty include Federal hydro generation risk, PS load
5 risk, CGS generation risk, PS wind generation risk, PS transmission and ancillary services
6 expense risk, 4(h)(10)(C) credit risk, and electricity price risk. The load, resource, and price risk
7 inputs are reflected in the risk distributions for secondary energy revenues, firm surplus energy
8 revenues, balancing power purchases expenses, and system augmentation expenses. These risks,
9 along with the 4(h)(10)(C) credit risk and PS transmission and ancillary services expense risk,
10 are reflected in the PS operating net revenues calculated by RevSim and provided for input into
11 ToolKit.

12 13 **4.1.1.1.5.1. Federal Hydro Generation Risk**

14 The Federal hydro generation risk factor reflects the uncertain impacts that streamflow timing
15 and volume have on monthly Federal hydro generation under specified hydro operation
16 requirements. Federal hydro generation risk is accounted for in RevSim by inputting hydro
17 generation estimates from the HYDSIM model and adjusting these results to account for
18 efficiency losses associated with BPA standing ready to provide balancing reserve capacity,
19 which is discussed below.

20
21 For FY 2018–2019, average monthly hydro generation risk is accounted for based on hydro
22 generation estimates from the HYDSIM model for monthly streamflow patterns experienced
23 from October 1928 through September 2008 (also referred to as the 80 water years). These

1 monthly hydro generation data are developed by simulating hydro operations sequentially over
2 all 960 months of the 80 water years. This analysis by HYDSIM is referred to as a continuous
3 study. See Power Loads and Resources Study, BP-18-FS-BPA-03, § 3.1.2.1.1, regarding
4 HYDSIM, continuous study, and 80 water years.

5
6 For each of the 80 water years, monthly Heavy Load Hour (HLH) and Light Load Hour (LLH)
7 energy splits for the Federal system hydro generation are developed for each fiscal year of the
8 rate period based on analyses by the Hourly Operating and Scheduling Simulator (HOSS) Model,
9 which incorporate results from HYDSIM hydro regulation studies. See Power Loads and
10 Resources Study, BP-18-FS-BPA-03, § 3.1.2.1.4. These monthly HLH and LLH regulated
11 hydro generation estimates are combined with monthly HLH and LLH independent hydro
12 generation estimates developed from historical data to yield total monthly Federal HLH and LLH
13 hydro generation.

14
15 Monthly values for Federal hydro generation for each of the 80 historical water years are
16 provided in Documentation Table 1 for FY 2018 and Table 2 for FY 2019. Monthly values for
17 Federal hydro HLH generation ratios for each of the 80 historical water years are provided in
18 Documentation Table 3 for FY 2018 and Table 4 for FY 2019.

19
20 Adjustments are made to the average monthly hydro generation in the 80 water year data to
21 represent efficiency losses associated with standing ready to provide balancing reserve capacity
22 for load and wind variability. A significant factor in these adjustments is the shift of hydro
23 generation from HLH to LLH. The generation adjustments are reported in terms of HLH, LLH,

1 and flat energy adjustments in Documentation Tables 5–7 for FY 2018 and Tables 8–10 for
2 FY 2019. These generation data are added to the values presented in Documentation Tables 1–2
3 to yield the final monthly Federal hydro generation for each of the 80 water years.
4

5 The monthly Federal hydro generation data are input into RevSim to quantify the impact that
6 Federal hydro generation variability has on PS secondary energy sales and revenues, balancing
7 power purchases and expenses, and net revenues for 3,200 two-year simulations (FY 2018–
8 2019). The PS secondary energy sales data are input into the PS Transmission and Ancillary
9 Services Expense Risk Model to calculate these expenses for 3,200 two-year simulations.

10 See Section 4.1.1.1.5.2 below regarding the PS Transmission and Ancillary Services Expense
11 Risk Model.
12

13 The water year sequences developed for each game for PNW hydro generation are also used for
14 Federal hydro generation, resulting in a consistent set of PNW and Federal hydro generation
15 being used for each game in AURORA[®]xmp and RevSim. See Power Market Price Study and
16 Documentation, BP-18-FS-BPA-04, § 2.3.3.1, regarding the development of water year
17 sequences for PNW hydro generation.
18

19 **4.1.1.1.5.2. BPA Load Risk**

20 The BPA load risk factor represents the impacts that variability in the economy and temperature
21 can have on PS revenues and expenses. Under the TRM, fluctuations in customer loads and
22 revenues are considered as changes in Tier 1 loads, specifically through the Load Shaping and
23 Demand charges. Load fluctuations are also reflected as changes in secondary energy revenues

1 and balancing power purchase expenses. The level of regional economic activity affects the
2 annual amount of load placed on BPA. Weather and climate conditions cause real-time and
3 monthly variations in loads, especially during the winter and summer when heating and cooling
4 loads are highest. BPA annual load growth variability and monthly load variability due to
5 weather are derived from PNW load variability simulated in the load risk model for the WECC.
6 *Id.* at § 2.3.2.1. BPA load variability is derived such that the same percentage changes in PNW
7 loads are used to quantify BPA load variability.

8
9 While the load risk model considers WECC-wide loads for AURORAxmp[®], only the PNW
10 component of the load risk is applied to BPA loads for the revenue simulation.

11 12 **4.1.1.1.5.3. CGS Generation Risk**

13 The CGS generation risk factor reflects the impact that variability in the output of CGS has on
14 the amount of PS secondary energy sales and balancing power purchases estimated by RevSim.
15 The source of the CGS generation risk data input into RevSim is AURORAxmp[®], which
16 simulates these data when calculating electricity prices. See *id.* at § 2.3.5.1, regarding the
17 methodology used in quantifying CGS generation risk.

18 19 **4.1.1.1.5.4. PS Wind Generation Risk**

20 The PS wind generation risk factor reflects the uncertainty in the amount and value of the energy
21 generated by the portions of the Condon, Klondike I and III, Stateline, and Foote Creek I and IV
22 wind projects that are under contract to BPA.

1 The uncertainty in the amount of energy generated by BPA’s portions of these wind projects is
2 simulated in the PNW Hourly Wind Generation Risk Model, which is described in the Power
3 Market Price Study and Documentation, BP-18-FS-BPA-04, Section 2.3.4.1. Since the PNW
4 Hourly Wind Generation Risk Model includes the output of wind projects that do not serve BPA
5 loads, the results from this model are scaled such that the average wind generation output is
6 equal to the forecast wind generation in the Power Loads and Resources Study, BP-18-FS-
7 BPA-03.

8
9 The simulated monthly wind generation results are specified in terms of flat energy. Results
10 shown in Documentation Figure 1 are the monthly flat energy output for all wind projects during
11 FY 2018–2019 at the 5th, 50th, and 95th percentiles. These monthly flat energy values are input
12 into RevSim, where they are converted into monthly HLH and LLH energy values by applying
13 HLH and LLH shaping factors that are associated with these wind projects. The source of these
14 HLH and LLH shaping factors is the data used to compute the monthly HLH and LLH wind
15 generation values included under Other Federal Generation in the Power Loads and Resources
16 Study, BP-18-FS-BPA-03, Section 3.1.3.

17
18 The uncertainty in the value of the wind generation output is calculated in RevSim based on the
19 differences between (1) the monthly weighted average purchase prices for all the output
20 contracts between wind generators and BPA and (2) the wholesale electricity prices at which
21 BPA can sell the amount of variable energy produced. The output contracts specify that BPA
22 pays for only the amount of energy produced. The risk of the value of the wind generation
23 output is computed in RevSim in the following manner: (1) subtract from expenses the expected

1 monthly payments for the expected output from all the wind projects; (2) on a game-by-game
2 basis, compute the monthly payments for the output from all the wind projects; and (3) on a
3 game-by-game basis, compute the revenues associated with the wind generation from all the
4 projects.

5
6 Results shown in Documentation Tables 11–12 report information from which the value of wind
7 generation during FY 2018–2019 can be observed at expected monthly flat energy output levels
8 and variable monthly electricity prices. Total deterministic wind generation purchase costs and
9 total revenues earned from the sale of all wind generation at average, 50th percentile,
10 5th percentile, and 95th percentile electricity prices estimated by AURORAxmp[®] are provided,
11 with the value of the wind generation being the difference between the revenues earned and
12 purchase costs paid.

13 14 **4.1.1.1.5.5. PS Transmission and Ancillary Services Expense Risk**

15 The PS transmission and ancillary services expense risk factor represents the uncertainty in
16 PS transmission and ancillary services expenses relative to the expected values of these expenses
17 included in the power revenue requirement. Those expected values are \$108.6 million during
18 FY 2018 and \$104.2 million during FY 2019. *See Power Revenue Requirement Study*
19 *Documentation, BP-18-FS-BPA-02A, Table 3A.* This risk is modeled in the PS Transmission
20 and Ancillary Services Expense Risk Model.

21
22 The modeling of this risk is based on comparisons between monthly firm PTP Network
23 transmission capacity that PS has under contract, the amount of existing firm contract sales, and

1 the variability in secondary energy sales estimated by RevSim. Expense risk computations
2 reflect how transmission and ancillary services expenses vary from the cost of the fixed, take-or-
3 pay firm PTP Network transmission capacity that PS has under contract. Because PS has more
4 firm PTP Network transmission capacity under contract than it has firm contract sales, the
5 probability distribution for these expenses is asymmetrical. This asymmetry occurs because
6 PS does not incur the costs of purchasing additional transmission capacity until the amount of
7 secondary energy sales exceeds the amount of residual firm transmission capacity after serving
8 all firm sales.

9
10 Transmission and ancillary services expenses will increase under conditions in which PS sells
11 more energy than it has firm PTP Network transmission rights. Alternatively, transmission and
12 ancillary services expenses will remain unchanged under conditions in which PS sells less
13 energy than it has firm PTP Network transmission rights.

14
15 Results shown in Documentation Figures 2 and 3 indicate how FY 2018–2019 transmission and
16 ancillary service expenses vary depending on the amount of secondary energy sales. In these
17 figures, the PS transmission and ancillary services expenses do not fall below \$73 million in
18 FY 2018 and \$72 million in FY 2019, regardless of the amount of secondary energy sales. This
19 result is because PS must pay for the take-or-pay firm transmission capacity it has under
20 contract. Included in these expenses are deterministic costs for the take-or-pay firm transmission
21 capacity the PS has under contract on the Southern (AC and DC) Interties.

1 Results shown in Documentation Figures 4 and 5 reflect the probability distributions for
2 transmission and ancillary service expenses during FY 2018–2019. These figures indicate how
3 often transmission and ancillary service expenses fall within various expense ranges.
4

5 **4.1.1.1.5.6. 4(h)(10)(C) Credits**

6 The 4(h)(10)(C) credit risk results are quantified in an external risk model and input into
7 RevSim. These results reflect the uncertainty in the amount of 4(h)(10)(C) credits BPA receives
8 from the U.S. Treasury. Section 4(h)(10)(C) of the Northwest Power Act allows BPA to allocate
9 its expenditures for system-wide fish and wildlife mitigation activities to various purposes.

10 16 U.S.C. § 839b(h)(10)(C). The credit reimburses BPA for its expenditures allocated to the
11 non-power purposes of the Federal hydro projects, and BPA reduces its annual Treasury payment
12 by the amount of the credit. The 4(h)(10)(C) credit risk analysis performed in this study estimates
13 the amount of 4(h)(10)(C) credits available for each of the 80 water years for FY 2018–2019 by
14 first summing the costs of the operating impacts on the hydro system (*e.g.*, power purchase
15 expenses), direct program expenses, and capital costs associated with BPA’s fish and wildlife
16 mitigation measures. The resulting total cost is multiplied by 0.223 (22.3 percent is the
17 percentage of the FCRPS attributed to non-power purposes) to yield the amount of 4(h)(10)(C)
18 credits available for each of the 80 water years.
19

20 Operating impact costs are calculated for each of the 80 water years for FY 2018–2019 by
21 multiplying spot market electricity prices from AURORAxmp[®] by the amount of power
22 purchases (aMW) qualifying for 4(h)(10)(C) credits. The amount of power purchases qualifying
23 for 4(h)(10)(C) credits is derived outside of RevSim and is used to calculate the dollar amount of

1 the 4(h)(10)(C) credits. A description of the methodology used to derive the amount of power
2 purchases associated with the 4(h)(10)(C) credits is contained in the Power Loads and Resources
3 Study, BP-18-FS-BPA-03, Section 3.3. The 4(h)(10)(C) credit power purchase amount for
4 FY 2018 is reported in Table 7.1.1 and for FY 2019 in Table 7.1.2 in the Power Loads and
5 Resources Documentation, BP-18-FS-BPA-03A.

6
7 The direct program expenses and capital costs for FY 2018–2019 do not vary by water volume or
8 flow timing and are documented in the Power Revenue Requirement Study Documentation,
9 BP-18-FS-BPA-02A, Sections 3 and 4. A summary of the costs included in the 4(h)(10)(C)
10 calculation and the resulting credit for each fiscal year are shown in Table 13 of this Study’s
11 documentation.

12
13 Results shown in Documentation Figures 6 and 7 reflect the probability distributions for the
14 4(h)(10)(C) credit during FY 2018–2019. The average 4(h)(10)(C) credit for the 3,200 games is
15 \$93.2 million for FY 2018 and \$91.5 million for FY 2019. These values are included in the
16 revenue forecast component of the Power Rates Study, BP-18-FS-BPA-01, Section 9.4.1.

17 The 4(h)(10)(C) credit for each of the 3,200 games is included in the net revenue provided to the
18 ToolKit.

19
20 **4.1.1.1.5.7. Electricity Price Risk (Market Price and Critical Water AURORAxmp® Runs)**

21 Results from two runs of the AURORAxmp® model are used in this Study. One run, which uses
22 hydro generation for all 80 water years, is referred to as the “market price run.” The other run,
23 which uses hydro generation for only the critical water year, 1937, is referred to as the “critical

1 water run.” *See also* Power Market Price Study and Documentation, BP-18-FS-BPA-04, § 2.4.
2 Both runs produce 3,200 games of monthly HLH and LLH prices for FY 2018–2019. Figures 1
3 and 2 of this Study provide a summary of the average monthly HLH and LLH prices for each of
4 these AURORAxmp[®] runs.

5
6 Prices from the market price run are used by RevSim to develop secondary energy revenues, firm
7 surplus energy revenues, and balancing power purchase expenses for FY 2018–2019. They are
8 also used to compute 4(h)(10)(C) credits that are computed external to, but input into, RevSim.
9 These values are provided to RAM2018 to develop rates for FY 2018–2019. Prices from the
10 market price run are also used to incorporate risk in the operating net revenues calculated by
11 RevSim and provided to the ToolKit. See Sections 4.1.1.2.1, 4.1.1.2.2, 4.1.1.2.3, and 4.1.1.2.4,
12 below for a description of this process.

13
14 Prices from the critical water run are used to compute the system augmentation costs provided to
15 RAM2018 for ratemaking purposes. Prices from the critical water run are also used to
16 incorporate system augmentation expense risk in the operating net revenues calculated by
17 RevSim and provided to the ToolKit. See Section 4.1.1.2.1 below for a description of this
18 process.

19 20 **4.1.1.2 RevSim Model Outputs**

21 RevSim model outputs are provided to RAM2018, the ToolKit model, and the revenue forecast
22 component of the Power Rates Study, BP-18-FS-BPA-01, Chapter 9.

4.1.1.2.1 System Augmentation Costs and Firm Surplus Energy Revenues

For the rate period, the deterministic values for system augmentation costs provided for input into RAM2018 are calculated by multiplying the system augmentation amount (aMW) by the average AURORAxmp[®] price from the critical water run. The source of the system augmentation amounts is the Power Loads and Resources Study, BP-18-FS-BPA-03, Section 4.2. A summary of the system augmentation costs calculation in this Study is shown in Documentation Table 14.

The system augmentation costs included in the net revenues provided for input into ToolKit represent the uncertainty in the cost of system augmentation purchases not made prior to setting rates. The uncertainty in the cost of system augmentation considers electricity price risk associated with meeting system augmentation needs. RevSim calculates the system augmentation cost risk associated with each of the 3,200 games for each fiscal year. These variable cost values replace the deterministic values for system augmentation costs provided to RAM2018.

Firm surplus energy revenues are treated in a manner similar to system augmentation costs. The deterministic values for firm surplus energy revenues provided to RAM2018 are calculated by multiplying the firm surplus energy amount (aMW) by the average AURORAxmp[®] price from the market price run. The source of the firm surplus energy amounts is the Power Loads and Resources Study, BP-18-FS-BPA-03, Section 4.3. The inclusion of the firm surplus energy revenues in RAM2018 reduces rates, since it is a revenue credit. This inclusion in RAM2018 as a firm sale also reduces the total amount of surplus energy (aMW) such that loads and resources

1 are in balance on a firm energy basis. Thus, the net secondary energy revenue analysis in
2 RevSim reflects only secondary energy values. A summary of the firm surplus energy revenues
3 calculation is shown in Documentation Table 15.

4 **4.1.1.2.2 Secondary Energy Sales/Revenues and Balancing Power Purchases/Expenses**

5 RevSim calculates secondary energy sales and revenues under various load, resource, and market
6 price conditions. A key attribute of RevSim is that each month is divided into two time periods:
7 Heavy Load Hours and Light Load Hours. For each simulation, RevSim calculates Power
8 Services' HLH and LLH load and resource conditions and determines HLH and LLH secondary
9 energy sales and balancing power purchases.
10

11
12 Included in this calculation are the additional amounts of secondary energy revenues that result
13 from the forward power purchases of 100 aMW in FY 2018 and 100 aMW in FY 2019, which
14 were acquired to provide Southeast Idaho Load Service (SILS) upon termination of the
15 BPA-PacifiCorp Exchange Agreement. Although the SILS loads are included in the loads and in
16 the calculation of system augmentation within the Power Loads and Resources Study, BP-18-FS-
17 BPA-03, the amounts of these forward power purchases are not included. Once the amounts of
18 these forward power purchases are used to serve the SILS loads, the amounts of secondary
19 energy marketable at Mid-C increase due to the reductions in firm load obligations associated
20 with SILS. See Power Loads and Resources Study, BP-18-FS-BPA-03, § 3.1.4, regarding the
21 treatment of SILS forward power purchases, and Power Loads and Resources Study
22 Documentation, BP-18-FS-BPA-03A, Tables 1.2.1, 1.2.2, and 1.2.3, where the SILS loads are
23 embedded in the total load values.

1 Losses on BPA’s transmission system, which reduce the amount of resource output that can be
2 delivered and sold beyond the busbar, are incorporated into RevSim by reducing by 2.97 percent
3 the Federal hydro generation, CGS output, and wind generation that BPA has under contract.
4 Additional incremental loss percentages (above the 2.97 percent) are applied to the Green
5 Springs, Lost Creek, and Cowlitz Falls independent hydro projects. These losses are
6 4.45 percent for Green Springs, 4.45 percent for Lost Creek, and 0.5 percent for Cowlitz Falls.
7 *See Power Loads and Resources Study, BP-18-FS-BPA-03, § 3.1.5.*

8
9 Electricity prices estimated by AURORAxmp[®] from the market price run are applied to the
10 secondary energy sales and balancing power purchase amounts to determine secondary energy
11 revenues and balancing power purchases expenses. These HLH and LLH revenues and expenses
12 are then combined with other revenues and expenses to calculate PS operating net revenues.

14 **4.1.1.2.3 Valuing Extra-regional Marketing in RevSim**

15 Given that BPA has access to extra-regional markets (*e.g.*, California-Oregon Border (COB),
16 Nevada-Oregon Border (NOB) and other points of delivery contiguous to the California
17 Independent System Operator (CAISO)), BPA can reasonably expect to participate in these
18 markets and receive a premium for corresponding sales. For the BP-18 rate period, BPA has
19 incorporated a modeling extension into RevSim that models the value that can be obtained from
20 making extra-regional sales. Extra-regional sales include CAISO transactions as well as bilateral
21 transactions at COB and NOB, where BPA realizes a premium for the latter on the presumption
22 that such energy will be remarketed into California. RevSim allocates surplus energy sales
23 between Mid-C, COB, and NOB such that it maximizes surplus energy revenues. This allocation

1 takes into consideration the relative price spreads between COB, NOB, and Mid-C; the amount
2 of available transmission capacity on the interties; the amount of excess available firm
3 transmission capacity on the Southern Interties that PS has under contract; and the cost of
4 transmission losses for sales over the interties. The source of the available excess transmission
5 capacity and the price spreads is AURORAxmp[®]. See Power Market Price Study and
6 Documentation, BP-18-FS-BPA-04, § 2.3.8.1 and § 2.1, respectively.

7
8 The excess available firm transmission capacities that PS has under contract on the Southern
9 Interties are represented by deterministic data that are input into RevSim. Results from the
10 WECC-wide dispatch process in AURORAxmp[®] provide a distribution of modeled transmission
11 capacity constraints. Therefore, for a given game, RevSim is able to determine whether all or
12 only a portion of PS excess firm transmission capacity on the Southern Interties is available for
13 export sales.

14
15 BPA recognizes that extra-regional sales incur incremental transaction costs that are not
16 observed at Mid-C. Such transaction costs include contractual fees associated with third-party
17 contracts that BPA uses to market power into the CAISO. The transaction costs also include
18 liquidity concerns in the bilateral market. To model these costs, BPA establishes a coefficient α
19 that discounts the price spread between the relevant California hub (*e.g.*, COB or NOB) and
20 Mid-C, both calculated by AURORAxmp[®]. The coefficient is a constant parameter calculated
21 by taking the weighted average share of the California – Mid-C price spread that BPA is
22 expected to realize, suggested by historical FERC Electric Quarterly Reports (EQR) data. Staff

1 analyzed EQR data for the period Q3 2013 through Q1 2016 and determined that 29 percent of
2 the observations were direct CAISO transactions, while 71 percent were bilateral transactions.

3
4 Currently, in order to sell into the CAISO, BPA uses third-party contracts, which include a
5 contract fee. Thus, for this class of extra-regional transactions BPA constructed the model in a
6 manner that would expect $|\alpha| < 1$, which accounts for the transaction cost of the contract fee.

7 BPA expects that bilateral transactions realize the full California – Mid-C price spread, because
8 the third-party contracts are not required to participate in this market.

9
10 BPA's third-party contracts expire on an annual basis (because California recalculates BPA's
11 emissions rate each year). Therefore, BPA currently does not have contracts in place to continue
12 marketing surplus power inventories directly in the CAISO during the BP-18 rate period. BPA
13 assumes that the absence of third-party contracts during the rate period implies that these
14 inventories will be marketed at Mid-C, given the uncertainty of whether the bilateral market has
15 enough liquidity to accommodate inventories that otherwise would have been marketed directly
16 into the CAISO. Because α is zero for Mid-C transactions, the weighted average α parameter
17 used to discount the value of extra-regional transactions reduces to the proportion of bilateral
18 transactions in the EQR data, which is 71 percent.

19
20 This modeling extension adds \$8.6 million in FY 2018 and \$9.6 million in FY 2019 to the net
21 secondary energy revenue credits as compared to modeling sales being made only at Mid-C.

1 **4.1.1.2.4 Median Net Secondary Revenue Computations**

2 Secondary energy revenues and balancing power purchases expenses for FY 2018–2019 are
3 provided to RAM2018. These revenues and expenses are based on the median net secondary
4 revenues (secondary energy revenues less balancing power purchases expenses) from the
5 3,200 games. The secondary energy sales and balancing power purchases passed to RAM2018,
6 both measured in annual average megawatts, are the arithmetic means of these quantities over
7 the 3,200 games for each fiscal year.

8
9 In a data set with an even number of values, the median value is the mean of the two middle
10 values. Because these two middle games have specific qualities (*e.g.*, loads, resources, prices,
11 and monthly shape) that may not be representative of the study as a whole, the mean of more
12 than two middle games was used to smooth out any particular features of individual games. To
13 avoid specific games distorting the results, the mean of 320 games was used. The values for
14 secondary energy revenues and balancing power purchases expenses passed to RAM2018 are the
15 arithmetic means of the secondary energy revenues and balancing power purchases expenses
16 (calculated and reported separately to RAM2018) for the 320 middle games as measured by net
17 secondary revenue (160 above the median net secondary revenue and 160 below).

18
19 Documentation Tables 16 and 17 provide summary calculations of the secondary energy sales
20 revenues and balancing power purchase expenses provided to RAM2018 for FY 2018–2019.

21 Documentation Tables 18 and 19 provide monthly values for the secondary energy
22 sales/revenues and total power purchases/expenses provided to RAM2018 for FY 2018–2019.

23 Annual secondary energy sales/revenues and total power purchases/expenses for FY 2018–2019

1 (based on the median approach described above) are reported in Documentation Table 20. The
2 secondary energy revenues are \$329.3 million for FY 2018 and \$334.2 million for FY 2019. The
3 total power purchases expenses are \$60.5 million for FY 2018 and \$54.4 million for FY 2019.
4

5 **4.1.1.2.5 Net Revenue**

6 RevSim results are used in an iterative process with ToolKit and RAM2018 to calculate PNRR
7 and, ultimately, rates that provide BPA with at least a 95 percent TPP for the two-year rate
8 period. The PS net revenue simulated in each RevSim run depends on the revenue components
9 developed by RAM2018, which in turn depend on the level of PNRR assumed when RAM2018
10 is run. RevSim simulates intermediate sets of net revenue during this iterative process. The final
11 set of PS net revenue from RevSim is the set that yields at least a 95 percent TPP. Consistent
12 with the FRP, the Power rates used to calculate net revenues include \$20 million in PNRR each
13 year. *See* Chapter 6.
14

15 Using 3,200 games of net revenue risk data simulated by RevSim and P-NORM and
16 mathematical descriptions of the CRAC and RDC, the ToolKit produces 3,200 games of cash
17 flow and annual ending reserves levels. The ToolKit calculates TPP from these games, and then
18 analysts change the amounts of PNRR to achieve TPP targets.
19

20 A statistical summary of the annual net revenue for FY 2018–2019 simulated by RevSim using
21 rates with \$20 million in PNRR per year is reported in Table 1. PS net revenue over the rate
22 period averages \$33.9 million per year. This amount represents only the operating net revenues
23 calculated in RevSim. It does not reflect additional net revenue adjustments in the ToolKit

1 model caused by the output from P-NORM, interest earned on financial reserves, or impacts of
2 the CRAC and RDC. The average net revenue in Table 1 of this Study will differ from the net
3 revenue shown in the Power Revenue Requirement Study, BP-18-FS-BPA-02, Table 1, which
4 shows the results of a deterministic forecast that does not account for system augmentation risk
5 and uses median, rather than average (*i.e.*, mean), net secondary energy revenues. The average
6 net revenues over the rate period of \$33.9 million include \$20 million of PNRN per year.
7 Average net secondary energy revenues over the rate period are \$13.9 million higher than the
8 median net secondary energy revenues used in RAM2018 over the rate period. See Section
9 4.1.1.2.4 regarding the median net secondary revenue computations used for input into
10 RAM2018.

11

12 **4.1.2 P-NORM**

13 **4.1.2.1 Inputs to P-NORM**

14 The primary source of risk estimates in P-NORM is the judgment of subject matter experts who
15 understand how the expenses, and occasionally the revenue, associated with the sources of
16 uncertainty might vary from the forecasts embedded in the baseline assumptions used in rate
17 development. When available, historical data are used in the modeling of risks in P-NORM.

18
19 Table 2 shows the 5th percentile, mean, and 95th percentile results from each of the risk models
20 described below, along with the deterministic amount that is assumed in the revenue requirement
21 for that risk. *See* Power Revenue Requirement Study Documentation, BP-18-FS-BPA-02A,
22 Table 3A.

1 **4.1.2.1.1 CGS Operations and Maintenance (O&M)**

2 CGS O&M uncertainty is modeled for Base O&M and Nuclear Electric Insurance Limited
3 (NEIL) insurance premiums. P-NORM captures uncertainty around Base O&M and NEIL
4 insurance costs. For Base O&M, P-NORM distributes the minimum- and maximum-based
5 subject matter expert estimation of deviations from the expected value. For FY 2017, P-NORM
6 models the maximum O&M expense as 1.25 percent greater than forecast and the minimum as
7 1.25 percent less than forecast. For FY 2018 and FY 2019, the maximums are 6 percent greater
8 than forecast and the minimums are 4 percent less than forecast.

9
10 For NEIL insurance premiums, risk is modeled around forecast gross premiums and distributions
11 based on the level of earnings on the NEIL fund. Historically, member utilities have received
12 annual distributions based on the level of these earnings, and the net premiums they pay are
13 lower as a result. NEIL premiums are modeled using a Program Evaluation and Review
14 Technique (PERT) distribution. A PERT distribution is a type of beta distribution for which
15 minimum, most likely, and maximum values are specified. For FY 2017, FY 2018, and FY 2019
16 the most likely is set to the base NEIL premium amount. For FY 2017, the maximum is set
17 2.5 percent higher than the most likely and the minimum is set to 2.5 percent lower than the most
18 likely, less an annual distribution amount of \$0.3 million. For FY 2018 and FY 2019, the
19 maximum is set 5 percent higher than the most likely and the minimum is set to 5 percent lower,
20 less an annual distribution amount of \$0.3 million.

21
22 The distributions for CGS O&M are shown in Documentation Figure 8.

1 **4.1.2.1.2 U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) and Bureau of Reclamation**
2 **(Reclamation) O&M**

3 For Corps and Reclamation O&M, P-NORM models uncertainty around the following:

- 4 • Additional costs if a security event occurs or if the security threat level increases
- 5 • Additional costs if a fish event occurs
- 6 • Additional extraordinary hydro system maintenance
- 7 • Additional costs due to a catastrophic event
- 8 • Additional costs due to new system requirements

9
10 For additional security costs, P-NORM assumes for FY 2017, FY 2018, and FY 2019 that there
11 is a 1 percent, 2 percent, and 2 percent probability (respectively) that an event will occur that
12 leads to a requirement for additional security at the Corps and Reclamation facilities. The
13 additional annual cost if an event were to occur is the same for both the Corps and Reclamation
14 at \$3 million each.

15
16 Additional fish environmental costs are modeled similarly for FY 2017, FY 2018, and FY 2019,
17 with a 1 percent, 2 percent, and 2 percent probability (respectively) that an event that requires
18 additional annual expenditures of \$2 million each for both the Corps and Reclamation will occur
19 in FY 2017 through FY 2019.

20
21 For additional extraordinary hydro system maintenance needs, P-NORM models the uncertainty
22 that additional repair and maintenance costs at the Federal hydro projects could be incurred and
23 the probability that an outage event could occur. For FY 2017, FY 2018, and FY 2019, this risk

1 is modeled with a 1.25 percent, 2.5 percent, and 2.5 percent probability (respectively) that an
2 event will occur that leads to an additional \$5 million expense. This risk is modeled in the same
3 way for both the Corps and Reclamation.

4
5 P-NORM models the expense cost of a catastrophic, system-wide event. This risk is modeled for
6 FY 2017, FY 2018, and FY 2019 with 0.5 percent, 1 percent, and 1 percent probability
7 (respectively) of a \$30 million expense. This risk is modeled in the same way for both the Corps
8 and Reclamation.

9
10 P-NORM models the expense cost related to increased compliance or regulatory requirements.
11 This risk is modeled for FY 2017, FY 2018, and FY 2019 with 5 percent, 10 percent, and 10
12 percent probability of a \$5 million expense. This risk is modeled in the same way for both the
13 Corps and Reclamation.

14
15 The distributions for total Corps and Reclamation O&M are shown in Documentation Figure 9.

16 17 **4.1.2.1.3 Conservation Expense**

18 For this expense item, P-NORM models uncertainty around Conservation Acquisition and Low-
19 Income and Tribal Weatherization. Conservation Acquisition expense is modeled for each year
20 from FY 2017 through FY 2019 using a PERT distribution. Conservation Acquisition expense is
21 modeled with a minimum value of 90 percent of the amount in the revenue requirement, a most
22 likely value equal to the amount, and a maximum value of 105 percent of the amount. *See Power*
23 *Revenue Requirement Study Documentation, BP-18-FS-BPA-02A, Table 3A.*

1 Low-Income and Tribal Weatherization expense variability is modeled using a PERT
2 distribution for FY 2017 through FY 2019. These expenses are modeled with a minimum value
3 of 95 percent of the amount in the revenue requirement, a most likely value equal to the amount,
4 and a maximum value of 105 percent of the amount. *Id.* The distributions for Conservation
5 Acquisition and Low-Income and Tribal Weatherization are shown in Documentation Figure 10.
6

7 **4.1.2.1.4 Spokane Settlement**

8 Within the BP-18 rate period, legislation could pass enacting a settlement with the Spokane
9 Tribe similar to the settlement with the Colville Tribes. *See* Confederated Tribes of the Colville
10 Reservation Grand Coulee Settlement Act, Pub. L. No. 103-436, 108 Stat. 4577 (Nov. 2, 1994).
11 For FY 2018 and FY 2019, the payments to the Spokane Tribe would equal 25 percent of the
12 payments made to the Colville Tribes. *See* Power Revenue Requirement Study Documentation,
13 BP-18-FS-BPA-02A, Table 3A.
14

15 P-NORM includes an assumption of a 20 percent probability that the legislation will pass during
16 the rate period, with an equal probability that payments would begin in FY 2018 or in FY 2019.
17 The distributions for Spokane Settlement payments are shown in Documentation Figure 11.
18

19 **4.1.2.1.5 Power Services Transmission Acquisition and Ancillary Services**

20 For this cost item, P-NORM models uncertainty around expenses for Third-Party Transfer
21 Service Wheeling and Third-Party Transmission and Ancillary Services.
22
23

1 P-NORM models Third-Party Transfer Service Wheeling cost for each year from FY 2017
2 through FY 2019 with PERT distributions. For FY 2017, the minimum is set to 99 percent of the
3 revenue requirement amount; the most likely value is set to the revenue requirement amount; and
4 the maximum is set to 100.5 percent of the revenue requirement amount. For FY 2018, the
5 minimum, most likely, and maximum are set to 96 percent, 100 percent, and 102 percent of the
6 revenue requirement amounts. For FY 2019, the minimum, most likely, and maximum are set to
7 96 percent, 100 percent, and 103 percent of the revenue requirement amounts. Documentation
8 Figure 12 shows the distribution for Third-Party Transfer Service Wheeling.

9
10 The cost of Third-Party Transmission and Ancillary Services is modeled for FY 2017 through
11 FY 2019 using a PERT distribution with minimum and most likely values set to the revenue
12 requirement amount. For FY 2017, FY 2018, and FY 2019, the maximums are set to
13 102.5 percent, 110 percent, and 116 percent of the revenue requirement amount. The
14 distributions for Third-Party Transmission and Ancillary Services expense are shown in
15 Documentation Figure 13.

16 17 **4.1.2.1.6 Power Services Internal Operations Expenses**

18 For Power Services Internal Operations Expenses, P-NORM models uncertainty around the
19 following expenses:

- 20 • PS System Operations
- 21 • PS Scheduling
- 22 • PS Marketing and Business Support
- 23 • PS allocation of corporate general and administrative (G&A) costs

1 PS Internal Operations Expenses are modeled in P-NORM for FY 2017 through FY 2019. The
2 costs in the PS Internal Operations Expense categories consist primarily of salaries. Risk in
3 these categories is modeled based on aggregate variation in staffing levels from forecast.
4 Variation in staffing levels is modeled in each year using a PERT distribution. For FY 2017, the
5 5th percentile of the distribution is set to two less staff than forecast and the 95th percentile of
6 the distribution is set to two more staff than forecast. For FY 2018, the 5th percentile of the
7 distribution is set to 10 less staff than forecast and the 95th percentile of the distribution is set to
8 10 more staff than forecast. For FY 2019, the 5th percentile of the distribution is set to 15 less
9 staff than forecast and the 95th percentile of the distribution is set to 15 more staff than forecast. .
10 The difference between the modeled staffing level and the revenue requirement staffing level is
11 multiplied by \$108,000 per employee per fiscal year.

12
13 Documentation Figure 14 shows the distributions for total Internal Operations Costs, including
14 Power Services' share of corporate G&A.

16 **4.1.2.1.7 Fish & Wildlife Expenses**

17 P-NORM models uncertainty around four categories of fish and wildlife mitigation program
18 expense, as described below.

20 **4.1.2.1.7.1. BPA Direct Program Costs for Fish and Wildlife Expenses**

21 The costs of BPA's fish and wildlife program are uncertain, in large part because the actual pace
22 of implementation cannot be known ahead of time and there is a chance that program
23 components will not be implemented as planned. This does not reflect any uncertainty in BPA's

1 commitment to the plans; instead, it reflects the reality that it can take time to plan and
2 implement programs, and the expenses of the programs may not be incurred in the fiscal years in
3 which BPA plans for them to be incurred. The uncertainty in fish and wildlife expenses is
4 modeled using PERT distributions. For FY 2017, variation is not modeled for fish and wildlife
5 expenses. For FY 2018 and FY 2019, the minimums are set to 5 percent lower than the revenue
6 requirement amount; the most likely values are set to 2.5 percent lower than the revenue
7 requirement amount; and the maximums are set equal to the revenue requirement amounts.
8 Documentation Figure 15 shows the distributions for the BPA Direct Program expense.

9
10 **4.1.2.1.7.2. U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (USFWS) Lower Snake River Hatcheries**
11 **Expenses**

12 Uncertainty in the expenses for the USFWS Lower Snake River Hatcheries is not modeled for
13 FY 2017. For FY 2018 and FY 2019, uncertainty is modeled as a PERT distribution with a
14 minimum value set to 10 percent less than the forecast value, a most likely value 5 percent less
15 than the forecast value, and a maximum equal to the forecast value. Documentation Figure 16
16 shows the distributions for risk over the Lower Snake River Hatcheries expense.

17
18 **4.1.2.1.7.3. Bureau of Reclamation Leavenworth Complex O&M Expenses**

19 P-NORM models uncertainty of the O&M expense of Reclamation's Leavenworth Complex
20 using a discrete risk model. A discrete risk is defined using a set of specified values, with
21 probabilities assigned to each value. In a discrete distribution, only the specified values can be
22 drawn, as opposed to a continuous distribution, in which the set of possible values is not
23 specified and any value between the minimum and maximum can be drawn. Leavenworth

1 Complex O&M risk is modeled with a 1 percent probability of incurring an additional \$1 million
2 expense in each year. The revenue requirement amounts for Bureau of Reclamation
3 Leavenworth Complex O&M for FY 2017, FY 2018, and FY 2019 are included in the Bureau's
4 O&M budget, which is discussed in Section 4.1.2.1.2 above. Documentation Figure 17 shows
5 the distributions for Leavenworth Complex O&M expense.

7 **4.1.2.1.7.4. Corps of Engineers Fish Passage Facilities Expenses**

8 P-NORM models uncertainty of the cost of the fish passage facilities for the Corps using a
9 discrete risk model, with a 1 percent probability of incurring an additional \$1 million expense in
10 each year. The revenue requirement amounts for Corps of Engineers Fish Passage Facilities
11 Expenses for FY 2017, FY 2018, and FY 2019 are included in the Corps' O&M budget, which is
12 discussed in Section 4.1.2.1.2 above. Documentation Figure 18 shows the distributions for Fish
13 Passage Facilities expense.

15 **4.1.2.1.8 Interest Expense Risk**

16 P-NORM models the impact of interest rate uncertainty associated with new debt issuances
17 during the forecast period and the resulting interest expense impact. The planned borrowings
18 (Power Revenue Requirement Study Documentation, BP-18-FS-BPA-02A, Tables 7A and 8A)
19 are used to calculate expected interest expense on long-term debt and appropriations for the
20 revenue requirement. This analysis assesses the potential difference in interest expense on long-
21 term debt and appropriations from the amount rates are set to recover in the revenue requirement.

1 In each fiscal year, planned new borrowings occur on a monthly basis for different amounts each
2 month, with different term lengths. *See* Power Revenue Requirement Study Documentation, BP-
3 18-FS-BPA-02A, Table 7A. P-NORM models uncertainty in the interest rate BPA will
4 eventually receive when these borrowings occur. The analysis does not model uncertainty in the
5 amount borrowed, term length of the borrowing, or timing of the borrowing.

6
7 P-NORM uses a historical database of interest rates as the basis to forecast future uncertainty in
8 interest rates. The database was generated from 20 years of historical daily data from 1994 to
9 2014 that includes each interest rate term (for example one year, two year, 30 year). This
10 historical data is captured for U.S. Agency interest rates, which are the rates BPA pays for
11 Federal borrowings and which are also used for modeling uncertainty in the rates for
12 appropriations paid by BPA. The data source for these rates is Bloomberg Curve CO843.
13 Historical data is also captured for taxable and tax-exempt interest rate indexes for AA-rated
14 utilities. These are used as proxy rates for third-party financing related to Energy Northwest new
15 capital and refinancing of existing Energy Northwest Debt. The data sources for these taxable
16 and tax-exempt rates are Bloomberg Curve 903M and Bloomberg Curve 520M, respectively.

17 To model the interest expense uncertainty in P-NORM, for each game a starting date from the
18 historical data set is selected and, for that date, the interest rate for each term length on the yield
19 curve is captured. Then, the interest rates are captured for each term length on the yield curve
20 30 days later. This process is repeated for three years plus one month following the starting date,
21 so that 37 interest rate data points for each term length are captured. This process is performed
22 for Agency interest rates, AA Utility Taxable rates, and AA Utility Tax-Exempt interest rates.

1 The monthly returns are measured by taking the log return, also known as geometric return,
2 which is the natural logarithm of the interest rate from one month less the natural logarithm of
3 the interest rate of the prior month. This is similar to taking the percentage change, known as the
4 simple return. The log return approach is preferred because it is more accurate at calculating
5 small returns, which are more common when the time difference between returns is shorter (for
6 example when the time difference is monthly, as in this analysis, versus annually). Also, the log
7 returns possess the convenient mathematical property that they are additive through time; simple
8 returns are not. Monthly returns are calculated for each interest rate product (Agency and AA
9 Taxable), for each term length of that product and for each 30-day period for a full three years
10 from the sample starting date. The 3,200 calculated monthly returns are used to create three-year
11 projections of interest rates for each term length and for each interest rate product, all of which
12 start from BPA's official starting interest rates in FY 2017.

13
14 For example, assume the sample starting date for Game 1 is June 5, 2001. The interest rate for
15 the Agency product with a 10-year term in the first month of the 36-month projection is equal to
16 the FY 2017 Agency 10-year interest rate from the official forecast multiplied by the calculated
17 return from June 5, 2001, to July 5, 2001. The Agency 10-year interest rate is 3.70 percent. The
18 June 5, 2001, 10-year Agency interest rate is 6.02 percent. The July 5, 2001, 10-year Agency
19 interest rate is 6.19 percent. The log return of the two 10-year Agency interest rates equals
20 1.2094 percent ($\log(6.19)$ less $\log(6.02)$). Taking the exponent of the log return yields 1.012168.
21 Multiplying that factor by the Agency 10-year interest rate ($1.012168 * 3.70$ percent) yields
22 3.745 percent. That is the 10-year Agency interest rate for Game 1.

1 Continuing the example, to generate the Month 2 projection of the 10-year Agency interest rate
2 for Game 1, the calculated rate from Month 1, 3.745 percent, is multiplied by the sampled return
3 from July 5, 2001, to August 5, 2001. For the full projection, the process is repeated for all
4 36 months, for each term length on the yield curve, and for each interest rate product. In the
5 second game, a new sample starting date is selected from the 20-year dataset, and the process is
6 repeated for this new three-year historical window within the dataset.

7
8 Using this methodology, 3,200 games are run, generating interest rate projections of each term
9 length for each interest rate product. Once all 3,200 projections are generated, they are adjusted
10 so that the average interest rate for all 3,200 runs aligns with the expected interest rate in BPA's
11 official FY 2019 interest rate forecast. Thus, this analysis captures the possible uncertainty
12 around the expected interest expense in the revenue requirement and does not assess the expected
13 value itself. The generated interest rates are then combined with the corresponding timing and
14 term length of anticipated monthly borrowings in the repayment study to generate
15 3,200 projections of interest expense and appropriations expense. The difference between the
16 deterministic forecast and the gamed amount is calculated for each issuance. The distribution of
17 variation in Federal debt service expense, non-Federal debt service expense, and appropriations
18 expense is shown in Documentation Figure 19.

19 20 **4.1.2.1.9 CGS Refueling Outage Risk**

21 In the spring of 2017, Energy Northwest took CGS out of service for refueling and maintenance.
22 The same will occur in the spring of 2019. There is uncertainty in the duration of these outages
23 and thus uncertainty in the amount of replacement power BPA must purchase from the market,

1 the amount of secondary energy available to be sold in the market, and the price of secondary
2 energy at the time of any particular purchase or sale.

3
4 CGS outage duration risk is modeled as deviations from expected net revenue due to variability
5 in the duration of the planned maintenance outages. Increases or decreases in downtime of the
6 CGS plant result in changes in megawatthours generated, which results in decreased or increased
7 net revenue for Power Services in FY 2017 and FY 2019. This revenue variability is a function
8 of plant outage duration, monthly flat AURORAxmp[®] market prices, and monthly flat CGS
9 energy amounts from RevSim.

10
11 The outage duration for FY 2017 was modeled with a minimum of 36 days, a maximum of
12 60 days, and a median of 39 days. For FY 2019, the minimum is 40 days, the maximum is
13 75 days, and the median is 54 days. The probability distribution of the outage durations is shown
14 in Documentation Figure 20.

15
16 To calculate the impact of the outages on net revenue, 3,200 outage durations are simulated. The
17 difference between the simulated duration from P-NORM and the deterministic duration
18 assumed in RevSim is used to determine the number of additional days the plant is in or out of
19 service in each month. These additional days in or out of service are then applied to the gamed
20 CGS energy amounts from RevSim to calculate monthly megawatthour deviations. Monthly, flat
21 AURORAxmp[®] prices (*see* Power Market Price Study and Documentation, BP-18-FS-BPA-04,
22 § 2.4) are then multiplied by the gamed generation deviations, resulting in a net revenue

1 deviation. The distributions of revenue changes for FY 2017 and FY 2019 are shown in
2 Documentation Figure 21.

3 4 **4.1.2.1.10 Undistributed Reduction Risk**

5 Based on the comments received in the 2016 IPR/CIR workshops (*see* Power Revenue
6 Requirement Study, BP-18-FS-BPA-02, § 2.1), spending increases for Power Services were
7 reduced by \$10 million in both FY 2018 and FY 2019. These expense reductions are reflected in
8 the revenue requirement as undistributed reductions, meaning that the reduction has not been
9 applied to any specific expense categories. *See* Power Revenue Requirement Study
10 Documentation, BP-18-FS-BPA-02A, Table 3A, Power Services Program Spending Levels
11 Table.

12
13 P-NORM models uncertainty in achieving the undistributed reduction amount. The
14 undistributed reduction model is dependent on the aggregate expense uncertainty modeled in
15 P-NORM, described above. In each of the 3,200 games in P-NORM, the total of the expense
16 deviations for each fiscal year is compared to the undistributed reduction amount. If the expense
17 deviation is negative (that is, modeled expenses underrun the amount in the revenue
18 requirement), then that expense underrun is treated as satisfying part of the needed undistributed
19 reduction, up to the full amount of the undistributed reduction. For example, if in a given game
20 the expense underrun is \$5 million, then that underrun is treated as satisfying \$5 million of the
21 \$10 million undistributed reduction. In that case, \$5 million of the undistributed reduction
22 remains to be handled. If the expense underrun were \$25 million, then the full \$10 million of the
23 undistributed reduction would be met by the expense underrun. In that case the expense

1 | underrun is decreased by \$10 million to \$15 million, and \$0 of the undistributed reduction
2 | remains to be handled.

3 |
4 | BPA monitors expenses throughout the rate period and actively manages expenses to achieve the
5 | targeted undistributed reduction amount. In the event the undistributed reduction has not been
6 | fully achieved through random variation (as described above), active management of budgets
7 | will assist in achieving any remaining undistributed reduction amount. This mitigation is
8 | modeled in P-NORM by randomly drawing an undistributed reduction risk mitigation percentage
9 | between 0 and 100 percent. The unmitigated percent (1 less the drawn percentage) multiplied by
10 | the remaining undistributed reduction amount results in the unrealized portion of the
11 | undistributed reduction, increasing expenses by that amount. For example, if the remaining
12 | undistributed reduction amount is \$5 million, and the risk mitigation percent drawn is 25 percent,
13 | then the additional expense is $(1 - 0.25) * 5 = \$3.75$ million.

15 | **4.1.2.2 P-NORM Results**

16 | The output of P-NORM is an Excel[®] file containing (1) the aggregate total net revenue deltas for
17 | all of the individual risks that are modeled and (2) the associated Net Revenue-to-Cash
18 | adjustments for each game for FY 2017, FY 2018, and FY 2019. Each run has 3,200 games.
19 | The ToolKit uses this file in its calculations of TPP. Summary statistics and distributions for
20 | each fiscal year are shown in Documentation Figure 22.

22 | **4.1.3 Net Revenue-to-Cash Adjustment**

23 | One of the inputs to the ToolKit (through P-NORM) is the NRTC Adjustment. Most of BPA's

1 probabilistic modeling is based on impacts of various factors on net revenue. BPA's TPP
2 standard is a measure of the probability of having enough cash to make payments to the
3 Treasury. While cash flow and net revenue generally track each other closely, there can be
4 significant differences in any year. For instance, the requirement to repay Federal borrowing
5 over time is reflected in the accrual arena as depreciation of assets. Depreciation is an expense
6 that reduces net revenue, but there is no cash inflow or outflow associated with depreciation.
7 The same repayment requirement is reflected in the cash arena as cash payments to the Treasury
8 to reduce the principal balance on Federal bonds and appropriations. These cash payments are
9 not reflected on income statements. Therefore, in translating a net revenue result to a cash flow
10 result, the impact of depreciation must be removed and the impact of cash principal payments
11 must be added. The 3,200 NRTC adjustments calculated in P-NORM make the necessary
12 changes to convert RevSim and P-NORM accrual results (net revenue results) into the equivalent
13 cash flows so ToolKit can calculate reserves values in each game and thus calculate TPP.

14
15 The NRTC Adjustment is modeled probabilistically in P-NORM. P-NORM uses the
16 deterministic NRTC Table as its starting point and includes 3,200 gamed adjustments for the
17 Slice True-Up (*see* Power Rates Study, BP-18-FS-BPA-01, Chapter 7, and Power GRSP II.R.),
18 based on the calculated deviations in those revenue and expense items in P-NORM that are
19 subject to the true-up. The NRTC table is shown in Documentation Table 21.

20 21 **4.2 Power Quantitative Risk Mitigation**

22 The preceding sections of this chapter describe the Power risks that are modeled explicitly, with
23 the output of P-NORM and RevSim quantitatively portraying the financial uncertainty faced by

1 PS in each fiscal year. This section describes the tools used to mitigate these risks—PS
2 Reserves, the Treasury Facility, PNRR, the CRAC, and the RDC—and how BPA evaluates the
3 adequacy of this mitigation.

4
5 The risk that is the primary subject of this study is the possibility that BPA might not have
6 sufficient cash on September 30, the last day of a fiscal year, to fully meet its obligation to the
7 Treasury for that fiscal year. BPA’s TPP standard, described in Section 2.3 above, defines a way
8 to measure this risk (TPP) and a standard that reflects BPA’s tolerance for this risk (no more than
9 a 5 percent probability of any deferrals of BPA’s Treasury payment in a two-year rate period).
10 TPP and the ability of the rates to meet the TPP standard are measured in the ToolKit by
11 applying the risk mitigation tools described in this section to the modeled financial risks
12 described in the previous sections.

13
14 A second risk addressed in this study is within-year liquidity risk—the risk that at some time
15 within a fiscal year BPA will not have sufficient cash to meet its immediate financial obligations
16 (whether to the Treasury or to other creditors) even if BPA might have enough cash later in that
17 year. In each recent rate proceeding, a need for reserves for within-year liquidity (“liquidity
18 reserves”) has been defined. This level is based on a determination of BPA’s total need for
19 liquidity and a subsequent determination of how much of that need is properly attributed to
20 Power Services.

1 **4.2.1 Power Risk Mitigation Tools**

2 **4.2.1.1 Liquidity**

3 Cash and cash equivalents provide liquidity, which means they are available to meet immediate
4 and short-term obligations. For the BP-18 rate period, Power Services has two sources of
5 liquidity: (1) Financial Reserves Available for Risk Attributed to PS (PS Reserves) and (2) the
6 Treasury Facility. These liquidity sources mitigate financial risk by serving as a temporary
7 source of cash for meeting financial obligations during years in which net revenue and the
8 corresponding cash flow are lower than anticipated. In years of above-expected net revenue and
9 cash flow, financial reserves can be replenished so they will be available in later years.

10
11 **4.2.1.1.1 PS Reserves**

12 PS Reserves are not held in a PS-specific account. BPA has only one account, the Bonneville
13 Fund, in which it maintains financial reserves. Staff in the BPA Chief Financial Officer’s
14 (CFO’s) organization “attributes” part of the BPA Fund balance to the power generation function
15 and part to the transmission function. Reserves attributed to Power do not belong to Power
16 Services; they belong to BPA.

17
18 Financial reserves available to the generation function (Power Services) include cash and
19 investments (“Treasury Specials”) held in the BPA Fund at the Treasury plus any deferred
20 borrowing. Deferred borrowing refers to amounts of capital expenditures BPA has made that
21 authorize borrowing from the Treasury when BPA has not yet completed the borrowing.
22 Deferred borrowing amounts can be converted to cash at any time by completing the borrowing.

1 As \$49 million of PS reserves are considered not to be available for risk, that amount is not
2 included in the starting financial reserves or any other part of the TPP calculation. These
3 “Reserves Not For Risk” are made up of three categories:

- 4 1. \$20 million of funds collected from customers under contracts that obligate BPA to
5 perform energy efficiency-related upgrades to the customers’ facilities.
- 6 2. \$25 million in customer deposits for credit worthiness. These deposits are held in the
7 BPA Fund as collateral for open trades.
- 8 3. \$5 million for deposits received from third parties for cost-sharing of fish and wildlife
9 project expenses.

11 **4.2.1.1.2 The Treasury Facility**

12 In FY 2008, BPA reached an agreement with the Treasury that made a \$300 million short-term
13 note available to BPA for up to two years to pay expenses. BPA has concluded that this note can
14 be prudently relied on as a source of liquidity. In FY 2009, BPA and the Treasury agreed to
15 expand this facility to \$750 million.

16
17 The Treasury Facility is an agency liquidity tool, managed by Corporate Finance. For actual use,
18 the Treasury Facility is not allocated or earmarked for specific business lines or purposes. For
19 the purpose of modeling risk for the BP-18 rate period, all \$750 million of the Treasury Facility
20 is modeled to be available for PS risk. This allocation is made for TPP modeling purposes only.

1 **4.2.1.1.3 Within-Year Liquidity Need**

2 BPA needs to maintain access to short-term liquidity for responding to within-year needs, such
3 as uncertainty due to the unpredictable timing of cash receipts or cash payments, or known
4 timing mismatches. An illustrative timing mismatch is the large Energy Northwest bond
5 payment due in the spring. Priority Firm Power rates are set to recover the entire amount of this
6 payment, but by spring BPA will have received only about half of the PF revenue that will fully
7 recover this cost by the end of the fiscal year. The PS within-year liquidity need of \$320 million
8 was determined in the BP-14 rate proceeding, and that amount continues to be used for
9 ratemaking risk mitigation purposes.

10
11 **4.2.1.1.4 Liquidity Reserves Level**

12 No PS Reserves need to be set aside for within-year liquidity; *i.e.*, the Liquidity Reserves Level
13 is \$0. Instead, all PS Reserves are considered to be available for the year-to-year liquidity
14 needed to support TPP.

15
16 **4.2.1.1.5 Liquidity Borrowing Level**

17 For this study, \$320 million of the short-term borrowing capability provided by the Treasury
18 Facility is considered to be available only for within-year liquidity needs, fully meeting the need
19 for short-term liquidity. Thus, \$430 million of the \$750 million Treasury Facility is considered
20 to be available for year-to-year liquidity for TPP.

1 **4.2.1.1.6 Net Reserves**

2 The concept of “Net Reserves” used in this study simplifies the discussion of the above sources
3 of liquidity by combining the two discrete sources into a single measure. Net Reserves is the
4 amount of PS Reserves above zero, less any balance on the Treasury Facility. In each individual
5 Monte Carlo game in the ToolKit, either PS Reserves are \$0 or higher and the balance on the
6 Treasury Facility is \$0, or PS Reserves are \$0 and the balance on the Treasury Facility is \$0 or
7 higher. Thus, in a single game, PS Reserves and the balance on the Treasury Facility will not
8 both be above \$0. This is because the ToolKit models a positive outstanding balance on the
9 Treasury Facility if and only if PS Reserves are depleted. This clear-cut relationship does not
10 hold for expected values calculated from a set of multiple games. That is, it is mathematically
11 possible for the expected value of ending reserves attributed to PS to be above zero and for the
12 expected value of the outstanding balance on the Treasury Facility to be above zero. Net
13 Reserves, which represent balances on the Treasury Facility as a negative reserves balance,
14 provides a more intuitive representation of the interaction between the PS Reserves and Treasury
15 Facility Borrowing statistics.

16
17 The definition of financial reserves used in the FRP and the GRSPs is equivalent to the definition
18 of Net Reserves used in this study. The FRP defines financial reserves as “cash, market-based
19 special investments, and deferred borrowing, all of which are highly liquid and unobligated for
20 BPA to use to mitigate financial risk, less any outstanding balance on the Treasury Facility.”
21 Administrator’s Final Record of Decision, BP-18-A-04, Appendix A, § 3.1.

1 **4.2.1.2 Planned Net Revenues for Risk**

2 Analyses of BPA’s TPP are conducted during rate development using current projections of
3 PS Reserves and other sources of liquidity. If the TPP is below the 95 percent two-year standard
4 established in BPA’s Financial Plan, then the projected reserves, along with whatever other risk
5 mitigation is considered in the risk study, are not sufficient to reach the TPP standard. This may
6 be corrected by adding PNRR to the revenue requirement as a cost needing to be recovered by
7 rates. This addition has the effect of increasing rates, which will increase net cash flow, which
8 will increase the available PS Reserves and therefore increase TPP.

9
10 PNRR needed to meet the TPP standard is calculated in the ToolKit, described in Section 3.1.5
11 above. If the ToolKit calculates TPP below 95 percent, PNRR can be iteratively added to the
12 model in one or both years of the rate period (typically, PNRR is added evenly to both years).
13 PNRR is added in \$1 million increments until a 95 percent TPP is achieved. The calculated
14 PNRR amounts are then provided to the Power Revenue Requirement Study, which calculates a
15 new revenue requirement. This adjusted revenue requirement is then iterated through the rate
16 models and tested again in ToolKit. If ToolKit reports TPP below 95 percent or TPP above
17 95 percent by more than the equivalent of \$1 million in PNRR, PNRR adjustments are calculated
18 again and reiterated through the rate models.

19
20 Based on analyses for the Final Proposal, no PNRR is needed to meet the TPP standard for the
21 BP-18 rates. In accordance with the FRP, however, \$20 million in PNRR has been included in
22 the revenue requirement for both FY2018 and FY2019. *See* Chapter 6, Financial Reserves
23 Policy Implementation.

1 **4.2.1.3 The Cost Recovery Adjustment Clause**

2 In most power rates in effect since 1993, BPA has employed CRACs or Interim Rate
3 Adjustments (IRAs) as upward rate adjustment mechanisms that can respond to the financial
4 circumstances BPA experiences before the next opportunity to adjust rates in a rate proceeding.
5 The Power CRAC explained here could increase rates for FY 2018 based on financial results for
6 FY 2017. It also could increase rates for FY 2019 based on the accumulation of financial results
7 for FY 2017 and FY 2018 (taking into account any Power CRAC applying to FY 2018 rates).
8 The Power rates subject to the Power CRAC (and eligible for the Power RDC, Section 4.2.1.4
9 below) are the Non-Slice Customer rate, the PF Melded rate, the Industrial Firm Power rate, and
10 the New Resource rate. Additionally, some reserves-based Ancillary and Control Area Services
11 rates, which are levied by Transmission Services, are subject to the Power CRAC. These rates
12 are Regulating and Frequency Response Service, Operating Reserve-Spinning, and Operating
13 Reserve-Supplemental. *See* Power GRSPs II.O–P and Transmission GRSP II.G.

14
15 **4.2.1.3.1 Calibrated Net Revenue (CNR)**

16 CNR is net revenue adjusted for certain debt management and contract-related transactions that
17 affect the relationship between accruals and cash. The method for calculating Power CNR is
18 described in Power GRSP II.O. Examples of the application of this method, including actions
19 that change Federal depreciation, debt transactions that affect net revenue but not cash, and cash
20 contract settlements, are described in Documentation Example 1.

1 **4.2.1.3.2 Description of the Power CRAC**

2 As described in the introduction to Section 4.2 above and Power GRSP II.O, the CRAC for
3 FY 2018 and FY 2019 is a potential annual upward adjustment in various power and
4 transmission rates. The threshold for triggering the CRAC is an amount of Power Services'
5 CNR accumulated since the end of FY 2016.

6
7 The Accumulated Calibrated Net Revenue (ACNR) threshold values will be set in July 2017,
8 based on the terms specified in the FRP. *See* Chapter 6. In this Final Proposal, the ACNR
9 threshold is set at the equivalent of \$0 in PS Net Reserves, which is the minimum threshold
10 allowed by the FRP. The ACNR threshold for each year is calculated by taking the difference
11 between average ACNR and average Net Reserves across all 3,200 games in the ToolKit and
12 adding that difference to the target Power CRAC threshold in terms of reserves.

13
14 As an example, assume that a given fiscal year's Power CRAC threshold in terms of reserves is
15 supposed to be \$0. If the average ACNR at the start of that fiscal year is \$200 million and the
16 average Net Reserves at the start of that fiscal year is \$50 million, then the CRAC threshold in
17 terms of ACNR for that year is \$150 million ($\$0 + \$200 - \$50 = \150 million).

18
19 The Power CRAC will recover 100 percent of the first \$100 million that ACNR is below the
20 threshold. Any amount beyond \$100 million will be collected at 50 percent up to the CRAC
21 annual limit on total collection, or cap, of \$300 million. For example, at an equivalent of
22 negative \$100 million in reserves at the end of the fiscal year, \$100 million will be collected in
23 the next year. At the equivalent of negative \$150 million, \$125 million will be collected

1 (\$100 million plus one-half of the next \$50 million). The Power CRAC will be implemented
2 only if the amount of the CRAC is greater than or equal to \$5 million.

3
4 Calculations for the CRAC that could apply to FY 2018 rates will be made in July 2017;
5 the corresponding calculations for possible adjustments to FY 2019 rates will be made in
6 September 2018. A forecast of the year-end Power Services ACNR will be made based on the
7 results of the Third Quarter Review and then compared to the thresholds for the CRAC and the
8 RDC. *See* Section 4.2.1.4 below. If the ACNR forecast is below the CRAC threshold, an
9 upward rate adjustment will be calculated for the duration of the upcoming fiscal year. *See*
10 Power GRSP II.O.

11 12 **4.2.1.4 Reserves Distribution Clause (RDC)**

13 One of BPA's financial policy objectives is to ensure that reserves do not accumulate to
14 excessive levels. *See* Section 2.1. The Power RDC is triggered if both BPA ACNR *and* Power
15 Services' ACNR are above specified thresholds, and may provide a downward adjustment to the
16 same power and transmission rates that are subject to the Power CRAC. In the same way that a
17 CRAC passes costs of bad financial outcomes to BPA's customers, an RDC may pass benefits of
18 good financial outcomes to BPA's customers. The total distribution is capped at \$500 million
19 per fiscal year. The RDC will be implemented only if the amount of the RDC is greater than or
20 equal to \$5 million. *See* Chapter 6 and Power GRSP II.P.

1 **4.2.1.5 The NFB Adjustment**

2 NFB (NMFS [National Marine Fisheries Service] FCRPS [Federal Columbia River Power
3 System] BiOp [Biological Opinion]) risks arise from litigation over the FCRPS BiOp. NFB risks
4 and mitigation are addressed through qualitative risk assessment and mitigation. *See*
5 Section 4.3.1 below.

6
7 **4.2.2 ToolKit**

8 The ToolKit model is described in Section 3.1.5. The inputs to the ToolKit for Power are shown
9 in Documentation Figure 23.

10
11 **4.2.2.1 ToolKit Inputs and Assumptions for Power**

12 **4.2.2.1.1 RevSim Results**

13 The ToolKit reads in risk distributions generated by RevSim that are created for the current year,
14 FY 2017, and the rate period, FY 2018–2019. TPP is measured for only the two-year rate
15 period, but the starting Reserves Available for Risk for FY 2018 depend on events yet to unfold
16 in FY 2017; these runs reflect that FY 2017 uncertainty. See Section 4.1.1 for more detail on
17 operating risk models.

18
19 **4.2.2.1.2 Non-Operating Risk Model**

20 The ToolKit reads in P-NORM distributions that are created for FY 2017–2019 and that reflect
21 the uncertainty around non-operating expenses. See Section 4.1.2 of this study for more detail
22 on P-NORM.

1 **4.2.2.1.3 Treatment of Treasury Deferrals**

2 In the event that ToolKit forecasts a deferral of payment of principal to the Treasury, the ToolKit
3 assumes that BPA will track the balance of payments that have been deferred and will repay this
4 balance to the Treasury at its first opportunity. “First opportunity” is defined for TPP
5 calculations as the first time Power Services ends a fiscal year with more than \$100 million in
6 net reserves. The same applies to subsequent fiscal years if the repayment cannot be completed
7 in the first year after the deferral. This is referred to as “hybrid” logic on the ToolKit main page.

8
9 **4.2.2.1.4 Starting PS Reserves**

10 The FY 2017 starting PS reserves have a known value of \$158.7 million based upon the FY 2016
11 Fourth Quarter Review. Each of the 3,200 games starts with this value. See Section 4.2.1.1.1
12 above for a description of PS Reserves.

13
14 **4.2.2.1.5 Starting ACNR**

15 The FY 2017 starting ACNR value of \$0 million is known from the definition of ANCR as being
16 accumulated PS net revenue since the end of FY 2016. Each of the 3,200 games starts with this
17 value.

18
19 **4.2.2.1.6 PS Liquidity Reserves Level**

20 The PS Liquidity Reserves Level is an amount of PS Reserves set aside (*i.e.*, not available for
21 TPP use) to provide liquidity for within-year cash flow needs. This amount is set to \$0.

22 *See* Section 4.2.1.1.4.
23

1 **4.2.2.1.7 Treasury Facility**

2 This study relies on all \$750 million of BPA’s Treasury Facility: \$320 million for within-year
3 liquidity needs, as described in Section 4.2.1.1.2 above, and the remaining \$430 million to
4 support PS TPP.

5
6 **4.2.2.1.8 Interest Rate Earned on Reserves**

7 Interest earned on the both the cash component and the Treasury Specials component of
8 PS Reserves, as well as interest paid on the Treasury Facility, is assumed to be 0.17 percent in
9 FY 2017, 0.45 percent in FY 2018, and 0.66 percent in FY 2019.

10
11 **4.2.2.1.9 Interest Credit Assumed in Net Revenue**

12 An important feature of the ToolKit is the ability to calculate interest earned on PS reserves
13 separately for each game. The net revenue games the ToolKit reads in from RevSim include
14 deterministic assumptions of interest earned on reserves for each fiscal year; that is, the interest
15 earned does not vary from game to game. To capture the risk impacts of variability in interest
16 earned induced by variability in the level of reserves, in the TPP calculations the values
17 embedded in the RevSim results for interest earned on reserves are backed out of all ToolKit
18 games and replaced with game-specific calculations of interest credit. The interest credit
19 assumptions embedded in RevSim results that are backed out are \$1.7 million for FY 2017,
20 \$1.4 million for FY 2018, and \$2.3 million for FY 2019. *See* Power Revenue Requirement
21 Study Documentation, BP-18-FS-BPA-02A, Table 3A.

1 **4.2.2.1.10 The Cash Timing Adjustment**

2 The cash timing adjustment reflects the impact on earned interest of the non-linear shape of PS
3 reserves throughout a fiscal year as well as the interest earned on reserves attributed to PS that
4 are not available for risk and are not modeled in the ToolKit. The ToolKit calculates interest
5 earned on reserves by making the simplifying assumption that reserves change linearly from the
6 beginning of the year to the end. ToolKit takes the average of the starting reserves and the
7 ending reserves and multiplies that figure by the interest rate for that year. Because PS cash
8 payments to the Treasury are not evenly spread throughout the year but instead are heaviest in
9 September, PS will typically earn more interest in BPA's monthly calculations than the
10 straight-line method yields. Additionally, the ToolKit does not model Reserves Not For Risk
11 (*see* Section 4.2.1.1.1) or the interest earned from these. The cash timing adjustment is a number
12 from the repayment study that approximates this additional interest credit earned on reserves
13 throughout the fiscal year along with the interest earned on reserves attributed to PS that are not
14 available for risk. The cash timing adjustments for this study are \$1.3 million for FY 2017,
15 \$0.8 million for FY 2018, and \$0.8 million for FY 2019.

16 17 **4.2.2.1.11 Cash Lag for PNRR**

18 Although figures for cash lag for PNRR appear in the input section of the ToolKit's main page,
19 they are calculated automatically. When the ToolKit calculates a change in PNRR (either a
20 decrease, or more typically, an increase), it calculates how much of the cash generated by the
21 increased rates would be received in the subsequent year, because September revenue is not
22 received until October. In order to treat ToolKit-generated changes in the level of PNRR on the
23 same basis as amounts of PNRR that have already been assumed in previous iterations of rate

1 calculations and are already embedded in the RevSim results, the ToolKit calculates the same
2 kind of lag for PNRR that is embedded in the RevSim output file the ToolKit reads. Because
3 this study does not require iteratively generated PNRR to meet the TPP standard, there are no
4 cash adjustments for PNRR.

6 **4.2.3 Quantitative Risk Mitigation Results**

7 Summary statistics are shown in Table 3.

9 **4.2.3.1 Ending PS Reserves**

10 Known starting PS Reserves for FY 2017 are \$158.6 million. The expected values of ending
11 year net reserves are \$28 million for FY 2017, \$28 million for FY 2018, and \$128 million for
12 FY 2019. Over 3,200 games, the range of ending FY 2019 net reserves is from negative
13 \$366 million to positive \$1,176 million. The rate adjustment mechanisms would produce a
14 CRAC of \$233 million or an RDC of \$500 million (if Agency ANR is also high enough) in these
15 extreme cases if the FY 2020 rates include mechanisms comparable to those included in the
16 FY 2018–2019 rates. The 50 percent confidence interval for ending net reserves for FY 2019 is
17 negative \$44 million to \$286 million. ToolKit summary statistics for reserves and liquidity are
18 in Documentation Figure 24 and Table 22.

20 **4.2.3.2 TPP**

21 The two-year TPP is greater than 99.9 percent. In 3,200 games, there are no deferrals for
22 FY 2017, FY 2018, or FY 2019.

1 **4.2.3.3 CRAC and RDC**

2 The Power CRAC triggers at the end of FY 2017, modifying rates for FY 2018, in 22 percent of
3 games. The average Power CRAC amount is \$4.9 million for FY 2018 (measured as the average
4 amount across all 3,200 games). The Power CRAC also triggers at the end of FY 2018,
5 modifying rates for FY 2019, in 46 percent of games. The average Power CRAC amount is
6 \$50 million for FY 2019.

7
8 The Power RDC does not trigger in any of the 3,200 games for FY 2018. The Power RDC
9 triggers in 0.5 percent of games for FY 2019, yielding an average of \$0.5 million. Power CRAC
10 and Power RDC statistics are shown in Table 3.

11
12 The thresholds and caps for the Power CRAC and Power RDC applicable to rates for FY 2018
13 and FY 2019 are shown in Tables 4 and 5. The BPA RDC Thresholds are shown in Table 6.

14
15 **4.3 Power Qualitative Risk Assessment and Mitigation**

16 The qualitative risk assessment described here is a logical analysis of the potential impacts of
17 risks that have been identified but not included in the quantitative risk assessment. The
18 qualitative analysis considers the risk mitigation measures that have been created, which are
19 largely terms and conditions that define how possible risk events would be treated. If this logical
20 analysis indicates that significant financial risk remains in spite of the risk mitigation measures,
21 additional risk treatment might be necessary. The three categories of risk analyzed here are
22 (1) financial risks to BPA arising from legislation over the FCRPS BiOps; (2) financial risks to

1 BPA or to Tier 1 costs arising from BPA’s provision of service at Tier 2 rates; and (3) financial
2 risks to BPA or to Tier 1 costs arising from BPA’s provision of Resource Support Services.

3 4 **4.3.1 FCRPS Biological Opinion Risks**

5 Certainty that BPA can cover its fish and wildlife program costs is an important objective.
6 Because of pending and possible litigation over BPA’s FCRPS fish and wildlife obligations, it is
7 impossible to determine now the approach to fish recovery and the associated costs that BPA
8 will be required to implement during the rate period, FY 2018–2019.

9
10 The possibilities for FY 2018–2019 are many and mostly unknowable at this time and, as a
11 result, probabilities cannot be estimated for any particular scenario that might be created.

12 Because the uncertainty is open-ended, it is necessary to have an equally open-ended adjustment
13 mechanism to ensure that BPA can fund its fish and wildlife obligations despite the uncertainty.

14 This study includes two related features that help to mitigate the financial risk to BPA and its
15 stakeholders caused by uncertainty over future fish and wildlife obligations under FCRPS BiOps
16 and their financial impacts. These are the NFB Adjustment and the Emergency NFB Surcharge,
17 collectively referred to as the NFB Mechanisms. Implementation details for the NFB

18 Mechanisms are provided in Power GRSP II.Q.

19
20 The NFB Mechanisms will take effect should certain events, called trigger events, occur. An
21 NFB Trigger Event is one of the following events that results in changes to BPA’s FCRPS
22 Endangered Species Act (ESA) obligations compared to those in the most recent BPA Final
23 Proposal, as modified, prior to this Trigger Event:

- 1 • A court order in *National Wildlife Federation vs. National Marine Fisheries Service*,
2 No. 3:01-cv-0640-SI, or any other case filed regarding an FCRPS BiOp issued by NMFS
3 (also known as NOAA Fisheries Service) or the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, or any
4 appeal thereof (“Litigation”).
- 5 • An agreement (whether or not approved by the Court) that results in the resolution of
6 issues in, or the withdrawal of parties from, Litigation.
- 7 • A new FCRPS BiOp including unplanned or unexpected implementation measures.
- 8 • A BPA commitment to implement Recovery Plans under the ESA that results in the
9 resolution of issues in, or the withdrawal of parties from, Litigation.
- 10 • Actions needed for meeting obligations for the development of the Columbia River
11 System Operations Environmental Impact Statement.

12
13 The fish and wildlife operation or fish and wildlife program (or both) that BPA implements in a
14 fiscal year may not be the same as that assumed in the rate proposal. The “as modified” term
15 used in the description of the NFB mechanisms means that BPA will first adjust for changes in
16 operations due to non-trigger event reasons, as well as changes in operations due to prior NFB
17 events to determine the baseline for calculating the financial effects of an NFB event.

18
19 The NFB Mechanisms protect the financial viability of BPA and its financial resources from the
20 potentially large impact of changes in the operation of the Columbia River hydro system or in
21 fish and wildlife program costs that are directly related to FCRPS BiOps and litigation over
22 BiOps (as specified above).

1 **4.3.1.1 The NFB Adjustment**

2 The NFB Adjustment adjusts the Power CRAC for any year in the rate period if one or more
3 NFB Trigger Events with financial effects occurred in the previous year (unless one or more
4 Emergency NFB Surcharges, in the previous year collected additional revenue equal to the
5 financial effects). *See* Section 4.3.1.2. The adjustment allows the CRAC to collect more
6 revenue under specific conditions. The NFB Adjustment could modify the CRAC Cap
7 applicable to rates for FY 2018 or FY 2019. While the NFB Adjustment increases the revenue
8 the CRAC can collect, it does not necessarily result in higher revenue collected. If the NFB
9 Adjustment triggers but Power Services' ACNR is above the CRAC threshold specified in the
10 Power GRSPs, there will be no adjustment to rates, because the CRAC will not trigger. It is
11 possible to have a trigger event that does not reduce net revenue; these events do not trigger NFB
12 Adjustments or Emergency NFB Surcharges.

13
14 **4.3.1.2 The Emergency NFB Surcharge**

15 The Emergency NFB Surcharge results in nearly immediate increases in net revenue for PS if
16 (a) an NFB Trigger Event occurs, and (b) BPA is in a "Cash Crunch" and cannot prudently wait
17 until the next year to collect incremental net revenue. A Cash Crunch is defined to exist when
18 BPA calculates that the within-year Agency TPP (*i.e.*, including both TS and PS) is below
19 80 percent. The surcharge increases net revenue by making an upward adjustment to power and
20 transmission rates as specified in Power GRSP II.Q.

21
22 The Emergency NFB Surcharge addresses the fact that the CRAC does not produce revenue until
23 the year following the fiscal year in which financial effects of a Trigger Event are experienced.

1 Thus, the financial benefit of the NFB Adjustment may be too late if BPA is in a Cash Crunch
2 when a Trigger Event occurs. The surcharge may be implemented in FY 2018 if the events
3 required to impose the surcharge occur in that fiscal year, or in FY 2019 if the requisite events
4 occur in that year.

6 **4.3.1.3 Multiple NFB Trigger Events**

7 There can be multiple NFB Trigger Events in one year. If BPA is not in a Cash Crunch in such a
8 year, then there will be only one final analysis near the end of the year that calculates the NFB
9 Adjustment to the cap on the Power CRAC applicable to the next fiscal year. If BPA is in a
10 Cash Crunch in such a year, there may be more than one Emergency NFB Surcharge calculated
11 and applied during that year. For example, there could be more than one court order in FY 2018
12 that increases the financial impacts of operations in FY 2018. If BPA was in a Cash Crunch,
13 there could be an Emergency NFB Surcharge calculated for each of the Trigger Events and
14 applied during FY 2018. If BPA was not in a Cash Crunch in FY 2018, all of these triggering
15 events would be included in the calculation of the single NFB Adjustment that would increase
16 the cap on the Power CRAC applicable to FY 2019.

17
18 Each NFB Adjustment affects only one year. However, because the comparison used to
19 calculate the NFB Adjustment is between the actual operation for fish and the operation assumed
20 in the most recent Final Proposal (as modified by previously responded-to NFB Events), it is
21 possible for a Trigger Event to affect operations for more than one year of the rate period. For
22 example, a decision in FY 2017 may affect operations in both FY 2017 and FY 2018. The
23 analysis of the total financial impact during FY 2017 for adjusting the cap on the CRAC

1 applying to FY 2018 would be separate from the analysis of the total financial impact during
2 FY 2018 for adjusting the cap on the CRAC applying to FY 2019 (or for implementing an
3 Emergency NFB Surcharge during FY 2018). Increases in the financial impacts during FY 2019
4 are not covered by the NFB Adjustment, because incorporating those increases through an NFB
5 Adjustment would require a CRAC during FY 2020, and the rates for FY 2020 are not covered
6 by this Study. However, financial impacts during FY 2019 are covered by the Emergency NFB
7 Surcharge provisions applicable to FY 2019.

8 9 **4.3.2 Risks Associated with Tier 2 Rate Design**

10 For the FY 2018–2019 rate period, there are four Tier 2 rate alternatives: the Tier 2 Short-Term,
11 Tier 2 Load Growth, Tier 2 VR1-2014, and Tier 2 VR1-2016 rates. *See* Power Rates Study, BP-
12 18-FS-BPA-01, § 3.2.2. BPA has made all of the necessary power purchases to meet its load
13 obligations at the Tier 2 rate for the rate period. BPA purchased four flat annual blocks of power
14 from the market for delivery to BPA at Mid-C. *Id.* at § 3.2.2.1. BPA expects to meet its
15 remaining load obligation for Tier 2 in FY 2018 and FY 2019 using firm power from the FCRPS.
16 *See* Power Rates Study, BP-18-FS-BPA-01, § 3.2.2.1. For this Final Proposal, power to meet the
17 remaining obligation is valued at the Remarketing Value. *See id.* at § 3.2.2.6. Preventing risks
18 associated with Tier 2 from increasing costs for Tier 1 or requiring increased mitigation for
19 Tier 1 is one of the objectives guiding the development of the risk mitigation for the FY 2018–
20 2019 rate period. *See* Section 2.1.

1 **4.3.2.1 Identification and Analysis of Risks**

2 The qualitative assessment of risks associated with Tier 2 cost recovery identified several
3 possible events that could pose a financial risk to either BPA or Tier 1 costs:

- 4 • The contracted-for power is not delivered to BPA.
- 5 • A customer's Above-Rate Period High Water Mark (Above-RHWM) load is
6 lower than the amount forecast.
- 7 • A customer's Above-RHWM load is higher than the amount forecast.
- 8 • A customer does not pay for its Tier 2 service.
- 9 • A customer's Above-RHWM load is lower than its take-or-pay VR1-2016 rate amounts.
- 10 • The cost of BPA power purchases to meet Tier 2 obligations is higher than the cost
11 allocated to the Tier 2 pool.

12
13 The following sections describe the analysis of these risks, which determines whether there is
14 any significant financial risk to BPA or Tier 1 costs.

15
16 **4.3.2.1.1 Risk: The Contracted-for Power Is Not Delivered to BPA**

17 BPA has executed three standard Western Systems Power Pool (WSPP) Schedule C contracts for
18 purchases made to meet its load obligations under Tier 2 rates for the rate period. Under the
19 WSPP Schedule C contracts, if a supplier fails to deliver power at Mid-C, the contract provides
20 for liquidated damages to be paid by the supplier. The liquidated damages cover the cost of any
21 replacement power purchased by BPA to the extent the cost of the replacement power exceeds
22 the original purchase price.

1 If there is a disruption in the delivery from Mid-C to the BPA point of delivery due to a
2 transmission event, BPA will supply replacement power and pass through the cost of the
3 replacement power to the Tier 2 purchasers by means of a Transmission Curtailment
4 Management Service (TCMS) calculation. The Power Rates Study, BP-18-FS-BPA-01,
5 Sections 5.4.5 and 5.6.1.5, explains how the TCMS calculation is performed for service at Tier 2
6 rates. BPA will base the TCMS cost on the amount of megawatt hours that was curtailed and the
7 Powerdex (or its replacement) Mid-C hourly index for the hour the event occurred. Based upon
8 BPA's past experiences, it is not anticipated that such disruptions would affect a substantial
9 number of hours in a year. The market index is a fair, unbiased estimate of the cost of
10 replacement power; therefore, there is no reason to believe that if such events occur in a fiscal
11 year BPA or Tier 1 would incur a net cost.

13 **4.3.2.1.2 Risk: A Tier 2 Customer's Load is Lower than the Amount Forecast**

14 Each customer provided BPA an election regarding its intention to meet none, some, or all of its
15 Above-RHWM Load with Tier 2-priced power from BPA. Elections were made by
16 September 30, 2011, for FY 2018 and FY 2019. Using the Above-RHWM Loads that were
17 computed in the RHWM Process, which concluded in September 2016, and the customers'
18 elections, BPA has determined each customer's Above-RHWM Load served at a Tier 2 rate for
19 the BP-18 rate period. As noted in Section 4.3.2.1 above, BPA has made or will make
20 contractual commitments to purchase power sufficient to supply the necessary quantity of power
21 at Tier 2 rates.

1 Even if the customer's actual load is lower than the BPA forecast, the terms of the customer's
2 Contract High Water Mark (CHWM) contract obligate the customer to continue to pay the full
3 cost of its purchases at the Tier 2 rates. This approach protects BPA and Tier 1 purchasers from
4 financial impacts of this event. The customer's load reduction would free up some of the power
5 BPA has contracted for, and BPA would remarket this power. BPA would return the value of
6 the remarketed power to the customer by charging it less through the Load Shaping rate than it
7 would otherwise have been charged. BPA would effectively credit the customer for the
8 unneeded power at the Load Shaping rate, which is an unbiased estimate of the market value of
9 the power; thus, there would be no net cost to BPA or Tier 1.

11 **4.3.2.1.3 Risk: A Tier 2 Customer's Load is Higher than the Amount Forecast**

12 This risk is the inverse of the previous risk. If a customer's load is higher than forecast by BPA
13 and the customer's sources of power (the sum of the quantity of power at Tier 2 rates the
14 customer committed to purchase, its Tier 1 power, and the amount of non-BPA power the
15 customer committed to its load) are inadequate to meet its total retail load, BPA would obtain
16 additional power from the market and charge the customer for this power at the Load Shaping
17 rate. The Load Shaping rate is an unbiased estimate of the market cost of the power. The
18 customer retains the primary obligation to pay for the additional power, and there would be no
19 net cost to BPA or Tier 1.

21 **4.3.2.1.4 Risk: A Customer Does Not Pay for its Service at the Tier 2 Rate**

22 It is not possible for a customer to be in default on its Tier 2 charges and remain in good standing
23 for its Tier 1 service. If a customer does not pay for its service at the Tier 2 rate, it will be in

1 arrears for its BPA bill and will be subject to late payment charges. BPA may require additional
2 forms of payment assurance if (1) BPA determines that the customer's retail rates and charges
3 may not be adequate to provide revenue sufficient to enable the customer to make the payments
4 required under the contract, or (2) BPA identifies in a letter to the customer that BPA has other
5 reasonable grounds to conclude that the customer may not be able to make the payments required
6 under the contract. If the customer does not provide payment assurance satisfactory to BPA,
7 then BPA may terminate the CHWM contract.

9 **4.3.2.1.5 Risk: A Customer's Above-RHWM Load is Lower than its Take-or-Pay Tier 2**

10 **Amounts**

11 When customers subscribed to the Tier 2 VR1-2014 and VR1-2016 rates, they requested specific
12 amounts of load to be served at these rates on a take-or-pay basis for the term of the rate
13 alternative's application. Customers were eligible for amounts that were capped at levels based
14 on BPA load forecasts completed the previous spring. Once customers requested an amount and
15 BPA was successful purchasing that amount, then the customers became contractually
16 committed to that purchase amount. Some customers elected, in accordance with Section 10 of
17 the CHWM contract, to have BPA remarket amounts of their purchases that are in excess of their
18 Above-RHWM Load. These customers will continue to pay the full cost of the purchases they
19 elected. BPA will allocate some of this power to the Tier 2 Short-Term cost pool at a market
20 price. The remainder will be purchased to meet a portion of BPA's system augmentation need, if
21 any, at the forecast system augmentation prices. Because BPA is selling the excess power at
22 fixed prices to Short-Term customers and at fixed prices for augmentation needs, the revenues

1 that will be received from Short-Term customers will equal the remarketing credits paid to Tier 2
2 customers, and there is no risk to BPA or Tier 1.

3
4 **4.3.2.1.6 Risk: The Cost of BPA Power Purchases to Meet Tier 2 Obligations is Higher**
5 **than the Cost Allocated to the Tier 2 Pool**

6 In the event that BPA must make additional power purchases to meet its Tier 2 obligations, there
7 is a risk that the cost of the purchase is greater (or less) than the cost applied to the Tier 2 cost
8 pool. If the purchase cost is greater, then the Power net revenue will be reduced by the amount
9 of the difference. As of this Final Proposal, all power purchases needed to serve Tier 2 load in
10 FY 2018 and FY 2019 have been made and the cost of those purchases has been allocated to the
11 Tier 2 cost pool. *See* Power Rates Study, BP-18-FS-BPA-01, § 3.2.2.1. Therefore, there is no
12 risk that power purchase costs for Tier 2 service will be higher than the cost allocated.

13
14 A portion of BPA's FY 2018 Tier 2 obligations will be served out of firm power from the
15 FCRPS. *See* Power Rates Study Documentation, BP-18-FS-BPA-01A, Table 2.3.8. This power
16 is priced at the Remarketing Value for purposes of cost allocation. The Remarketing Value
17 includes an implicit risk premium in order to mitigate the risk that actual market prices end up
18 higher than forecast. *See* Power Rates Study, BP-18-FS-BPA-01, § 3.2.2.4.

19
20 **4.3.3 Risks Associated with Resource Support Services Rate Design**

21 Resource Support Services (RSS) are resource-following services that help financially convert
22 the variable, non-dispatchable output from non-Federal generating resources to a known,
23 guaranteed shape. Operationally, BPA serves the net load placed on it after taking into

1 consideration the variability of the customer’s loads and resources. RSS include Secondary
2 Crediting Service (SCS), Diurnal Flattening Service (DFS), and Forced Outage Reserve Service
3 (FORS). The customers that have elected to purchase RSS and their elections are listed in the
4 Power Rates Study Documentation, BP-18-FS-BPA-01A, Table 3.13.

6 **4.3.3.1 Identification and Analysis of Risks**

7 The RSS pricing methodology is a value-based methodology that relies on a combination of
8 forecast market prices and costs associated with new capacity resources rather than aiming to
9 capture the actual cost of providing these services. Therefore, the primary risk for BPA is that
10 the “true” value of providing these services will be more or less than the established rate. This
11 pricing approach makes the sale of RSS no different from that of any other service or product
12 BPA sells into the open market. Moreover, there is currently no transparent and/or liquid market
13 for such services, which makes after-the-fact measurements of the “true” value and the price paid
14 to BPA difficult. BPA does not intend to quantify the cost of each operational decision, which
15 means that BPA is not able to measure the cost of following a customer’s load separately from
16 the cost of following its resources when a customer is taking some combination of RSS.
17 Therefore, in addition to the difficulty in quantifying the after-the-fact value difference between
18 the price paid and the “true” value, it would be extremely challenging, if not impossible, to
19 measure the difference between the price received by BPA and the cost incurred by BPA.

20
21 The total forecast cost of RSS is about \$4 million annually. *See* Power Rates Study, BP-18-FS-
22 BPA-01, § 5.6. The magnitude of the risk of miscalculation of these RSS costs is not large
23 enough to affect TPP calculations.

1 **4.3.4 Qualitative Risk Assessment Results**

2 **4.3.4.1 Biological Opinion Risks**

3 The financial risks deriving from possible changes to BiOps are adequately mitigated by the
4 NFB mechanisms. *See* Section 4.3.1.1 above and GRSP II.Q.

5
6 **4.3.4.2 Risks Associated with Tier 2 Rate Design**

7 Tier 2 risks are adequately mitigated by the terms and conditions of service at the Tier 2 rate and
8 BPA’s credit risk policies, and no residual Tier 2 risk is borne by BPA or Tier 1.

9
10 **4.3.4.3 Risks Associated with Resource Support Services Rate Design**

11 BPA uses a pricing construct that does not lead to prices for RSS that are systematically too high
12 or systematically too low. There is not a significant financial risk that the cost would affect the
13 Composite or Non-Slice cost pools or BPA generally, and as a consequence, there is no
14 quantification or mitigation of RSS risks in this study.

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1 **5. TRANSMISSION RISK**

2

3 **5.1 Transmission Quantitative Risk Assessment**

4 This chapter describes the uncertainties pertaining to Transmission Services’ finances in the
5 context of setting transmission rates. Section 5.2 describes how BPA determines whether its risk
6 mitigation measures are sufficient to meet the TPP standard given the risks detailed in this
7 chapter.

8

9 Variability in Transmission revenues is modeled in RevRam, as described in Section 5.1.2.
10 Variability in Transmission expenses and Net Revenue-to-Cash (NRTC) adjustments is modeled
11 in T-NORM, as described in Section 5.1.3. The results of these quantitative risk models are
12 provided to ToolKit, which performs quantitative risk mitigation, as described in Section 5.2.

13

14 **5.1.1 RevRAM – Revenue Risk**

15 See Section 3.1.2.2 for an overview of RevRAM. The following sections describe the
16 uncertainties modeled in RevRAM.

17

18 **5.1.1.1 Network Integration Service Revenue Risk**

19 Risks in the NT revenue forecast arise from uncertainty in the load forecast, which is the basis
20 for the NT sales and revenue forecast. The load forecast is based on predicted year-to-year
21 NT load growth. Actual loads can vary from the forecast because economic conditions may be
22 different from those forecast and load center temperatures may differ from the normalized
23 temperatures on which the forecast is based.

1 Risk in the growth rate is modeled with a triangular risk distribution defined by a high value, a
2 low value, and a most likely value, or mode. The most likely value is the forecast rate of year-to-
3 year load growth. The high value is an optimistic load growth rate that serves as the 80th
4 percentile of the triangular distribution, and the low value is a pessimistic load growth rate that
5 serves as the 20th percentile of the distribution.

6
7 The optimistic load growth rate is determined by adding the predicted year-to-year NT load
8 growth rate to an optimistic forecast of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) obtained from IHS
9 Markit (formally known as Global Insights), an economic forecasting and analysis firm.

10 Similarly, the pessimistic load growth rate is determined by adding the predicted year-to-year NT
11 load growth rate to a pessimistic GDP forecast obtained from IHS Markit. The resulting
12 distribution around growth rate serves as the first component of NT revenue risk.

13
14 The impact of temperature variability on the load is also modeled. The load forecast is based on
15 normalized temperature, so the risk arises from the variability of load center temperatures.
16 Variability in these temperatures induces variability in the load. The distribution of temperatures
17 in a 30-year period follows a normal distribution (a bell curve symmetrical around the mean)
18 calculated from historical temperatures.

19
20 The NT revenue risk distributions have standard deviations of \$3.6 million for FY 2018 and
21 \$4.1 million for FY 2019.

1 **5.1.1.2 Long-Term Network Point-to-Point Service Revenue Risk**

2 Risks in revenue from long-term PTP service are related to assumptions about new service and
3 potential deferrals of the service commencement date, exercise of renewals under BPA’s Open
4 Access Transmission Tariff (OATT), conversions of Formula Power Transmission (FPT) and
5 Integration of Resources (IR) service to PTP service, and possible customer default. BPA also
6 models revenue risk related to service that has not been granted yet but that might be granted
7 during the rate period.

8
9 BPA models risk for forecast revenue from new transmission service (that is, service that has
10 been offered to customers but has not yet begun) because the customer has a right to defer the
11 service commencement date for up to five years. A deferral delays the revenue from that service
12 for the period of the deferral. The revenue risk associated with deferrals is based on a
13 comparison of the service commencement date on the service reservation to the probable service
14 commencement date after deferrals.

15
16 BPA identifies possible deferrals by determining whether the service appears to be related to a
17 Large Generator Interconnection Agreement (LGIA). If the generation in-service date has been
18 forecast, then risk around the forecast LGIA generation in-service date is modeled using a
19 triangular distribution defined by maximum, most likely, and minimum values. The
20 transmission service commencement date is assumed to match the risk-adjusted generation
21 in-service date (that is, the analysis assumes the customer would defer its transmission service
22 commencement date to match the generation in-service date). If the generation in-service date
23 has not been forecast, the risk of deferral is identified based on information from BPA’s account

1 executive for the customer. The likelihood of deferral is based on the account executive's level
2 of confidence that the request will begin on its current service commencement date.

3
4 BPA also models risk associated with revenue from new service to be offered as a result of new
5 transmission infrastructure that BPA will energize in the rate period. A PERT distribution (a
6 distribution in which the user defines the maximum, most likely, and minimum values) is used to
7 model possible delays to the in-service date for these projects (and resulting delays in the start of
8 service and receipt of revenue). There are no sales associated with new infrastructure that BPA
9 will energize in the BP-18 rate period.

10
11 Risk is also modeled for service that is eligible to be renewed during the rate period. Historical
12 data was gathered on the frequency of renewal of long-term PTP service for service reservations
13 that have been eligible for renewal over the past five years. A normal distribution was identified
14 using the historical frequency of renewals for service requests that are eligible for renewal. That
15 distribution is applied to the service requests that are eligible for renewal during the rate period
16 to identify the probability of the service being renewed.

17
18 Risk is modeled for service that is eligible to convert from FPT or IR service to PTP service by
19 gathering information from BPA's account executives for the customers on the likelihood that
20 individual requests will convert either after the expiration or prior to the expiration of the FPT or
21 IR contract. The likelihood of conversion is based on the account executive's level of
22 confidence that the request will be converted to PTP service during the rate period.

1 Risk of default is modeled for all current and anticipated service. The probability of default for
2 each customer is modeled using information from Standard & Poor's. BPA applies Standard &
3 Poor's credit rating for each entity and refers to Standard & Poor's Global Corporate Average
4 Default Rate for the level of default risk associated with that credit rating. Standard & Poor's
5 conducts its default studies on the basis of groupings called static pools. Static pools are formed
6 by grouping issuers by rating category at the beginning of each year covered by the study.
7 Annual default rates were calculated for each static pool, first in units and later as percentages
8 with respect to the number of issuers in each rating category. Finally, these percentages were
9 combined to obtain cumulative default rates for the 30 years covered by the study. If a default
10 occurs in the model, the capacity held by the defaulting customer is assumed to return to
11 inventory to be resold for a portion of the remaining months of the fiscal year. Assuming the
12 capacity is resold for only a portion of the year accounts for the time it takes to process and offer
13 the new contract for the service.

14
15 Risk associated with additional sales of service that have not yet been requested (the possibility
16 that revenues will be higher than forecast due to these sales) is modeled based on three different
17 sources: (1) new sales associated with new generation that is included in the LGIA forecast but
18 for which long-term service has not yet been requested; (2) new sales from transmission
19 inventory that becomes available due to customer default, as described above; and (3) new sales
20 as a result of competitions performed in accordance with Section 17.7 of the OATT (deferral
21 competitions). Sales due to new generation are modeled using a PERT distribution and
22 information from TS's customer service engineering organization on expected in-service dates.
23 Modeling of sales from inventory that becomes available due to customer default is described

1 above. To model sales that occur after competitions, it is assumed that zero to six competitions
2 will be performed a year. For each competition performed there is a 50 percent chance that the
3 competition will be successful and result in additional revenue.

4
5 The long-term PTP revenue risk distribution results in standard deviations of \$5.6 million for
6 FY 2018 and \$6.5 million for FY 2019.

7 8 **5.1.1.3 Short-Term Network Point-to-Point Service Revenue Risk**

9 The short-term PTP revenue forecast carries significant risk due to the nature of the product.
10 This service is not reserved far in advance with an existing contract but instead is requested on
11 an hourly, daily, weekly, or monthly basis. Short-term PTP service is sensitive to market
12 conditions and streamflow, so we model the risks around the price spread between the North of
13 Path 15 (NP-15) hub and the Mid-C hub, as well as streamflow. Modeling of risk around the
14 Mid-C and NP-15 prices incorporates variability around natural gas prices and streamflow.
15 Natural gas volatility is important because natural gas-fired electricity generation is often the
16 marginal resource in western power markets and therefore plays an important role in setting the
17 market price of power. Fluctuations in natural gas prices lead to fluctuations in power prices.

18
19 Streamflow variability is important for two reasons. First, the Mid-C and NP-15 price spread is
20 positively correlated with streamflow. As streamflow increases, Mid-C prices decrease and the
21 price spread widens. Second, streamflow has a high correlation with short-term transmission
22 reservations made by PS. The short-term PTP forecast is developed using a regression analysis,
23 so risk of errors is incorporated in the relationships identified between historical sales,

1 streamflow, and price spread. For a more in-depth discussion on the short-term PTP forecast and
2 risk assessment process, see the Transmission Rates Study and Documentation, BP-18-FS-
3 BPA-08, Section 2.2.2.2. The short-term PTP risk distribution resulting from the methodology
4 outlined above results in standard deviations of \$9.5 million for FY 2018 and \$9.4 million for
5 FY 2019.

6 7 **5.1.1.4 Long-Term Southern Intertie Service Revenue Risk**

8 Long-term capacity on the Southern Intertie is almost fully subscribed in the north to south
9 direction. This means that BPA cannot make additional sales unless existing agreements
10 terminate or are not renewed, or until reliability upgrades on the Pacific DC Intertie (PDCI)
11 increase transfer capability. In addition, there is a queue of transmission service requests that are
12 seeking long-term IS service but that have not been granted service because no long-term IS
13 capacity is available for sale. Requests in the queue are expected to replace any contracts that
14 expire. Thus, BPA identified a high service commencement probability, with a normal
15 distribution, for these requests. In addition, default risk for service on the Southern Intertie is
16 modeled using the same method described for long-term PTP service. The long-term IS risk
17 distribution results in standard deviations of \$1.1 million for FY 2018 and \$1.3 million for
18 FY 2019.

19 20 **5.1.1.4.1 Short-Term Southern Intertie Service Revenue Risk**

21 The revenue forecast for short-term Southern Intertie service carries significant risk due to the
22 nature of the product. This service is not reserved far in advance with an existing contract but
23 instead is requested on an hourly, daily, weekly, or monthly basis. Short-term Southern Intertie

1 service is sensitive to market conditions and streamflow, so BPA models the risks around the
2 NP-15 minus Mid-C price spread, South of Path 15 (SP-15) minus Mid-C spread, and
3 streamflow. The forecast is developed using a regression analysis, so BPA also models risk of
4 errors in correlations identified between historical sales, streamflow, and price spread. For a
5 more in-depth discussion on the short-term IS forecast and risk assessment process, see *id.*
6 § 2.3.1.2. The short-term IS revenue risk distribution results in standard deviations of
7 \$1.3 million for FY 2018 and \$1.2 million for FY 2019.

8 9 **5.1.1.5 Other Transmission Revenue Risk**

10 The risk related to other transmission revenues arises from variability in Utility Delivery and DSI
11 Delivery revenues, revenues from fiber and wireless contracts, and revenues from other fixed-
12 price contracts. This risk is modeled based on the historical variance between rate case revenue
13 forecasts for these products and actual revenue. Data from FY 2011 through FY 2015 is used
14 and the mean average deviation is applied, resulting in a deviation of \$0.2 million per year for
15 Utility and DSI Delivery revenue, \$1.0 million per year for fiber and wireless contract revenue,
16 and \$4.8 million per year for other fixed-price contract revenue.

17 18 **5.1.1.6 Ancillary and Control Area Services Revenue Risk**

19 BPA models the revenue risk associated with the ancillary service Scheduling, System Control,
20 and Dispatch, which applies to customers taking both firm and non-firm transmission service.
21 SCD revenue is based on sales of NT, long-term PTP, short-term PTP, long-term IS, and
22 short-term IS. As such, the revenue variability for SCD follows the risk associated with those

1 services, and SCD revenue risk is not modeled individually. Instead, variations in SCD revenues
2 are assumed to be directly proportional to variations in the revenue from those services.

3
4 BPA does not model revenue risk associated with the Ancillary Service Reactive Supply and
5 Voltage Control from Generation Sources (GSR) because that rate is a formula rate that is
6 currently set at zero. As a result, it generates no revenue. The formula rate for GSR is calculated
7 for each quarter but has been calculated to be zero in every quarter since 2009.

8
9 Generation Inputs services comprise Regulation & Frequency Response, Dispatchable Energy
10 Resource Balancing Service, Variable Energy Resource Balancing Service, Energy & Generation
11 Imbalance, and Operating Reserve – Spinning & Supplemental (OR). We sorted these sources of
12 revenue into two categories based on their characteristics and their impact on TS net revenue:
13 (1) variable revenue but fixed expense, and (2) variable revenue with variable expense.

14
15 TS expects to pay PS a fixed amount for providing reserves for RFR, VERBS, and DERBS
16 during the rate period. The revenue that TS receives from its customers is variable, however, so
17 the contribution to TS net revenue is variable. For RFR the billing factor is customers' loads in
18 the BPA balancing area, which vary due to factors that include weather variation from normal
19 and changes in economic conditions. The standard deviation of historical billed RFR loads from
20 FY 2008 through FY 2014 is used in the simulation of the load and associated revenue during the
21 rate period. The resulting variability on revenues for RFR is \$0.1 million per year. The VERBS
22 billing factor is the installed capacity of the plant. In the BP-18 rate period 2,607 MW of wind
23 installed capacity is expected to leave the BPA balancing authority area, and 300 MW of new

1 wind generation is expected to be connected to the BPA balancing authority area. Any departure
2 from the forecast time period when generation leaves or interconnects to the BPA balancing
3 authority presents variability to VERBS revenues. The VERBS revenue risk distribution results
4 in standard deviations of \$0.4 million for FY 2018 and \$0.3 million for FY 2019.

5
6 The DERBS billing factor is based on the station control error of non-Federal thermal plants.
7 Station control error is the deviation of a generator from its basepoint, which is the generation
8 level to which the plant is planned to operate. The historical standard deviation of the station
9 control area for DERBS plants for incremental (*inc*) and decremental (*dec*) reserves is used in
10 simulating DERBS revenue. The resulting variability on revenues for DERBS is \$0.1 million
11 per year.

12
13 Generation inputs whose revenues and expenses have generally equivalent variability and are
14 correlated—that is, any potential change in TS revenue is matched by an offsetting change in TS
15 expense—create insignificant uncertainty in TS net revenue. This category comprises EI/GI and
16 OR. No uncertainty in net revenue from EI/GI and OR is modeled.

17 18 **5.1.1.7 Total Transmission Revenue Risk**

19 The Transmission Revenue Risk worksheets compute the revenue risk and the resulting expected
20 value for transmission revenues from these products. The revenue uncertainty from all
21 transmission services is aggregated. The variability of the total transmission revenues (as
22 measured by the standard deviation) is less than the sum of the variabilities (standard deviations)
23 of the individual services. The standard deviation of the distribution of total transmission

1 revenue for the FY 2018 is \$16.2 million and for FY 2019 is \$16.5 million. In each game, the
2 total transmission revenue is linked into the income statement in T-NORM.

3 4 **5.1.2 T-NORM Inputs**

5 **5.1.2.1 Inputs to T-NORM**

6 To obtain the data used to develop the probability distributions used by T-NORM, BPA analyzed
7 historical data and consulted with subject matter experts for their assessment of the risks
8 concerning their cost estimates, including the possible range of outcomes and the associated
9 probabilities of occurrence.

10
11 Table 7 shows the 5th percentile, mean, and 95th percentile results from each of the risk models
12 described below, along with the deterministic amount that is assumed in the revenue requirement
13 for that risk. *See* Transmission Revenue Requirement Study Documentation, BP-18-FS-
14 BPA-09A, Table 1-1.

15 16 **5.1.2.1.1 Transmission Operations**

17 T-NORM models variability in transmission operations expense using PERT distributions for
18 FY 2017 and for each of the two fiscal years in the rate period, FY 2018 and FY 2019. For
19 FY 2017, the most likely value comes from the start-of-year budget. For the rate period years,
20 the most likely values come from the revenue requirement. The minimum and maximum values
21 of the distribution come from the historically observed minimum and maximum actual values
22 (FY 2009–2016) compared to rate case projections. The minimum value is 8.4 percent lower

1 and the maximum value is 15.9 percent higher than the expected level of expense in the revenue
2 requirement.

3
4 See Table 7 for the expected, 5th percentile, and 95th percentile values for this risk.

6 **5.1.2.1.2 Transmission Maintenance**

7 To model variability in transmission maintenance expense, PERT distributions are used for
8 FY 2017 and for each of the two fiscal years in the rate period. For FY 2017, the most likely
9 value comes from the start-of-year budget. For the rate period years, the most likely values come
10 from the revenue requirement. The minimum and maximum values of the distribution come
11 from the historically observed minimum and maximum actual values (FY 2009–2016) compared
12 to rate case projections. The minimum value is 9.7 percent lower and the maximum value is
13 27.1 percent higher than the expected level of expense in the revenue requirement.

14
15 See Table 7 for the expected, 5th percentile, and 95th percentile values for this risk.

17 **5.1.2.1.3 Agency Services General & Administrative**

18 To model variability in agency services general and administrative (G&A) costs, PERT
19 distributions are used for FY 2017 and for each of the two fiscal years in the rate period. For
20 FY 2017, the most likely value comes from the start-of-year budget. For the rate period years,
21 the most likely values come from the revenue requirement. The minimum and maximum values
22 come from the historically observed minimum and maximum actual values (FY 2009–2016)

1 compared to rate case projections. The minimum value is 22.9 percent lower and the maximum
2 value is 14.8 percent higher than the expected level of expense in the revenue requirement.

3
4 See Table 7 for the expected, 5th percentile, and 95th percentile values for this risk.

6 **5.1.2.1.4 Interest on Long-Term Debt Issued to the U.S. Treasury**

7 T-NORM models the impact of interest rate uncertainty associated with new debt issuances
8 (borrowings) on interest expense and on TS Reserves. These planned borrowings
9 (Transmission Revenue Requirement Study Documentation, BP-18-FS-BPA-09A, Tables 8-2
10 and 10-2) are used to calculate expected interest expense on long-term debt and appropriations
11 for the revenue requirement. This analysis assesses the potential difference in interest expense
12 on long-term debt and appropriations from the amount rates are set to recover in the revenue
13 requirement. The method used for modeling interest rate uncertainty in T-NORM is identical to
14 the method used in P-NORM. This method is described in Section 4.1.2.1.8.

15
16 See Table 7 for the expected, 5th percentile, and 95th percentile values for this risk.

18 **5.1.2.1.5 Transmission Engineering**

19 To model variability in transmission engineering expense, PERT distributions are used for
20 FY 2017 and for each of the two fiscal years in the rate period. For FY 2017, the most likely
21 value comes from the start-of-year budget. For the rate period years, the most likely values come
22 from the revenue requirement. The minimum and maximum values of the distribution come
23 from the historically observed minimum and maximum actual values (FY 2009–2016) compared

1 to rate case projections. The minimum value is 28.1 percent lower and the maximum value is
2 30.0 percent higher than the expected level of expense in the revenue requirement.

3
4 See Table 7 for the expected, 5th percentile, and 95th percentile values for this risk.

5 6 **5.1.2.2 T-NORM Results**

7 The output of T-NORM is an Excel[®] file containing (1) the aggregate total net revenue deltas for
8 all of the individual risks that are modeled and (2) the associated NRTC adjustments for each
9 game for FY 2017, FY 2018, and FY 2019. Each run has 3,200 games. The ToolKit uses this
10 file in its calculations of TPP. Summary statistics and distributions for each fiscal year are
11 shown in Documentation Figure 25.

12 13 **5.1.3 Net Revenue-to-Cash Adjustment**

14 One of the inputs to the ToolKit (through T-NORM) is the NRTC Adjustment. Most of BPA's
15 probabilistic modeling is based on impacts of various factors on net revenue. BPA's TPP
16 standard is a measure of the probability of having enough cash to make payments to the
17 Treasury. While cash flow and net revenue generally track each other closely, there can be
18 significant differences in any year. For instance, the requirement to repay Federal borrowing
19 over time is reflected in the accrual arena as depreciation of assets. Depreciation is an expense
20 that reduces net revenue, but there is no cash inflow or outflow associated with depreciation.
21 The same repayment requirement is reflected in the cash arena as cash payments to the Treasury
22 to reduce the principal balance on Federal bonds and appropriations. These cash payments are
23 not reflected on income statements. Therefore, in translating a net revenue result to a cash flow

1 result, the impact of depreciation must be removed and the impact of cash principal payments
2 must be added. The 3,200 NRTC adjustments calculated in T-NORM make the necessary
3 changes to convert RevRAM and T-NORM accrual results (net revenue results) into the
4 equivalent cash flows so ToolKit can calculate reserves values in each game and thus calculate
5 TPP.

6
7 The NRTC Adjustment is modeled probabilistically in T-NORM. As its starting point,
8 T-NORM uses deterministic expected values for each fiscal year's cash adjustment and non-cash
9 adjustment. It then adjusts NRTC results using the cash timing lag model described below. The
10 NRTC table is shown in Documentation Table 23.

11 12 **5.1.3.1 Cash Timing Lags**

13 T-NORM uses projections of revenues and expenses to estimate possible changes in TS reserves.
14 TS reserves are discussed in Section 5.2.1.1.1 below. A projected revenue or expense is an
15 assumption of when accounting will record that a service has been performed by BPA (revenue)
16 or that a service has been received by BPA (expense). The projection of when accounting
17 records a revenue or expense is typically within one month of when the cash is received or paid.
18 For most revenues and expenses, BPA assumes that cash is received or paid in the same year as
19 the revenue or expense is recorded, unless the revenue or expense has no cash associated with it
20 (that is, it is a non-cash revenue or non-cash expense). These known non-cash revenues and
21 non-cash expenses are removed from the forecast. As revenues and expenses are projected for
22 each game in T-NORM, uncertainty in the timing of when the cash will be received or paid is
23 modeled.

1 For revenues or expenses projected to be recorded by accounting near the end of a fiscal year,
2 there is a potential for the cash transaction to lag sufficiently far behind the accounting
3 transaction that the cash will be received or paid in the following year. If some cash receipts
4 from revenue lag into the next year, TS reserves at the end of the year will be lower than
5 indicated by accrual accounting records, and if some cash payments for recorded expenses lag
6 into the next year, TS reserves at the end of the year will be higher than indicated by accrual
7 accounting records. Timing differences of this kind can be observed in historical data by looking
8 at the year-over-year changes to the accounts payable, accounts receivable, materials, and
9 prepaid expense accounts. These accounts represent revenues or expenses BPA has recorded
10 from an accounting standpoint but for which BPA has not yet received or paid cash.

11
12 To model this uncertainty required examination of the changes in BPA's accounts payable (both
13 Power and Transmission), accounts receivable, materials, and prepaid expenses from FY 2009 to
14 FY 2016. BPA assumed that the percentage of each account that is attributed to Transmission
15 Services equaled the percentage of BPA's total revenues that is earned by Transmission Services.
16 Transmission revenue averaged 29 percent of total FCRPS revenue across the eight-year
17 historical period from FY 2009 to FY2016. For FY 2009 through FY 2016 the changes in
18 accounts payable, accounts receivable, materials and prepaid expenses attributed to Transmission
19 Services were -\$32.1 million, \$14.9 million, -\$18.5 million, \$7.4 million, \$10.3 million, and
20 \$8.2 million, -\$6.4 million and --\$23.0 million respectively. The average over the period was -
21 \$7.6 million and the standard deviation was \$16.8 million. Over many years the average will be
22 very close to \$0, because the changes to these accounts are merely timing differences between

1 when revenue and expenses are accounted for and when the cash is received or paid. The
2 historical data show that over time, increases in one year are offset by decreases in another.

3
4 For example, in FY 2014, the change in accounts payable, accounts receivable, materials, and
5 prepaid expenses was \$8.2 million; in FY 2013 it was -\$10.3 million; and the trend continues
6 through FY 2009. BPA modeled the variability in cash timing lags in T-NORM in FY 2017–
7 2019 with a normal distribution (bell-shaped curve), average of \$0 (theoretical long-run
8 average), and standard deviation of \$16.8 million (observed standard deviation). Thus, on
9 average, the cash timing lag will be \$0, but it has the potential to vary on either side of \$0.

10 Two-thirds of the time the cash lag will be within the range of positive and negative
11 \$16.8 million. Because the FY 2016 actual amount was negative, the Study assumes the
12 FY 2017 amount will be positive, the FY 2018 amount will be negative, and the FY 2019
13 amount will be positive, reflecting the offsetting relationship of these amounts year over year.
14 Each T-NORM game sampled three values from the earlier-described normal distribution for
15 FY 2017, FY 2018, and FY 2019 and converted the sampled value to the appropriate positive or
16 negative sign. The analysis resulted in an average cash lag in FY 2018 and FY 2019 of \$0.3
17 thousand, with a standard deviation of \$10.1 million.

18 19 **5.2 Transmission Quantitative Risk Mitigation**

20 The preceding sections of this chapter describe the risks that are modeled explicitly, with the
21 output of T-NORM and RevRAM quantitatively portraying the financial uncertainty faced by TS
22 in each fiscal year. This section describes the tools used to mitigate these risks—TS Reserves,
23 PNRR, CRAC, and RDC—and how BPA evaluates the adequacy of this mitigation.

1 The risk that is the primary subject of this Study is the possibility that BPA might not have
2 sufficient cash on September 30, the last day of its fiscal year, to fully meet its obligation to the
3 U.S. Treasury for that fiscal year. BPA’s TPP standard, described in Section 2.3 above, defines a
4 way to measure this risk (TPP) and a standard that reflects BPA’s tolerance for this risk (no more
5 than a 5 percent probability of any deferrals of BPA’s Treasury payment in a two-year rate
6 period). TPP and the ability of the rates to meet the TPP standard are measured in the ToolKit
7 by applying the risk mitigation tools described in this chapter to the modeled financial risks
8 described in the previous chapters.

9
10 A second risk addressed in this Study is within-year liquidity risk—the risk that at some time
11 within a fiscal year BPA will not have sufficient cash to meet its immediate financial obligations
12 (whether to the Treasury or to other creditors) even if BPA might have enough cash later that
13 year. In each recent rate proceeding, a need for reserves for within-year liquidity (“liquidity
14 reserves”) has been defined. This level is based on a determination of BPA’s total need for
15 liquidity and a subsequent determination of how much of that need is properly attributed to
16 Transmission Services.

17 18 **5.2.1 Transmission Risk Mitigation Tools**

19 **5.2.1.1 Liquidity**

20 Cash and cash equivalents provide liquidity, which means they are available to meet immediate
21 and short-term obligations. For the BP-18 rate period, Transmission Services has one source of
22 liquidity: Financial Reserves Available for Risk Attributed to TS (TS Reserves). Liquidity
23 mitigates financial risk by serving as a temporary source of cash for meeting financial

1 obligations during years in which net revenue and the corresponding cash flow are lower than
2 anticipated. In years of above-expected net revenue and cash flow, financial reserves can be
3 replenished so they will be available in later years.

5 **5.2.1.1.1 TS Reserves**

6 TS Reserves are not held in a TS-specific account. BPA has only one account, the BPA Fund, in
7 which it maintains financial reserves. Staff in the Chief Financial Officer's (CFO's) organization
8 "attributes" part of the BPA Fund balance to the Transmission generation function and part to the
9 transmission function. Reserves attributed to Transmission do not belong to Transmission
10 Services; they belong to BPA.

11
12 Financial reserves available to the transmission function (Transmission Services) include cash
13 and investments ("Treasury Specials") held in the BPA Fund at the Treasury plus any deferred
14 borrowing. Deferred borrowing refers to amounts of capital expenditures BPA has made that
15 authorize borrowing from the Treasury when BPA has not yet completed the borrowing.

16 Deferred borrowing amounts can be converted to cash at any time by completing the borrowing.

17
18 Some financial reserves are considered to be not available for risk; such encumbered reserves are
19 not considered in the risk analysis. Encumbered reserves include customer deposits for capital
20 projects related to Large or Small Generator Interconnection Agreements, Network Open
21 Season, the Southern Intertie capital program, and Master Lease funds. These encumbered
22 reserves are deposits from third parties to pay for specific facilities, security deposits from third
23 parties, or advances through BPA's Master Lease program that are required by the lease

1 agreement terms to be used only for specified projects. Encumbered reserves attributed to TS
2 equaled \$72.8 million at the start of FY 2017. Financial reserves available for risk attributed to
3 TS (TS Reserves) were \$443.8 million at the beginning of FY 2017.

4 5 **5.2.1.1.2 Within-Year Liquidity Need**

6 The within-year liquidity need is the amount of cash or other liquidity (the temporary availability
7 of cash) BPA needs at the beginning of a fiscal year for dealing with cash flow deficits that result
8 from payments being made before cash receipts. T-NORM records a Treasury payment miss
9 (that is, T-NORM assumes that BPA is unable to make its Treasury payment) if TS reserves in a
10 game are below the within-year liquidity need at the end of either year in the rate period. The
11 transmission business line has over \$900 million in annual expenses.

12
13 Transmission's within-year liquidity need was calculated to be \$100 million in the BP-16 rate
14 proceeding, based on an analysis of historical within-year cash flow variation. *See* BP-16
15 Transmission Revenue Requirement Study Documentation, BP-16-FS-BPA-08A, § 10.6.

16 Transmission's within-year liquidity need remains unchanged for this study.

17 18 **5.2.1.2 Planned Net Revenues for Risk**

19 Analyses of BPA's TPP are conducted during rate development using current projections of
20 TS reserves. If the TPP is below the 95 percent two-year standard established in BPA's
21 Financial Plan, then the projected reserves, along with whatever other risk mitigation is
22 considered in the risk study, are not sufficient to reach the TPP standard. This may be corrected
23 by adding PNRR to the revenue requirement as a cost needing to be recovered by rates. This

1 addition has the effect of increasing rates, which will increase net cash flow, which will increase
2 the available TS reserves and therefore increase TPP.

3
4 PNRR needed to meet the TPP standard is calculated in the ToolKit, described in Section 3.1.5.
5 If the ToolKit calculates TPP below 95 percent, PNRR can be iteratively added to the model in
6 one or both years of the rate period (typically, PNRR is evenly added to both years). PNRR is
7 added in \$1 million increments until a 95 percent TPP is achieved. The calculated PNRR
8 amounts are then provided to the Transmission Revenue Requirement Study (BP-18-FS-
9 BPA-09), which calculates a new revenue requirement. This adjusted revenue requirement is
10 then iterated through the rate models and tested again in ToolKit. If ToolKit reports TPP below
11 95 percent or TPP above 95 percent by more than the equivalent of \$1 million in PNRR, PNRR
12 adjustments are calculated again and reiterated through the rate models.

13
14 Based on analyses for the Final Proposal, no PNRR is needed to meet the TPP standard for the
15 BP-18 rates.

17 **5.2.1.3 The Cost Recovery Adjustment Clause**

18 As specified in the FRP (*see* Chapter 6), the BP-18 Final Proposal includes a CRAC and an RDC
19 for Transmission. This is the first time that these rate adjustment mechanisms have been
20 included in Transmission rates. The CRAC can be used to adjust rates upward to respond to the
21 financial circumstances BPA experiences before the next opportunity to adjust rates in a rate
22 proceeding. The Transmission CRAC could increase rates for FY 2018 based on financial
23 results for FY 2017. It also could increase rates for FY 2019 based on the accumulation of

1 financial results for FY 2017 and FY 2018 (taking into account any Transmission CRAC
2 applying to FY 2018 rates). The Transmission rates subject to the Transmission CRAC (and
3 eligible for the Transmission RDC, see Section 5.2.1.4 below) are the Network Integration Rate
4 (NT-18), the Point-to-Point Rate (PTP-18), the Formula Power Transmission Rate (FPT-18.1),
5 the Southern Intertie Point-to-Point Rate (IS-18), the Utility Delivery Rate (Transmission
6 GRSP II.A.1.b.), the Scheduling, Control, and Dispatch Rate (ACS-18), the Integration of
7 Resources Rate (IR-18), and the Montana Intertie Rate (IM-18). *See* Transmission GRSP II.H.

8 9 **5.2.1.3.1 Calibrated Net Revenue**

10 Calibrated Net Revenue (CNR) is Net Revenue adjusted for certain debt management and
11 contract-related transactions that affect the relationship between accruals and cash. The method
12 for calculating Transmission CNR is described in Transmission GRSP II.H. Examples of the
13 application of this method, including actions that change Federal depreciation, debt transactions
14 that affect net revenue but not cash, and cash contract settlements, are described in
15 Documentation Appendix A.

16 17 **5.2.1.3.2 Description of the Transmission CRAC**

18 As described in the introduction to Section 5.2 above and Transmission GRSP II.H, the CRAC
19 for FY 2018 and FY 2019 is an annual upward adjustment in various Transmission rates. The
20 threshold for triggering the CRAC is an amount of Transmission Services' CNR accumulated
21 since the end of FY 2016.

1 The Accumulated Calibrated Net Revenue (ACNR) threshold values are set in July 2017, based
2 on the terms specified in the FRP. *See* Chapter 6. In this Final Proposal, the ACNR threshold is
3 set at the equivalent of \$99 million in TS Net Reserves, consistent with the FRP. *Id.* The ACNR
4 threshold for each year is calculated by taking the difference between average ACNR and
5 average Net Reserves across all 3,200 games in the ToolKit and adding that difference to the
6 target Transmission CRAC threshold in terms of reserves.

7
8 As an example, assume that a given fiscal year's Transmission CRAC threshold in terms of
9 reserves is supposed to be \$100 million. If the average ACNR at the start of that fiscal year is
10 \$200 million and the average Net Reserves at the start of that fiscal year is \$50 million, then the
11 CRAC threshold in terms of ACNR for that year is \$250 million ($\$100 \text{ million} + \$200 \text{ million} -$
12 $\$50 \text{ million} = \250 million).

13
14 The Transmission CRAC will recover 100 percent of the amount that ACNR is below the
15 threshold, up to a cap of \$100 million. The Transmission CRAC will be implemented only if the
16 amount of the CRAC is greater than or equal to \$5 million.

17
18 Calculations for the CRAC that could apply to FY 2018 rates will be made in July 2017; the
19 corresponding calculations for possible adjustments to FY 2019 rates will be made in
20 September 2018. A forecast of the year-end Transmission Services ACNR will be made based
21 on the results of the Third Quarter Review and then compared to the thresholds for the CRAC
22 and the RDC. *See* Section 5.2.1.4 below. If the ACNR forecast is below the CRAC threshold,

1 an upward rate adjustment will be calculated for the duration of the upcoming fiscal year. *See*
2 Transmission GRSP II.H.

3 4 **5.2.1.4 Reserves Distribution Clause**

5 One of BPA’s financial policy objectives is to ensure that reserves do not accumulate to
6 excessive levels. *See* Section 2.1. The Transmission RDC is triggered if both BPA ACNR and
7 Transmission Services’ ACNR are above a threshold. The RCD provides a downward
8 adjustment to the same Transmission rates that are subject to the Transmission CRAC. In the
9 same way that a CRAC passes costs of bad financial outcomes to BPA’s customers, an RDC
10 passes benefits of good financial outcomes to BPA’s customers. The total distribution is capped
11 at \$200 million per fiscal year. The RDC will be implemented only if the amount of the RDC is
12 greater than or equal to \$5 million. *See* Chapter 6 and Transmission GRSP II.I.

13 14 **5.2.2 ToolKit**

15 The ToolKit model is described in Section 3.1.5. The inputs to the ToolKit for Transmission are
16 shown in Documentation Figure 26.

17 18 **5.2.2.1 ToolKit Inputs and Assumptions for Transmission**

19 **5.2.2.1.1 RevRAM Results**

20 The ToolKit reads in risk distributions generated by RevRAM that are created for the current
21 year, FY 2017, and the rate period, FY 2018–2019. TPP is measured for only the two-year rate
22 period, but the starting Reserves Available for Risk for FY 2018 depends on events yet to unfold

1 in FY 2017; these runs reflect that FY 2017 uncertainty. See Section 5.1.1 for more detail on
2 RevRAM.

3 4 **5.2.2.1.2 Non-Operating Risk Model**

5 The ToolKit reads in T-NORM distributions that are created for FY 2017–2019 and reflect the
6 uncertainty around non-operating expenses. See Section 5.1.2 for more detail on T-NORM.

7 8 **5.2.2.1.3 Treatment of Treasury Deferrals**

9 In the event that ToolKit forecasts a deferral of payment of principal to the Treasury, the ToolKit
10 assumes that BPA will track the balance of payments that have been deferred and will repay this
11 balance to the Treasury at its first opportunity. “First opportunity” is defined for TPP
12 calculations as the first time Transmission Services ends a fiscal year with more than
13 \$100 million in net reserves. The same applies to subsequent fiscal years if the repayment
14 cannot be completed in the first year after the deferral. This is referred to as “hybrid” logic on
15 the ToolKit main page.

16 17 **5.2.2.1.4 Starting TS Reserves**

18 The FY 2017 starting TS reserves have a known value of \$443.8 million based upon the FY 2016
19 Fourth Quarter Review. Each of the 3,200 games starts with this value. See Section 5.2.1.1.1
20 above for a description of TS reserves.

1 **5.2.2.1.5 Starting ACNR**

2 The FY 2017 starting ACNR value of \$0 million is known from the definition of ANCR as being
3 accumulated TS net revenue since the end of FY 2016. Each of the 3,200 games starts with this
4 value.

5
6 **5.2.2.1.6 TS Liquidity Reserves Level**

7 The TS Liquidity Reserves Level is an amount of TS reserves set aside (*i.e.*, not available for
8 TPP use) to provide liquidity for within-year cash flow needs. This amount is set to
9 \$100 million. *See* Section 5.2.1.1.2.

10
11 **5.2.2.1.7 Interest Rate Earned on Reserves**

12 Interest earned on the cash component and the Treasury Specials component of TS reserves and
13 interest paid on the Treasury Facility is assumed to be 0.17 percent in FY 2017, 0.45 percent in
14 FY 2018, and 0.66 percent in FY 2019.

15
16 **5.2.2.1.8 Interest Credit Assumed in Net Revenue**

17 An important feature of the ToolKit is the ability to calculate interest earned on TS reserves
18 separately for each game. The net revenue games the ToolKit reads in from T-NORM include
19 deterministic assumptions of interest earned on reserves for each fiscal year; that is, the interest
20 earned does not vary from game to game. To capture the risk impacts of variability in interest
21 earned induced by variability in the level of reserves, in the TPP calculations the values
22 embedded in the T-NORM results for interest earned on reserves are backed out of all ToolKit
23 games and replaced with game-specific calculations of interest credit. The interest credit

1 assumptions embedded in T-NORM results that are backed out are \$2.4 million for FY 2017,
2 \$2.4 million for FY 2018, and \$4.0 million for FY 2019.

3 4 **5.2.2.1.9 The Cash Timing Adjustment**

5 The cash timing adjustment reflects the impact on earned interest of the non-linear shape of TS
6 reserves throughout a fiscal year as well as the interest earned on reserves attributed to TS that
7 are not available for risk and not modeled in the ToolKit. The ToolKit calculates interest earned
8 on reserves by making the simplifying assumption that reserves change linearly from the
9 beginning of the year to the end. It takes the average of the starting reserves and the ending
10 reserves and multiplies that figure by the interest rate for that year. Because TS cash payments
11 to the Treasury are not evenly spread throughout the year but instead are heaviest in September,
12 TS will typically earn more interest in BPA's monthly calculations than the straight-line method
13 yields. Additionally, the ToolKit does not model Reserves Not For Risk (*see* Section 5.2.1.1.1)
14 or the interest earned from these. The cash timing adjustment is a number from the repayment
15 study that approximates this additional interest credit earned on reserves throughout the fiscal
16 year along with the interest earned on reserves attributed to TS that are not available for risk.
17 The cash timing adjustments for this study are \$1.5 million for FY 2017, \$0.3 million for
18 FY 2018, and \$0.5 million for FY 2019.

19 20 **5.2.2.1.10 Cash Lag for PNRR**

21 Although figures for cash lag for PNRR appear in the inputs section of the ToolKit's main page,
22 they are calculated automatically. When the ToolKit calculates a change in PNRR (either a
23 decrease, or more typically, an increase), it calculates how much of the cash generated by the

1 increased rates would be received in the subsequent year, because September revenue is not
2 received until October. In order to treat ToolKit-generated changes in the level of PNRR on the
3 same basis as amounts of PNRR that have already been assumed in previous iterations of rate
4 calculations and are already embedded in the RevSim results, the ToolKit calculates the same
5 kind of lag for PNRR that is embedded in the RevSim output file the ToolKit reads. Because
6 this study does not require PNRR, there are no cash adjustments for PNRR.

8 **5.2.3 Quantitative Risk Mitigation Results**

9 Summary statistics are shown in Table 8.

11 **5.2.3.1 Ending TS Reserves**

12 Known starting TS Reserves for FY 2017 are \$443.8 million. The expected values of ending net
13 reserves are \$413 million for FY 2017, \$398 million for FY 2018, and \$366 million for FY 2019.

14 Over 3,200 games, the range of ending FY 2019 net reserves is from \$140 million to
15 \$558 million. The rate adjustment mechanisms would not produce a CRAC for FY 2020 in the
16 game with the lowest resulting net reserves if the FY 2020 rates include mechanisms comparable
17 to those included in the FY 2018–2019 rates. In the game with the highest resulting net reserves,
18 an RDC of \$200 million would occur (if Agency ANR is also high enough) for FY 2020 if the
19 FY 2020 rates include mechanisms comparable to those included in the FY 2018–2019 rates.

20 The 50 percent confidence interval for ending net reserves for FY 2019 is \$341 million to
21 \$402 million. ToolKit summary statistics for reserves and liquidity are in Documentation
22 Figure 27 and Table 24.

1 **5.2.3.2 TPP**

2 The two-year TPP is over 99.9 percent. In 3,200 games, there are no deferrals for FY 2017,
3 FY 2018, or FY 2019.

4
5 **5.2.3.3 CRAC and RDC**

6 The Transmission CRAC does not trigger in any of the 3,200 games.

7
8 At the end of FY 2017, the Transmission RDC triggers 0.2 percent of the time (9 of the
9 3,200 games), yielding an expected value of \$0.1 million in distributions for FY 2018. When a
10 Transmission RDC occurs, the forecast average size of the distributions in FY 2018 is
11 \$47 million. For the end of FY 2018, Transmission RDC triggers 17 percent of the time (544 of
12 the 3,200 games), yielding an expected value of \$17 million in distributions in that year. When a
13 Transmission RDC occurs, the forecast average size of the distributions in FY 2019 is
14 \$100 million. CRAC and Transmission RDC statistics are shown in Table 8.

15
16 The thresholds and caps for the Transmission CRAC and Transmission RDC applicable to rates
17 for FY 2018 and FY 2019 are shown in Tables 9 and 10. The BPA RDC Thresholds are shown
18 in Table 6.

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1 **6. FINANCIAL RESERVES POLICY IMPLEMENTATION**

2

3 **6.1 Overview of Financial Reserves Policy**

4 BPA’s Financial Reserves Policy (FRP) establishes a method for determining target ranges of
5 financial reserves for Power Services and Transmission Services. The FRP applies a consistent
6 methodology to determine lower and upper financial reserves thresholds for each business line
7 and an upper financial reserves threshold for BPA as a whole. *See* Administrator’s Final Record
8 of Decision, BP-18-A-04, Appendix A. The lower and upper business line thresholds determine
9 the target ranges for reserves for the business lines. The lower and upper thresholds are used to
10 determine when certain rate mechanisms are triggered within a rate period to support the policy
11 objectives stated in the FRP. The FRP’s main components are as follows:

- 12 • Lower financial reserves thresholds for Power Services and Transmission Services are
13 calculated independently for each rate period based on the higher of what is necessary to
14 meet the 95 percent Treasury Payment Probability (TPP) Standard or 60 days cash on
15 hand (a common industry liquidity metric). *Id.* at §§ 3.1–3.2. For each business line, if
16 financial reserves fall below the lower threshold, rate action specific to that business line
17 shall trigger to begin to recover the amount of the shortfall. *Id.* § 3.3.

- 18
- 19 • Upper financial reserves thresholds for Power Services and Transmission Services are
20 calculated independently for each rate period based on the financial reserves equivalent
21 of 60 days cash on hand above the lower financial reserves target. The agency upper
22 threshold is the sum of the business line lower thresholds plus 30 days agency cash. If
23 one business line’s financial reserves and agency financial reserves both are above their

1 respective upper thresholds, an RDC shall trigger for that business line, and the above-
2 threshold financial reserves will be considered for investment in other high-value
3 purposes such as debt retirement, incremental capital investment, or rate reduction. *Id.*

4 § 3.4. Upper thresholds are also called RDC thresholds.

5
6 The FRP includes a “phase-in” of the Power CRAC threshold. *Id.* § 4.2. Implementation of the
7 phase-in for this rate period is described in Section 6.8 below.

8 9 **6.2 Power Services Financial Reserves Target and Upper and Lower Thresholds**

10 The Financial Reserves Target and Upper and Lower Thresholds for Power called for by the
11 Policy are based on 90, 120, and 60 days’ cash respectively. The calculations of Power
12 operating expenses and translations into days’ cash dollar amounts are shown in Table 11.

13 14 **6.3 Transmission Services Financial Reserves Target and Upper and Lower Thresholds**

15 The Financial Reserves Upper and Lower Thresholds for Transmission called for by the FRP
16 also are based on 120 and 60 days cash. The calculations of Transmission operating expenses
17 and translations into days cash dollar amounts are shown in Table 12.

18 19 **6.4 Agency Upper Threshold**

20 The Agency (BPA) Upper Financial Reserves Threshold called for by the FRP is the sum of the
21 Power and Transmission Lower Reserves Thresholds plus 30 days Agency cash. The Agency
22 Upper Financial Reserves Threshold is used for each of the two years of the BP-18 rate period.

1 The formula for the Agency Financial Reserves Upper Threshold and the calculation of that
2 threshold for BP-18 are as follows:

$$\begin{aligned} & \text{BPA Upper Financial Reserves Threshold} = \text{Power Lower Financial Reserves Threshold} \\ & \quad + \text{Transmission Lower Financial Reserves Threshold} + 30 \text{ Days Agency Cash} \\ \text{BPA Upper Threshold} & = \$304.3 \text{ million} + \$99.3 \text{ million} + \$201.9 \text{ million} = \\ & \quad \$605.5 \text{ million.} \end{aligned}$$

9 **6.5 Reconciling FRP and TPP Perspectives on Lower Thresholds and CRAC** 10 **Thresholds**

11 The FRP and BPA's TPP framework (*see* Section 2.3) both provide guidance on the proper level
12 of lower reserves thresholds. These perspectives will be reconciled by establishing tentative
13 thresholds for each business line as the FRP requires and then evaluating whether the tentative
14 values are high enough to satisfy the requirements of BPA's TPP standard. If the TPP for a
15 business line is below 95 percent with the CRAC Threshold set to the tentative threshold
16 determined by the FRP, the CRAC Threshold will be increased to the lowest level yielding a
17 95 percent TPP.

19 **6.5.1 Power CRAC Thresholds**

20 The tentative Power Lower Threshold derived as the FRP requires is \$304 million. However,
21 this amount is reduced to the level of the Power CRAC Threshold from the BP-16 Final
22 Proposal, \$0, as part of the phase-in of the FRP (*see* Section 6.8 below). Power TPP is above
23 95 percent with the \$0 threshold. Because the TPP framework does not call for a higher

1 threshold than the FRP, the tentative threshold of \$0 becomes the Power CRAC Threshold for
2 FY 2018 and FY 2019 in the BP-18 Final Proposal.

3 4 **6.5.2 Transmission CRAC Thresholds**

5 The tentative Transmission Lower Threshold derived as the FRP requires is \$99 million.
6 Transmission TPP is above 95 percent with that threshold. Because the TPP framework does not
7 call for a higher threshold than the FRP, the tentative threshold of \$99 million becomes the
8 Transmission CRAC Threshold for FY 2018 and FY 2019 in the BP-18 Final Proposal.

9 10 **6.6 ACNR Values for CRAC and RDC Thresholds**

11 The CRAC and RDC thresholds determined above have been translated into equivalent ACNR
12 values for use in calculations of whether the CRAC or RDC for Power or Transmission will
13 trigger. The ACNR threshold for each year is calculated by taking the difference between
14 average ACNR and average Net Reserves across all 3,200 games in the ToolKit and adding that
15 difference to the target thresholds in terms of reserves.

16
17 The Power and Transmission CRAC thresholds are shown in Tables 4 and 9, respectively.

18 The Power, Transmission, and BPA RDC thresholds are shown in Tables 5, 10, and 6,
19 respectively.

1 **6.7 Timing of the CRAC and RDC Calculations**

2 Calculations to determine if the FY 2018 Power CRAC, Power RDC, Transmission CRAC, and
3 Transmission RDC trigger will be made in July 2017. The data used in the calculations will be
4 based on the FY 2017 Third Quarter Review.

5
6 Calculations to determine if the FY 2019 Power CRAC, Power RDC, Transmission CRAC, and
7 Transmission RDC trigger will be made in September 2018. The data used in the calculations
8 will be based on the FY 2018 Third Quarter Review, updated with any significant changes
9 available since that review.

10
11 **6.8 Phase-in of the Power CRAC Threshold up to the Power Lower Threshold**

12 Setting the Power CRAC Threshold to the level of the Power Lower Threshold, \$304 million,
13 would cause an immediate and very large Power CRAC for FY 2018. To avoid this very large
14 rate increase during a time when BPA is working diligently to keep rate increases as low as
15 possible, the increase of the Power CRAC threshold from the BP-16 value of \$0 in reserves for
16 risk to the Power Upper Threshold will be phased in over several years. The FRP calls for rate
17 action if Power reserves are below the Power Lower Threshold. *See Administrator's Final*
18 *Record of Decision, BP-18-A-04, Appendix A.* The rate action during the period of the phase-in
19 will use two mechanisms:

- 20 (1) Beginning with BP-18, \$20 million of PNRR per year will be included in the
21 Power revenue requirement until the Power CRAC Threshold has been increased
22 to the Power Lower Threshold. This will begin to build Power reserves up to the
23 level of the Power Lower Threshold.

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(2) A methodology for increasing the CRAC Threshold to the Power Lower Threshold will be created. This methodology will be discussed in a public process to be held after the BP-18 rate proceeding. When the Power CRAC Threshold has been increased to the Power Lower Threshold, the \$20 million of PNRR per year will be discontinued.

TABLES AND FIGURES

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**Table 1: RevSim Net Revenue Statistics (With PNRR of \$20 million)
for FY 2018 and FY 2019**

	FY18	FY19
Average	\$ (9,650)	\$ 77,435
Median	\$ (21,655)	\$ 85,669
Standard Deviation	\$ 187,263	\$ 187,695
1%	\$ (319,455)	\$ (232,472)
2.50%	\$ (302,687)	\$ (220,030)
5%	\$ (290,742)	\$ (209,191)
10%	\$ (255,272)	\$ (169,876)
15%	\$ (213,010)	\$ (128,442)
20%	\$ (178,069)	\$ (90,235)
25%	\$ (147,761)	\$ (60,820)
30%	\$ (122,434)	\$ (36,783)
35%	\$ (99,249)	\$ (12,402)
40%	\$ (74,870)	\$ 11,943
45%	\$ (49,063)	\$ 35,508
50%	\$ (21,655)	\$ 62,042
55%	\$ 7,459	\$ 92,892
60%	\$ 29,970	\$ 121,874
65%	\$ 58,416	\$ 148,808
70%	\$ 81,908	\$ 176,953
75%	\$ 110,634	\$ 204,001
80%	\$ 143,981	\$ 232,534
85%	\$ 181,586	\$ 269,117
90%	\$ 236,230	\$ 320,591
95%	\$ 317,841	\$ 408,554
97.50%	\$ 385,751	\$ 476,148
99%	\$ 493,399	\$ 571,793

Table 2: P-NORM Risk Summary

	A	B	C	D	E	F	G
P-NORM Risk Summary (\$000,000)							
	Study Section	Risk Title	Fiscal Year	Pro Forma / Rev. Req.	5th Percentile	Mean	95th Percentile
1			2017	318.5	315.9	318.3	320.8
2	4.1.2.1.1	CGS Operations and Maintenance (O&M)	2018	270.1	263.1	271.0	279.5
3			2019	327.4	318.8	328.4	338.8
4			2017	401.6	401.6	402.5	406.6
5	4.1.2.1.2	U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) and Bureau of Reclamation (Reclamation) O&M	2018	420.7	420.7	422.4	426.7
6			2019	418.7	418.7	420.4	424.7
7			2017	76.3	74.1	76.0	77.6
8	4.1.2.1.3	Conservation Expense	2018	71.8	67.7	71.2	74.2
9			2019	71.8	67.7	71.2	74.2
10			2017	16.7	16.7	16.7	16.7
11	4.1.2.1.4	Spokane Settlement	2018	22.6	22.6	23.2	28.3
12			2019	23.0	23.0	24.1	28.7
13			2017	95.2	94.7	95.1	95.5
14	4.1.2.1.5	Power Services Transmission Acquisition and Ancillary Services	2018	94.0	92.0	93.7	95.3
15			2019	94.8	92.6	94.7	96.6
16			2017	138.7	138.5	138.7	138.9
17	4.1.2.1.6	Power Services Internal Operations Expenses	2018	154.8	153.7	154.8	155.9
18			2019	160.1	158.5	160.1	161.7
19			2017	295.8	295.8	295.8	295.8
20	4.1.2.1.7	Fish & Wildlife Expenses	2018	310.2	297.2	301.6	306.0
21			2019	310.2	297.2	301.6	306.0
22			2017	392.3	392.2	392.3	392.4
23	4.1.2.1.8	Interest Expense Risk	2018	630.3	627.9	630.3	633.1
24			2019	566.7	559.6	566.7	574.8
25			2017	N/A	0.2	3.5	6.6
26	4.1.2.1.9	CGS Refueling Outage Risk	2018	N/A	0.0	0.0	0.0
27			2019	N/A	-3.8	0.1	3.2
34			2017	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
35	4.1.2.1.12	Undistributed Reduction Risk	2018	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
36			2019	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0

Table 3: Power Risk Mitigation Summary Statistics
[Dollars in millions]

	A	B	C	D
1	Two-Year TPP		99.9%	
		FY 2017	FY 2018	FY 2019
2	PNRR	\$0.0	\$20.0	\$20.0
3	CRAC Frequency	0%	22%	46%
4	Expected Value CRAC Revenue		\$4.9	\$50
5	RDC Frequency	0%	0%	0.5%
6	Expected Value RDC Payout	\$0	\$0	\$0.5
7	Treasury Deferral Frequency	0%	0%	0%
8	Expected Value Treasury Deferral	\$0	\$0	\$0
9	Exp. Value End-of-Year Net Reserves	\$28	\$28	\$128
10	Net Reserves, 5th percentile	(\$32)	(\$265)	(\$250)
11	Net Reserves, 25th percentile	(\$2)	(\$112)	(\$44)
12	Net Reserves, 50th percentile	\$22	\$19	\$130
13	Net Reserves, 75th percentile	\$52	\$149	\$286
14	Net Reserves, 95th percentile	\$103	\$364	\$522

Table 4: Power CRAC Annual Thresholds and Caps
[Dollars in millions]

<i>ACNR Calculated Near End of Fiscal Year</i>	<i>CRAC Applied to Fiscal Year</i>	<i>Threshold Measured in ACNR**</i>	<i>Threshold Measured in Reserves for Risk**</i>	<i>Maximum CRAC Amount (Cap)*</i>
2017	2018	\$249	\$0	\$300
2018	2019	\$464	\$0	\$300

* The Maximum CRAC Recovery Amount (Cap) may be modified by the NFB Adjustment (if triggered).

** The Thresholds will be modified in July 2017 as described in Power GRSP II.O

Table 5: Power RDC Thresholds and Caps
[Dollars in millions]

<i>ACNR Calculated Near End of Fiscal Year</i>	<i>RDC Applied to Fiscal Year</i>	<i>Threshold Measured in Power ACNR</i>	<i>Threshold Measured in Power Reserves for Risk</i>	<i>Maximum RDC Amount (Cap)</i>
2017	2018	\$858	\$609	\$500
2018	2019	\$1073	\$609	\$500

Table 6: BPA RDC Annual Threshold
[Dollars in millions]

<i>ACNR Calculated Near End of Fiscal Year</i>	<i>RDC Applied to Fiscal Year</i>	<i>Threshold Measured in BPA ACNR</i>	<i>Threshold Measured in BPA Reserves for Risk</i>
2017	2018	\$506	\$606
2018	2019	\$758	\$606

Table 7: T-NORM Risk Summary

A	B	C	D	E	F	G
T-NORM Risk Summary (\$000,000)						
Study Section	Risk Title	Fiscal Year	Pro Forma / Rev. Req.	5th Percentile	Mean	95th Percentile
1	5.1.3.1.1 Transmission Operations	2017	157.4	153.0	158.4	164.6
2		2018	167.1	157.6	169.1	182.3
3		2019	168.0	158.6	170.1	183.4
4	5.1.3.1.2 Transmission Maintenance	2017	167.3	161.7	169.7	179.7
5		2018	176.6	164.7	181.7	202.7
6		2019	178.1	166.2	183.3	204.5
7	5.1.3.1.3 Agency Services General & Administrative	2017	83.4	77.7	82.7	87.2
8		2018	93.9	81.1	92.4	102.6
9		2019	95.6	82.5	94.1	104.4
10	5.1.3.1.4 Interest on Long-Term Debt Issued to the U.S. Treasury	2017	140.9	140.7	140.9	141.2
11		2018	101.0	99.6	101.0	103.0
12		2019	106.6	103.8	106.6	110.5
13	5.1.3.1.5 Transmission Engineering	2017	51.6	47.0	51.6	56.3
14		2018	56.4	46.4	56.5	66.8
15		2019	57.7	47.6	57.9	68.4

Table 8: Transmission Risk Mitigation Summary Statistics
[Dollars in millions]

	A	B	C	D
1	Two-Year TPP	99.99%		
		FY 2017	FY 2018	FY 2019
2	PNRR	\$0.0	\$0.0	\$0.0
3	CRAC Frequency	0%	0%	0%
4	Expected Value CRAC Revenue	\$0	\$0	\$0
5	RDC Frequency	0%	0.2%	17%
6	Expected Value RDC Payout	\$0	\$0.1	\$17
7	Treasury Deferral Frequency	0%	0%	0%
8	Expected Value Treasury Deferral	\$0	\$0	\$0
9	Exp. Value End-of-Year Net Reserves	\$413	\$398	\$366
10	Net Reserves, 5th percentile	\$393	\$351	\$247
11	Net Reserves, 25th percentile	\$404	\$379	\$341
12	Net Reserves, 50th percentile	\$412	\$399	\$372
13	Net Reserves, 75th percentile	\$421	\$418	\$402
14	Net Reserves, 95th percentile	\$436	\$446	\$444

Table 9: Transmission CRAC Annual Thresholds and Caps
[Dollars in millions]

<i>ACNR Calculated Near End of Fiscal Year</i>	<i>CRAC Applied to Fiscal Year</i>	<i>Threshold Measured in ACNR</i>	<i>Threshold Measured in Reserves for Risk</i>	<i>Maximum CRAC Amount (Cap)</i>
2017	2018	(\$249)	\$99	\$100
2018	2019	(\$212)	\$99	\$100

Table 10: Transmission RDC Thresholds and Caps
[Dollars in millions]

<i>ACNR Calculated Near End of Fiscal Year</i>	<i>RDC Applied to Fiscal Year</i>	<i>Threshold Measured in ACNR</i>	<i>Threshold Measured in Reserves for Risk</i>	<i>Maximum RDC Amount (Cap)</i>
2017	2018	(\$150)	\$199	\$200
2018	2019	(\$113)	\$199	\$200

Table 11: Power Days Cash and Financial Reserves Thresholds

	<i>(\$ in thousands)</i>	A	B
1		FY 2018	FY 2019
2	TOTAL EXPENSES	2,705,577	2,766,946
3	less		
4	NET INTEREST EXPENSE	95,571	100,151
5	DEPRECIATION	144,092	144,065
6	AMORTIZATION	86,796	87,458
7	NON-FEDERAL DEBT SERVICE	490,562	420,704
8	CONTRACTED POWER PURCHASES	100,634	99,621
9	Sum of rows 4-8	917,655	851,999
10	Operating Expenses (row 2 less row 9)	1,787,922	1,914,946
11	Operating Expenses divided by 365 (row 10/365)	4,898	5,246
12	Rate period average (average of row 11 column A and B)	5,072	
13	Lower Financial Reserves Threshold (row 12 * 60)	304,345	
14	30 days cash on hand (row 12 * 30)	152,173	
15	Upper Financial Reserves Threshold (row 12 * 120)	608,691	

Table 12: Transmission Days Cash and Financial Reserves Thresholds

	(\$ in thousands)	A	B
1		FY 2018	FY 2019
2	TOTAL EXPENSES	1,027,204	1,051,440
3	less		
4	NET INTEREST EXPENSE	148,208	164,117
5	DEPRECIATION & AMORTIZATION	273,164	284,422
6	NON-FEDERAL DEBT SERVICE	0	0
7	CONTRACTED POWER PURCHASES	0	0
8	Sum of rows 4-7	421,370	448,541
9	Operating Expenses (row 2 less row 8)	605,833	602,901
10	Operating Expenses divided by 365 (row 9/365)	1,660	1,652
11	Rate period average (average of row 10 column A and B)	1,656	
12	Lower Financial Reserves Threshold (row 11 * 60)	99,348	
13	30 days cash on hand (row 11 * 30)	49,674	
14	Upper Financial Reserves Threshold (row 11 * 120)	198,696	

Figure 1: Monthly Average Mid-C Prices for Market Price Run for FY 2018 and FY 2019




Figure 2: Monthly Average Mid-C Prices for Critical Water Run for FY 2018 and FY 2019

